Morrison v. Goff

• Decision Date: 14 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03SC116.,03SC116.
• Citation: 91 P.3d 1050
• Parties: Cory A. MORRISON, Petitioner v. Richard J. GOFF, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

91 P.3d 1050

Cory A. MORRISON, Petitioner v. Richard J. GOFF, Respondent.

No. 03SC116.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 14, 2004.

Cory A. Morrison, pro se, Denver, Colorado.

Richard J. Goff, pro se, Littleton, Colorado.

Melat, Pressman & Higbie, LLP, Alan Higbie, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association.

Montgomery, Little & McGrew, P.C., David C. Little, Christopher B. Little, Englewood, Colorado, White & Steele, John M. Palmeri, Franz Hardy, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Bar Association.

Justice MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this legal malpractice action, Petitioner Cory A. Morrison appeals the court of appeals' decision affirming summary judgment in favor of Respondent Richard J. Goff. The court of appeals held that the statute of limitations for negligence actions barred Morrison's claims. We must decide whether in a legal malpractice action brought by a criminal defendant, the statute of limitations is tolled while the defendant pursues appellate or postconviction relief in the underlying criminal proceeding.¹ We hold that a criminal defendant's direct appeal or action for postconviction relief does not toll the statute of limitations for the defendant's related legal malpractice action. Instead, a defendant must file the malpractice action within two years of discovering the cause of action and the resulting injury, and may seek a stay pending the resolution of the criminal case.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In 1996, Goff represented Morrison in a criminal action. After a trial, Morrison was convicted and sentenced. In 1997, Morrison filed a formal complaint with the Office of Supreme Court Disciplinary Counsel² alleging several deficiencies in Goff's representation.³ As a result, Goff was later suspended from the practice of law. See Goff v. People, 35 P.3d 487 (Colo.O.P.D.J.2000).

In 1998, the court of appeals affirmed Morrison's conviction. People v. Morrison, 985 P.2d 1 (Colo.App.1999) (announced as non-published on Nov. 19, 1998, and later selected for official publication). Morrison then filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief, arguing that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2001, the trial court in that case granted Morrison's motion, vacated his conviction, and ordered a new trial.

In September 1999, while his Crim. P. 35(c) motion was pending, Morrison filed a civil action for professional negligence against Goff, with allegations similar to those contained in his letter to the discipline office. Upon Goff's motion, the trial court granted summary judgment in Goff's favor, holding that the statute of limitations barred Morrison's action. The trial court concluded that Morrison knew of Goff's negligence when he filed a disciplinary complaint against Goff in May of 1997. Therefore, the trial court reasoned, Morrison filed the action more than two years after he knew of Goff's negligence and the resulting injury and thus after the statute of limitations had elapsed. See §§ 13-80-102(1), 13-80-108(1), 5 C.R.S. (2003).

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order, holding that the statute of limitations barred Morrison's action. See Morrison v. Goff, 74 P.3d 409, 413 (Colo.App. 2003). The court of appeals rejected Morrison's argument that the statute of limitations for his malpractice action was tolled until he obtained postconviction relief. See id. at 412-13. Instead, it concluded that a criminal defendant with a pending claim for postconviction relief must file and preserve a related malpractice claim within the statute of limitations period. See id. Thus, the court of appeals held that the statute of limitations barred Morrison's claim because he brought it more than two years after he discovered the cause of action. See id.

II. Standard of Review and Principles of Interpretation

We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Ryder v. Mitchell, 54 P.3d 885, 889 (Colo.2002). We construe statutes of limitations like any other statute by attempting to "ascertain and effectuate" the General Assembly's intent. Hersh Cos. v. Highline Village Assocs., 30 P.3d 221, 223 (Colo.2001). Thus, we attempt to interpret statutes of limitations consistent with their purposes of promoting justice, avoiding unnecessary delay, and preventing the litigation of stale claims. Id.

