Herrera v. Courtney
| Decision Date | 18 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | 1 CA-CV 12-0104 |
| Parties | ANNIE HERRERA, individually and on behalf of all statutory beneficiaries of Decedent, Herman Herrera, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. KENT COURTNEY, EMT and JANE DOE COURTNEY, husband and wife; PEABODY WESTERN COAL COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; PEABODY ENERGY CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
(Not for publication - Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure)
The Honorable Ralph E. Hatch, Judge
Grysen & Associates
By B. Elliot Grysen
Spring Lake, MI
And
Law Office of Scott E. Boehm, P.C.
By Scott E. Boehm
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Phoenix
Broening Oberg Woods & Wilson, P.C.
By James R. Broening
Thomas Scott King
Mark R. Hill
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Courtney
Phoenix
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.
By Paul J. Giancola
Craig A. Logsdon
Martha E. Gibbs
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees Peabody Western Coal Company
and Peabody Energy Corporation
Phoenix
¶1 Plaintiff/Appellant Annie Herrera, individually and on behalf of all statutory beneficiaries of Herman Herrera, appeals the superior court's judgment dismissing her complaint against Defendants/Appellees Peabody Western Coal Company, Peabody Energy Corporation (collectively "Peabody"), and Kent Courtney for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue is whether our workers' compensation law bars a civil action against an employer based on allegedly negligent medical treatment at a company-run clinic: (1) for a condition unrelated to work; (2) when the clinic and services were available on the same terms and conditions to non-employees; and (3) when the employee went to the clinic because it was the only clinic available for treatment. We conclude the injury did not arise out of or occur in the course of employment. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint.
¶2 Peabody Western operates the Kayenta Mine, a coal mine located on the Navajo and Hopi Reservations about thirty miles southwest of Kayenta. Peabody Western offers a free medical clinic, staffed by a paramedic, at the mine complex. The clinic is not usually staffed after business hours, but when the clinic is closed, employees and others may obtain medical assistance by contacting the on-duty paramedic at the clinic crew quarters. Although the clinic was established to provide first aid and emergency services for Peabody Western employees, the clinic also serves non-employees who live in the area. At oral argument in this Court, Peabody and Courtney also conceded that any member of the public who sought emergency treatment at the clinic or crew quarters after hours would be treated on the same terms as a Peabody Western employee. It was undisputed that the clinic is the only medical clinic within nineteen miles for treating emergencies.
¶3 Peabody Western employed Herman at the Kayenta Mine. Herman and his wife, Annie, lived on the Navajo Reservation within the area leased to the mine.
¶4 Herman worked the day shift on July 24, 2008, and clocked out at 4:23 p.m. That evening after dinner, he began feeling ill and went to the Peabody Western medical clinic. Courtney, an emergency medical technician, was on call thatnight for after-hours care. He examined Herman at the crew quarters and administered aspirin. Later that night, Herman collapsed at his home. Family summoned Courtney, who responded to the home and attempted to stabilize Herman, then transported him to meet an ambulance from Kayenta so he could be taken to a hospital. Herman later died from a heart attack.
¶5 Annie filed this action for wrongful death, alleging Courtney negligently treated Herman. Peabody Western and Courtney moved to dismiss, arguing the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Arizona's Workers' Compensation Act, Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 23-901 through 23-1091 (1995 & Supp. 2012)1 ("the Act"), provided Annie's exclusive remedy. The court granted Annie's request for additional time, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), to conduct discovery regarding whether workers' compensation coverage applied to Herman's injury. Thereafter, the parties submitted additional evidence regarding the jurisdictional issue.
¶6 Annie argued Herman's injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment pursuant to A.R.S. § 23-1021(A) (1995) and thus was not compensable under the workers' compensation scheme. She also urged the court to apply the dualcapacity doctrine, which allows an employee who is otherwise subject to the exclusive remedy of workers' compensation to sue in tort when he is injured while in a relationship with the employer that is the same as any other member of the public. The court granted the motion to dismiss, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Annie's exclusive remedy was workers' compensation.2 Annie timely appealed.
¶7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2012).
¶8 Annie argues the superior court erred as a matter of law by ruling that her claims are barred by the exclusivity provision of Arizona's Workers' Compensation Act. Annie, as the plaintiff, had the burden to demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction. Swichtenberg v. Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 82, 828 P.2d 1218, 1223 (App. 1991). "Where jurisdictional fact issues are not intertwined with fact issues raised by a plaintiff's claim on the merits, the resolution of those jurisdictional fact issues is for the trial court." Id. In resolving such issues the court may consider affidavits, depositions, and exhibitswithout converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. Id. We view the record in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court's ruling and will infer any necessary findings reasonably supported by the evidence, but review the court's ultimate legal conclusion de novo. Id.
¶9 Arizona's Workers' Compensation Act grants the Industrial Commission of Arizona exclusive jurisdiction over claims for injuries arising out of and sustained in the course of employment. Rios v. Indus. Comm'n, 120 Ariz. 374, 376, 586 P.2d 219, 221 (App. 1978); see also A.R.S. § 23-1021(A).3 The Act thus bars employees to whom it affords coverage from suing their employer or co-employees for accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. A.R.S. § 23-1022(A) (1995) ().4 Annie argues that because Herman's injury did not arise out of or during the course of his employment, the Act does not constitute her exclusive remedy against Peabody Western or Courtney.
¶10 For an injury to "arise out of" employment, the cause producing the injury must flow or originate from a source within the employment; i.e., the source of the injury "must have its situs in some risk" incidental to the employment duties so that we can say there is some causal relation between the employment and the injury. Royall v. Indus. Comm'n, 106 Ariz. 346, 349, 476 P.2d 156, 159 (1970) (citation omitted).5 In contrast, the inquiry regarding whether an injury was sustained "in the course of" the employment focuses on the time, place, and circumstances under which it occurred. Id. Thus, an injury occurs in thecourse of employment if the employee is injured when he or she was doing what the employee "may reasonably do within a time during which [the employee] is employed and at a place where [the employee] may reasonably be during that time." Id. (citation omitted). The "arising out of" and "in the course of" tests are not independent, but are both parts of a single test of work connection known as the "quantum theory" of work connection. Noble v. Indus. Comm'n, 188 Ariz. 48, 50, 52-53, 932 P.2d 804, 806, 808-09 (App. 1996) (). Ultimately, "[w]hether an activity is related to the claimant's employment . . . will depend upon the totality of the circumstances." Finnegan v. Indus. Comm'n, 157 Ariz. 108, 110, 755 P.2d 413, 415 (1988).
¶11 We agree with Annie that Herman's risk of negligence by Courtney did not arise out of his employment because there was no causal connection between Herman's employment by Peabody Western and Courtney's allegedly negligent medical treatment. The Massachusetts Court of Appeals' decision in Case of Hicks, 820 N.E.2d 826 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005), is especially helpful to our analysis. There, a health care technician for a hospitalobtained a flu shot in the lobby of the hospital on her lunch hour. Hicks, 820 N.E.2d at 828. The hospital was offering such shots free of charge to employees and the general public. Id. She later had an adverse reaction to the shot and ultimately became blind from the reaction. Id. at 828-29. The employee filed a workers' compensation claim and the hospital conceded that the injury occurred in the course of her employment, but argued that it did not arise out of her employment. Id. at 833. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the injury arose out of her employment because the activity, receipt of the flu shot, was not a purely personal activity, but an incident of employment. Id. at 835. The court reasoned that her getting the shot on the hospital premises was consistent with her status as a health care worker providing...
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