Norton Co. v. Coffin
Decision Date | 25 July 1977 |
Citation | 553 S.W.2d 751 |
Parties | NORTON COMPANY and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellants, v. William E. COFFIN, Appellee. 553 S.W.2d 751 |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Thomas, Leitner, Mann, Warner & Owens, Chattanooga, for appellants.
Walter L. Lusk, Lusk, Smith & Heck, Chattanooga, for appellee.
This is a workmen's compensation case.
The employer, Norton Company, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, appeal from the decree of the trial court awarding benefits to the employee. We are to determine whether or not the trial court erred in concluding that the action was not barred by the one year statute of limitations, T.C.A., § 50-1003, and that the plaintiff, employee, had complied with the notice requirements of T.C.A., § 50-1001.
Plaintiff was, at all times material to this case, the manager of Norton Company's plant in Chattanooga and was its highest ranking official there. His superiors were in Ohio. Liberty Mutual insured Norton's workmen's compensation liability.
Mr. Coffin, plaintiff, received an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on April 23, 1970, when he "hopped down" from a 32 wall onto a concrete slab floor while inspecting a construction project on the employer's plant property in Chattanooga. He immediately felt a sharp pain in his left hip but did not consider it to be of any serious moment. He was bothered by pain in the hip area off and on, and sought the aid of a chiropractor on June 5, 1970, who diagnosed his problem as a recurrence of a "whiplash" injury suffered about ten years earlier. He continued to be treated by the chiropractor for about six months until, finally, on June 8, 1971, he sought the aid of Dr. Shelton and Dr. Frye, orthopedic surgeons in Chattanooga. From them he learned that he had suffered a hairline fracture of the head of the left femur in the episode of April 23, 1970, which had resulted in avascular necrosis of the left hip joint. These physicians had the plaintiff to enter a hospital and to undergo traction and other therapy there from July 25, 1971, to July 30, 1971. He was required to use crutches from the the time of his release from the hospital until October 5, 1973.
Plaintiff was regularly treated by Drs. Shelton and Frye from June 8, 1971, until the time of trial of this case in 1976. However, he continued to perform his duties until the employer terminated his employment on January 18, 1974. He filed this suit on May 13, 1974, more than four years after the accident of April 23, 1970.
The applicable statute is T.C.A., § 50-1003, which provides:
Important gloss has been added to the statute by decisions of this Court, two of which are particularly pertinent here, viz., Imperial Shirt Corp. v. Jenkins, 217 Tenn. 602, 399 S.W.2d 757 (1966) and Fields v. Lowe Furniture Corp., 220 Tenn. 212, 415 S.W.2d 340 (1967).
Imperial Shirt is the first of several decisions establishing the rule that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended until by reasonable care and diligence it is discoverable and apparent that an injury compensable under the workmen's compensation laws has been sustained. Accord Murray Ohio Manufacturing Co. v. Vines, Tenn., 498 S.W.2d 897 (1973); Union Carbide Corp., Food Products Div. v. Cannon, Tenn., 523 S.W.2d 360 (1975).
Fields holds that "voluntary payments of compensation" by the employer or his insurer which will toll the running of the statute of limitations under the savings proviso of the statute may consist of the furnishing of medical services through physicians or others employed by the employer or his insurer and that, in such cases, the statute will not begin to run until such medical services are terminated, i. e., the date of the last services thus furnished, rather than the date of payment for such services. 1
Applying the statute as thus interpreted, we hold that the trial court was correct in concluding that this action is not barred by the statute of limitations. We do not agree with his conclusion that defendants are precluded from relying upon the limitations statute by reason of equitable estoppel; but, we do conclude that the evidence shows that the one year period of limitations had not run prior to the filing of this suit.
First, we find adequate evidence, above stated, to support the finding of the trial court that the statute did not begin to run until June 8, 1971, when plaintiff first "discovered" wit...
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...terminated, i.e., the date of the last services thus furnished, rather than the date of payment for such services. Norton Co. v. Coffin, 553 S.W.2d 751, 752-53 (Tenn.1977) (citing Fields v. Lowe Furniture Corp., 220 Tenn. 212, 415 S.W.2d 340, 343 (1967)); see also Bowen v. Frito-Lay, Inc., ......
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