Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc., Supreme Court Case No. 17SA77

• Decision Date: 05 March 2018
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 17SA77
• Citation: 414 P.3d 700
• Parties: Adolfo HERNANDEZ, Rogelio Flores-Escobar, Francisco Silva-Garcia, Martin Perez-Medel, Gustavo Arellano-Olmos, Luis Leon-Salinas, and Manuel Morales, Plaintiffs, v. RAY DOMENICO FARMS, INC. ; Gregory L. Domenico; and Theresa M. Domenico, Defendants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

414 P.3d 700

Adolfo HERNANDEZ, Rogelio Flores-Escobar, Francisco Silva-Garcia, Martin Perez-Medel, Gustavo Arellano-Olmos, Luis Leon-Salinas, and Manuel Morales, Plaintiffs,

v.RAY DOMENICO FARMS, INC. ; Gregory L. Domenico; and Theresa M. Domenico, Defendants.

Supreme Court Case No. 17SA77

Supreme Court of Colorado.

March 5, 2018

Rehearing Denied April 9, 2018

Attorneys for Plaintiffs: The Kelman Buescher Firm, Andrew H. Turner, Ashley K. Boothby, Denver, Colorado, Colorado Legal Services: Migrant Farm Workers Division, Jenifer Rodriguez, Matthew Baca, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendants: The Litigation Boutique LLC, Leah P. VanLandschoot Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Civil Justice League: Husch Blackwell LLP, Christopher L. Ottele, Sonia Anderson, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Southern Poverty Law Center, Farmworker Justice, El Centro Humanitario Para Los Trabajadores, and Plaintiff Employment Lawyers Association: Law Office of David Lichtenstein, LLC, David Lichtenstein, Matt Molinaro, Kristina Rosett, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HART delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We accepted jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21.1 to answer a certified question of law from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado regarding how far back in time a terminated employee's unpaid wage claims can reach under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, §§ 8-4-101 to - 123, C.R.S. (2017). Answering this question requires us to examine the interaction among three provisions of the law. Under section 8-4-103 ("section 103"), employers must pay employees at regular intervals during their employment. Section 8-4-109 ("section 109") requires employers to pay employees upon termination for unpaid wages or compensation. Under the Wage Claim Act's statute of limitations, "all actions" must be commenced within two years (three for willful violations), "and not after that time." § 8-4-122, C.R.S. (2017). The certified question asks:

Does Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-109(1)(a) permit a terminated employee to sue for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the employee's employment, even when the statute of limitations ( Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-122 ) has run on the cause of action the employee could have brought for those unpaid wages under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-103(1)(a) ?

We hold that under the plain language of section 109, an employee may seek any wages or compensation that were unpaid at the time of termination; however, the right to seek such wages or compensation is subject to the statute of limitations. That statute of limitations begins to run when the wages or compensation first become due and payable and thus limits a terminated employee to claims for the two (or three) years immediately preceding termination. Thus, we answer the certified question in the negative.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 Defendant Ray Domenico Farms, Inc.¹ grows organic vegetables in Platteville, Colorado. Plaintiffs are three year-round and four seasonal migrant workers who had been previously employed by Domenico Farms from as far back as 1992. All of the Plaintiffs were paid by the hour, and allege that they never received overtime pay during their employment with Domenico Farms. While agricultural workers are generally exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act's ("FLSA") overtime requirements, see generally 29 C.F.R. pt. 780 (2017), Plaintiffs allege that they performed non-agricultural tasks in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours. Thus, Plaintiffs allege that they were entitled to overtime wages under the FLSA for those weeks. See 29 C.F.R. § 780.11 (2017) ("Where an employee in the same workweek performs work which is exempt under one section of the Act and also engages in work to which the Act applies but is not exempt under some other section of the Act, he is not exempt that week, and the wage and hour requirements of the Act are applicable."). The four seasonal-worker Plaintiffs also allege that they were denied the Adverse Effect Wage Rate hourly wages they should have received under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"). In January 2016, several of the Plaintiffs wrote a letter to Defendants in which they asserted that they had not been properly paid wages under both of these federal laws. By April 2016, all of the Plaintiffs had been terminated.

