Hernandez v. State
Decision Date | 30 March 2017 |
Docket Number | NUMBER 13-14-00245-CR |
Citation | 533 S.W.3d 472 |
Parties | Hector Vargas HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Hon. Fabian Guerrero, Edinburg, for Appellant.
Hon. Luis V. Saenz, Dist. Atty., Hon. Jennifer M. Avendano, Asst. Dist. Atty., Brownsville, for Appellee.
Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Hector Vargas Hernandez appeals his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, all first-degree felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02, 22.021 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). A jury returned a verdict of guilty and assessed punishment of forty years' imprisonment for continuous sexual abuse of a child and ten years' imprisonment for each count of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The trial court sentenced appellant accordingly and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. By three issues, appellant argues the trial court erred in (1) denying appellant's motion to suppress his statement, (2) denying appellant's request for a jury instruction under article 38.23 of the code of criminal procedure, and (3) "commenting and ordering the jury to go back and correct the verdict form." We affirm.
By his first issue, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress his confession. Specifically, appellant maintains that he was not adequately advised of his rights because the warnings read to him "contained four warnings rather [than] the five contemplated by Article 38.22." Appellant further argues that the "written admonishments in Spanish ... consisted of a fatally defective translation using the word 'supracitada' which is a Portuguese word[.]" As a result, appellant maintains that "his waiver [of his rights] was not voluntar[ily], knowing[ly] or intelligently given."1
Appellant's counsel argued during a pre-trial hearing that appellant's confession should be suppressed because "[appellant] was not properly instructed on his constitutional rights, and in the alternative, he didn't understand them." The State presented only one witness at the hearing—Alicia Garcia, an officer with the Harlingen Police Department.2
Officer Garcia, reading from a written form, advised appellant of his Miranda3 rights in Spanish prior to questioning him. The warnings provided to appellant were as follows:4
Appellant initialed next to each of the enumerated rights and signed at the bottom of the written form. Appellant told Officer Garcia that he understood his rights. He then stated The written warnings, appellant's video-recorded statement, and the English translation of appellant's recorded statement were admitted into evidence.
Following Officer Garcia's testimony, appellant's counsel presented further argument that appellant "was not informed properly of his rights [.]" Specifically, appellant's counsel objected to the use of the word "supracitada" in the following sentence: "El Codigo determina que el oficial que toma la declaracion del acusado debe darle la advertencia supracitada." The court interpreter informed the trial court on the record that "if we separate the word 'supra citada,' it means 'aforementioned.' " The interpreter translated the sentence in its entirety as reading, "The Code determines that the officer who takes the defendant's declarations must give him the aforementioned warnings." Appellant's counsel clarified that he was not arguing that appellant did not understand each individual right that was read to him. He was arguing only that "supracitada" is not a word in the Spanish language, and therefore, "[appellant's] rights were incorrectly given to him." The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress.
At a subsequent pre-trial hearing, appellant's counsel urged the following additional ground for suppression of appellant's statement:
I'd ask the Court to take note that the Spanish version of my client's rights being entered into evidence as part of that hearing do not comply with Article 38.22. And given that there are five particular rights, which my client is supposed to receive before his statement is to be used as evidence, this waiver of rights only has four lineated rights. What this waiver did was combine ... rights that are supposed to be read to my client, and because of that, I'm asking that my client's statement not be allowed and used as evidence in this proceeding.
The trial court again denied appellant's motion to suppress, and later issued the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:5
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress statements made as a result of custodial interrogation, we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 78–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ); Nelson v. State, 463 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref'd). We review the ruling in light of the totality of the circumstances, giving total deference to the trial court on questions of historical fact, as well as its application of law to fact questions that turn on credibility and demeanor. Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 79 ; Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). But we review de novo the trial court's rulings on questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact that do not depend on credibility determinations. Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 79 ; Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349. We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and reverse the judgment only if it lies outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Hereford v. State, 339 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ; Nelson, 463 S.W.3d at 126.
Appellant argues that the warnings administered to him prior to questioning did not comply with article 38.22 of the code of criminal procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
"In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court crafted safeguards to protect this 'privilege against self-incrimination' in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations." Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 75 (citing Miranda v....
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