Hill v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.
Decision Date | 28 June 2019 |
Docket Number | A19A0336 |
Citation | 351 Ga.App. 455,829 S.E.2d 193 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | HILL v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA et al. |
John M. Brown, John P. Batson, for appellant.
Morris Manning & Martin, Robert C. Threlkeld, Edgar D. Bueno, Anthony J. Cestaro ; Arnall Golden Gregory, Richard A. Mitchell, Samuel M. Lyddan, Aaron M. Danzig ; Coleman Talley, Annarita L. McGovern, for appellees.
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Irvan A. Pearlberg, Deputy Attorney General, Richard W. Tangum, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sara E. Vann, Kevin T. Gray, J. Felicia LeRay, Assistant Attorneys General, amici curiae.
Jennifer Hill filed this qui tam action to recover damages and civil penalties on behalf of the State of Georgia under the Georgia False Medicaid Claims Act, OCGA § 49-4-168, et seq. (the "GFMCA"), and for damages under the GFMCA and the Georgia Whistleblower Act, OCGA § 45-1-4 (the "Whistleblower Act"), for what she claims was retaliation against her. This appeal marks the second appearance of Hill's case before this Court,1 and she now challenges the trial court's dismissal of the claims alleged in her second amended complaint against the College of Dental Medicine Faculty Practice ("Faculty Practice"), MCG Health System, Inc. ("System"), and MCG Health, Inc. ("MCGHI") (collectively "Defendants"). Although the trial court properly dismissed Hill's claims arising out of allegedly false claims that Defendants submitted to the Georgia Medicaid program, we find that the trial court erred in dismissing her retaliation claims against Faculty Practice.
In considering a motion to dismiss, courts must accept as true "all well-pled material allegations in the complaint and must resolve any doubts in favor of the plaintiff[.]" (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Republic Title Co., LLC v. Andrews , 347 Ga. App. 463, 464, 819 S.E.2d 889 (2018). Applying these principles, we turn to the complaint in this case,2 which alleges that in May 2012, Hill accepted the position of Chair of Pediatric Dentistry and the faculty rank of Associate Professor of Pediatric Dentistry offered to her by the acting dean of the College of Dental Medicine (the "CDM"). As part of this position, Hill, along with other qualified faculty members, performed work at the CDM Dental Clinic (the "Clinic"). All faculty members who work at the Clinic are members of Faculty Practice, an unincorporated association. The revenue generated through this clinic was controlled by the Board of Regents of the State of Georgia (the "BOR") but distributed by Faculty Practice, and a portion of the revenue generated by each faculty member became part of his or her compensation pursuant to a revenue distribution plan. Under the terms of her contract, therefore, Hill received payment from both Faculty Practice and the BOR, and she alleges that she was an employee of both entities.3
MCGHI is a non-profit organization formed, in part, for the purpose of leasing and operating Georgia Health Sciences Medical Center clinics and hospitals. Although Faculty Practice is responsible for the billing at the Clinic, MCGHI and System (hereinafter collectively referred to as "MCG") managed and operated the CDM clinical facilities, providing administrative staff and support personnel who prepared the bills and submitted them on behalf of Faculty Practice. Under provider participation agreements with the State of Georgia, Faculty Practice and MCG were required to provide Medicaid Fee-For-Service to recipients and to provide services for children enrolled with the State's PeachCare for Kids Program ("PeachCare") under certain guidelines. MCG billed for these services under its provider number, as well as Faculty Practice's provider number, in accordance with provider agreements each entity signed (collectively, the "Provider Agreement") with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS").
Hill alleges that during the course of her employment, she discovered that Faculty Practice and MCG had violated provisions of the GFMCA by failing to conform to certain regulations regarding plans of care, informed consent, and billing, which in turn violated the Provider Agreement. On or around October 31, 2012, Hill began reporting the violations she observed to the acting dean of the CDM and others. Hill alleges that because of these reports, she was demoted, threatened, harassed, and/or discriminated against as to the terms and conditions of her employment.
In response, the Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss as to the second amended complaint, and the trial court entered a second order dismissing Hill's claims against the Defendants (the "Dismissal Order") on the ground that she had failed to state any claim for relief under the GFMCA.5
Hill argues on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) making findings of fact instead of searching for issues of fact in deciding the Defendants’ motions to dismiss; (2) misconstruing federal law in ruling that she had not pleaded a prima facie case under the GFMCA with regard to Schemes 1 and 2; (3) concluding that balance billing of patients, alleged in Scheme 3, does not violate Medicaid payment regulations; (4) dismissing her "so-called Reverse False Claims" (Scheme 5) under the GFMCA; (5) dismissing her retaliation claims under the GFMCA on the ground that Defendants were not her employer(s); and (6) dismissing her complaint rather than requiring a motion for more definite statement. This Court reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo. Andrews , 347 Ga. App. at 464, 819 S.E.2d 889.
(Citation omitted.) Id. at 667 (1), 824 S.E.2d 738. See also Anderson v. Flake , 267 Ga. 498, 501 (2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997). In other words, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, a trial court does not act as a trier of fact, but rather it determines whether a complaint sets up a sufficient framework upon which facts, if proved, could establish a ground for relief. See Goldston v. Bank of America Corp. , 259 Ga. App. 690, 697, 577 S.E.2d 864 (2003). Based on our review of the dismissal order, we find no error in the trial court's enunciation or application of the standard for considering a motion to dismiss.
2. Count I—False Claims under the GFMCA . Turning to the merits of the motion to dismiss, we note at the outset that the Complaint alleges Hill's claims under three separate counts: Count I alleging false claims under the GFMCA in connection with Schemes 1, 2, 3, and 5; Count II alleging retaliation claims under the GFMCA; and Count III, alleging claims under the Whistleblower Act.6 Hill only appeals the dismissal of her claims against Defendants under Counts I and II of the Complaint, and we address each count in turn.
(a) Schemes 1 and 2: Implied False Certification Claims . Hill first asserts that the trial court misconstrued applicable federal law in concluding that she failed to state a claim for relief under the GFMCA with regard to...
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