Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I

• Decision Date: 17 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 68783-8.,68783-8.
• Citation: 23 P.3d 440,144 Wn.2d 172,144 Wash.2d 172
• Parties: Eleanor HILL, a single woman, Petitioner, v. BCTI INCOME FUND-I, a Washington limited partnership, d/b/a/ Business Computer Training Institute, a Washington corporation; John Doe and Jane Doe I-X, d/b/a BCTI Associates; Business Computer Training Institute, Inc., a corporation, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

23 P.3d 440

144 Wn.2d 172

144 Wash.2d 172

Eleanor HILL, a single woman, Petitioner, v. BCTI INCOME FUND-I, a Washington limited partnership, d/b/a/ Business Computer Training Institute, a Washington corporation; John Doe and Jane Doe I-X, d/b/a BCTI Associates; Business Computer Training Institute, Inc., a corporation, Respondents.

No. 68783-8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued October 17, 2000.

Decided May 17, 2001.

As Amended on Denial of Reconsideration July 17, 2001.

Jeffrey Lowell Needle, Michael Craig Subit, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington Employment Lawyers Association.

Keating, Bucklin & McCormack, Stewart Andrew Estes, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Washington Defense Trial Lawyers.

Krilich, La Porte, West & Lockner, Thomas Joseph West, Philip I. Brennan, Jr., Tacoma, for Petitioner.

Lane, Powell, Spears & Lubersky, Michael Barr King, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, Wayne W. Hansen, Seattle, for Respondents.

BRIDGE, J.

We are asked to clarify the evidentiary standard that a plaintiff with a chapter 49.60 RCW employment discrimination claim must meet to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals adopted the so-called "pretext-plus" standard, which was recently rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). We, too, reject the pretext-plus standard and thus vacate the Court of Appeals' opinion. We affirm its rulings in this case on different grounds.

FACTS

In August 1993, Randy Potter of the Business Computer Training Institute, Inc. (BCTI) hired Eleanor Hill, who was 53 years old at the time. She soon proved to be the top recruiter in BCTI's Tacoma Lacey marketing office. On January 14, 1994, Hill signed the following notice:

It is a policy of BCTI that an employee not discuss financial arrangements with any other employee[,] i.e. current salary, raises, problems with hours or commissions, and/or benefits. Doing so is grounds for immediate and automatic termination. If problems or questions arise[,] discuss them with your supervisor.

Def.'s Ex. 29. That month, Hill told her supervisors, Terry Clark and Potter, that she was interested in transferring to BCTI's Southcenter office, since she was moving to Seattle to live near her mother, who was ill and in her 80s. They assured her that such a transfer could be arranged. They took no action, however, explaining later that they did not construe her comments as a formal request for a transfer. Hill moved to Seattle in February 1994 and began commuting to her work in Tacoma. A recipient of social security benefits since 1988 for, inter alia, chronic asthma, Hill told Potter and Clark on several occasions over the next few months that she believed the commute was aggravating her asthma and that she needed to transfer offices.

On May 3, 1994, Hill was hospitalized for several days following a severe asthma attack. Hill's daughter called BCTI to inform the company that Hill had been hospitalized for asthma and Potter and Clark each called Hill at the hospital. She reiterated her desire for a transfer, and both supervisors promised to help arrange it, though neither took any action toward that end.

Hill was absent from work the rest of May, reportedly recuperating. During that time, she phoned Tammy Johnson, public relations supervisor at BCTI's Southcenter office, to ask if there were any job openings. "Not at this time," Hill was told, but "[k]eep in touch." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 131-32. On May 24, Hill carpooled with Southcenter office employees to BCTI's annual company-wide retreat in Port Townsend. On the way, Hill and Johnson discussed a possible office transfer. Johnson and Rose Medley, who was also present, later said under oath (1) that Hill had insisted she would transfer to the Southcenter office only if offered similar pay, hours, and benefits, and (2) that Hill had claimed she was already earning $8 an hour, working 40 hours a week, and receiving benefits. At the time, Hill was working part-time, for $7.50 an hour, without health care benefits. In a sworn deposition, Hill said she told Johnson she was making "$7.50 or $8, around that figure" at BCTI's Tacoma office and working "37, 35, 37 [hours], something along there" per week. RP at 184-85. But later, when asked at trial, "Did you tell the people at Southcenter then what you were making at Tacoma?" Hill responded under oath, "Never." RP at 138. Hill denied violating the company policy, having simply told Johnson that she "would have to make $8 an hour" and "have full-time and benefits" before she would agree to a transfer. RP at 137.