III. Analysis

We now examine the effect of an action for appellate or postconviction relief on the statute of limitations for a related malpractice claim brought by a criminal defendant. At the outset, we note the narrowness of the question before us. We are only asked to examine the relationship between wrongful conviction claims and the statute of limitations for malpractice actions. We do not address the question of whether a criminal defendant must first obtain appellate or postconviction relief to prevail in a related malpractice claim, because Morrison has already obtained postconviction relief.⁴ We first provide background to statutes of limitations, as well as the principles of accrual and tolling. We then explain that jurisdictions have reached different conclusions regarding the effect of actions for appellate or postconviction relief on the statute of limitations for related malpractice claims. After outlining the various approaches and the justifications for each, we conclude that the statute of limitations for professional malpractice is not tolled while a defendant seeks appellate or postconviction relief. Instead, a criminal defendant must file a related malpractice action within two years of discovering the cause of action and the resulting injury. In such cases, trial courts have discretion to grant a stay in the malpractice action pending the resolution of the criminal case.

A. The Statute of Limitations in Colorado for Negligence Actions: Accrual and Tolling

In Colorado, the statute of limitations bars negligence actions brought more than two years after the action accrues.⁵ § 13-80-102(1). To determine when an action accrues, the General Assembly has adopted a form of the "discovery rule," which states that an action accrues "on the date both the injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence." § 13-80-108(1); see also Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 530-31, 474 P.2d 603, 606 (1970). When Colorado courts applied this rule to legal malpractice actions, they explained that such actions accrue when plaintiffs learn "facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of the general nature of damage and that the damage was caused by the wrongful conduct of an attorney." Broker House Int'l, Ltd. v. Bendelow, 952 P.2d 860, 863 (Colo.App.1998); see also Morris v. Geer, 720 P.2d 994, 997 (Colo.App. 1986).

Tolling is a principle independent from accrual. The tolling of a statute of limitations will either "delay the start of the limitations period" or suspend the running of the limitations period if the accrual date has passed. 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 169 (2000); see also Thurman v. Tafoya, 895 P.2d 1050, 1054 n. 5 (Colo.1995). Courts apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to suspend a statute of limitations period when "flexibility is required to accomplish the goals of justice." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Garrett v. Arrowhead Improvement Ass'n, 826 P.2d 850, 853 (Colo. 1992)). For example, we have tolled the statute of limitations when plaintiffs did not timely file their claims because of "extraordinary circumstances" or because defendants' wrongful conduct prevented them from doing so. Id. at 1096-97.

Thus, through two separate principles, accrual and tolling provide courts with tools to prevent statutes of limitations from expiring and barring claims. Courts have reached opposite conclusions as to whether these principles may prevent the statute of limitations from running for malpractice actions brought by criminal defendants when these defendants await appellate or postconviction relief.

B. Courts' Differing Interpretations

Courts have differed as to the effect of actions for appellate or postconviction relief on the statute of limitations for a related malpractice action brought by a criminal defendant. Some courts have opted for a bright-line rule under which statutes of limitations for the malpractice actions do not begin to run until a criminal defendant is exonerated through appellate or postconviction relief. Other courts have concluded that criminal defendants' actions for appellate or postconviction relief do not affect the statutes of limitations for related malpractice actions. These courts have required criminal defendants to file malpractice actions while actions for appellate or postconviction relief are pending. We outline these approaches and their justifications below, and ultimately adopt the latter approach.

1. Bright-line Rule to Determine When Statutes of Limitations Commence

Some jurisdictions have adopted a bright-line rule to resolve when the statute of limitations begins to run for malpractice actions brought by criminal defendants simultaneously seeking appellate or postconviction relief.⁶ These jurisdictions have concluded either that malpractice actions do not accrue or that statutes of limitations are tolled until defendants receive appellate or postconviction relief. These courts have cited concerns of judicial efficiency and fairness to criminal defendants to support their position.

Most jurisdictions that tie the running of the statute of limitations for malpractice actions to appellate or postconviction relief have concluded that malpractice actions only begin to accrue, and therefore statutes of limitations begin to run, when a defendant receives such relief. See Noske v. Friedberg, 670 N.W.2d 740, 746 (Minn.2003); Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556, 559-66 (1993); see also Steele v. Kehoe, ...