Hibner v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.
| Citation | 619 S.W.2d 109 |
| Parties | Mary Evelyn HIBNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY and McKendree Manor, Inc., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Decision Date | 27 July 1981 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Bart Durham, Nashville, for plaintiff-appellant.
William C. Moody and William A. Moody, Moody & Moody, Nashville, for defendants-appellants.
In this appeal of a worker's compensation action, the controlling issue is whether or not the employee's action is barred by the one year statute of limitations set forth in T.C.A. §§ 50-1003 and 50-1017. The chancellor concluded that the action was not barred and awarded the employee disability benefits, but denied her recovery of medical expenses on the ground that the expenses had been paid by "a third party source." Both the employee and the employer appealed, the employee seeking recovery of medical expenses and the employer taking issue with the trial judge's finding on the issue of the statute of limitations. The parties now agree that the employee is entitled to recover medical expenses incurred in treating her injury in the event her claim for benefits is not barred by the statute of limitations. Of course, if the employee's action is barred, the judgment in favor of the employee must be set aside and the case dismissed.
The accident upon which Mrs. Hibner bases her claim occurred on April 27, 1977. Suit was filed on February 13, 1980, some two years and ten months after the accident. The employer insists the statute of limitations began to run on April 27, 1977, the date Mrs. Hibner injured her back. On the other hand, Mrs. Hibner insists that her disability did not manifest itself in any way until May, 1979, and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that date.
The determination of the time the statute of limitations begins to run often is troublesome, not from the standpoint of what triggers the running of the statute but from a factual standpoint. It is now settled that the date the employee's disability manifests itself to a person of reasonable diligence, not the date of the accident, triggers the statute of limitations. Davidson & Graham Const. Co. v. McKee, 562 S.W.2d 426 (Tenn.1978); Norton Co. v. Coffin, 553 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn.1977); Union Carbide Corp., Food Prod. Div. v. Cannon, 523 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn.1975); Imperial Shirt Corporation v. Jenkins, 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966); Griffitts v. Humphrey, 199 Tenn. 528, 288 S.W.2d 1 (1955).
The facts in this case are not in material dispute. The record shows that Mrs. Hibner immediately notified her employer of the accident of April 27, 1977. She was examined by the "in-house" doctor, who advised self-treatment by heat packs.
In May, 1977, Mrs. Hibner was seen on two occasions by Dr. Vincent R. Couden, an orthopedic specialist, who concluded that Mrs. Hibner's injury was "probably muscular in nature." He told Mrs. Hibner her problem was not serious and that she could continue to work but not to do "heavy duties" for a while. She followed his advice and worked regularly.
In September, 1977, Mrs. Hibner's work assignment was changed from that of a nurse's aide to an assistant activities coordinator, charged with arranging activities for the patients. The new job was not as taxing physically as the old, but did require Mrs. Hibner to clean and vacuum the dining hall and patient's room whenever the patients celebrated special occasions.
In February, 1978, Mrs. Hibner returned to Dr. Couden for treatment, complaining of intermittent back pain. Dr. Couden diagnosed her trouble as "recurrent back strain," treated her by the use of antiinflammatory drugs, and instructed her to continue to work. She did so.
Mrs. Hibner next sought medical treatment on April 27, 1979. At that time she complained of pain extending from her back into her hip and the calf of her leg. The examination by Dr. Couden revealed for the first time objective symptoms of nerve root involvement. His tentative diagnosis was confirmed by a myelogram examination, and Mrs. Hibner underwent surgery on May 18, 1979, for the removal of a ruptured disc.
Dr. Couden expressed the...
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...suit against Mr. Earthman in March 1994. Statute of limitations defenses can be factually troublesome. See Hibner v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 619 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tenn.1981). Accordingly, the jury should normally decide whether a defendant should be prevented from asserting a statute of l......
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Johnson v. McKee Foods Corporation, No. E2003-02899-WC-R3-CV (TN 10/12/2004)
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