After the retreat, Hill followed-up with Johnson by phone and scheduled a job interview for the following week. On June 6, 1994, Hill returned to work and spoke with Potter. She requested a transfer to BCTI's Southcenter office, explaining that her asthma was making the commute unbearable. Under oath, Potter later claimed this was the first time Hill had formally requested a transfer. Potter promised Hill he would talk to Clark about it. The next day, Potter asked Hill whether it was true that she was already pursuing the transfer on her own and that she had disclosed her current salary and benefits to Johnson. Hill admitted doing the former after repeatedly—and unsuccessfully —asking Potter and Clark to arrange the transfer, but denied disclosing her terms of employment. On or about June 8, 1994, Potter and Clark met with Hill. When Hill repeated her earlier characterization of her conversations with Johnson, she was fired. Hill was given the following explanation for her termination: "Because you lied to us. You didn't tell us the truth." RP at 148. Neither Potter nor Clark was later able to recall any other instance when Hill's honesty was in doubt. The record indicates that Hill, an African-American, was replaced at BCTI by an African-American man and a Caucasian woman, both under age 40.

Hill brought this action against BCTI in Pierce County Superior Court, claiming she had been unlawfully fired because of age, race, and disability, in violation of chapter 49.60 RCW, Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).¹ At the close of Hill's case in chief, BCTI moved to dismiss all claims as a matter of law under CR 50. The court granted a directed verdict on Hill's disability-based claim, but permitted the two remaining claims to go to the jury. The jury rejected Hill's race-based claim, but found it more probable than not that BCTI had unlawfully fired her because of her age and awarded her $119,000 in damages. The court denied BCTI's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and awarded Hill costs and attorney fees.

BCTI appealed the jury verdict, and Hill cross-appealed the directed verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the latter, but set aside the jury's age discrimination verdict for insufficient evidence, relying on court rulings adopting the "pretext-plus" standard. Hill v. BCTI Income Fund-I, 97 Wash.App. 657, 661, 986 P.2d 137 (1999) (citing, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998)). After we granted review, the United States Supreme Court rejected the "pretext-plus" standard. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47,120 S.Ct. at 2108.

ANALYSIS

RCW 49.60.180(2) makes it unlawful for employers "[t]o discharge or bar any person from employment because of age, sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability." Because work-place discrimination is "a matter of state concern ... [that] threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state," RCW 49.60.010, the Legislature has mandated that WLAD provisions "shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof." RCW 49.60.020. While employers deserve protection from frivolous lawsuits and from jury verdicts not reasonably supported by evidence, courts must carefully consider all allegations of unlawful discrimination, since the WLAD "embodies a public policy of `the highest priority.'" Xieng v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 120 Wash.2d 512, 521, 844 P.2d 389 (1993) (quoting Allison v. Housing Auth., 118 Wash.2d 79, 86, 821 P.2d 34 (1991)).

Direct, "smoking gun" evidence of discriminatory animus is rare, since "[t]here will seldom be `eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes," United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), and "employers infrequently announce their bad motives orally or in writing." deLisle v. FMC Corp., 57 Wash. App. 79, 83, 786 P.2d 839 (1990). Consequently, it would be improper to require every plaintiff to produce "direct evidence of discriminatory intent." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1478. Courts have thus repeatedly stressed that "[c]ircumstantial, indirect and inferential evidence will suffice to discharge the plaintiffs burden." Sellsted v. Wash. Mut. Sav. Bank, 69 Wash.App. 852, 860, 851 P.2d 716, review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1018, 863 P.2d 1352 (1993). "Indeed, in discrimination cases it will seldom be otherwise ...." deLisle, 57 Wash.App. at 83, 786 P.2d 839.

Recognizing this reality, the United States Supreme Court established an evidentiary burden-shifting protocol in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to "compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "`The shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the "plaintiff [has] his [or her] day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence."...