¶ 3 Plaintiffs brought suit in July 2016 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging, in pertinent part, violations of the FLSA, the AWPA, and the Colorado Wage Claim Act ("the Act"). The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether section 109 allows a terminated employee to seek all wages that have been unpaid during the employment—even those that might seem to be time-barred because they became due and payable more than two (or three) years earlier. Judge William J. Martinez concluded that, as there are "at least two plausible interpretations of section 109" and the outcome of the decision was "of enormous importance" to employers and employees in Colorado, it was appropriate to sua sponte certify the question to this court. We accepted jurisdiction.

II. Analysis

¶ 4 Plaintiffs argue that, under section 109 of the Act, employees are entitled to seek any unpaid wages or compensation earned during the course of their employment, as the statute of limitations begins to run on their section 109 claim only upon the termination of the employment relationship. The section 109 claim, they argue, revives a terminated employee's right to seek unpaid wages that he would be time-barred from receiving if he were still employed and bringing a suit under section 103. Defendant argues that section 109 allows a terminated employee to collect wages only due as part of the final paycheck. Neither of these arguments is consistent with the statutory language and structure. We agree that the plain language of section 109 allows employees to seek both the wages or compensation that only become due and payable at the end of the employment and those that had previously become due and payable. However, we cannot agree that section 109 allows Plaintiffs to resurrect claims for wages that were time-barred as of the date of termination.

A. Standard of Review and Canons of Construction

¶ 5 Under Appellate Rule 21.1, this court may answer questions of Colorado law as to which it appears we have not issued controlling precedent when those questions are certified to us from a federal court. C.A.R. 21.1. We conduct our review of such questions de novo. Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 323, 326 (Colo. 2003).

¶ 6 In interpreting the language of the Act, we are guided by familiar principles. Our fundamental duty in construing statutes is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. E.g., Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 327 (Colo. 2004). We look first to the plain language of the statute; if it is clear and unambiguous, then we look no further and "apply the statute as written." Id. (quoting In re 2000–2001 Dist. Grand Jury, 97 P.3d 921, 924 (Colo. 2004) ). In so doing, we must consider the statute in its entirety, giving "harmonious and sensible effect to all its parts." Leonard, 63 P.3d at 326. In construing statutes of limitation, we attempt to interpret them "consistent with their purposes of promoting justice, avoiding unnecessary delay, and preventing the litigation of stale claims." Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1052 (Colo. 2004).

B. Section 109 Allows Former Employees to Seek Previously Unpaid Wages

¶ 7 As an initial matter, we must first determine what sorts of wages may be sought under section 109. Phrased differently, does section 109 refer only to wages that would be included in the "last paycheck," or may former employees use it to seek other wages that previously went unpaid and that could have been sought during employment under section 103? Plaintiffs argue that there are no words of limitation in section 109 to restrict former employees from seeking previously unpaid wages. Defendant argues that section 103 and section 109 govern two mutually exclusive sets of wages and compensation. Based on the Act's plain language, we agree with Plaintiffs on this initial point: terminated employees are not limited under section 109 to only those wages or compensation that become due and payable upon separation, but may seek prior earned-yet-unpaid wages or compensation as well.²

¶ 8 Mindful that we must read the Act as a coherent whole, we begin by looking to the plain language of section 109. Section 109(1)(a) provides in pertinent part: "When an interruption in the employer–employee relationship by volition of the employer occurs, the wages or compensation for labor or service earned, vested, determinable, and unpaid at the time of such discharge is [sic] due and payable immediately." The Act defines "wages or compensation" as:

(I) All amounts for labor or service performed by employees, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by the standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of calculating the same or whether the labor or service is performed under contract, subcontract, partnership, subpartnership, station plan, or other agreement for the performance of labor or service if the labor or service to be paid for is performed personally by the person demanding payment. No amount is considered to be wages or compensation until such amount is earned, vested, and determinable, at which time such amount shall be payable to the employee pursuant to this article.

(II) Bonuses or commissions earned for labor or services performed in accordance with the terms of any agreement between an employer and employee;

(III) Vacation pay earned in accordance with the terms of any agreement. If an employer provides paid vacation for an employee, the employer shall pay upon separation from employment all vacation pay earned and determinable in accordance with

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