Hill v. Safford Unified School Dist., 2

• Decision Date: 30 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 2,CA-CV,2
• Citation: 191 Ariz. 110,952 P.2d 754
• Parties: , 124 Ed. Law Rep. 721, 259 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 89 Kathy HILL, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Clint Hill, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; B.B. Andrews and Jane Doe Andrews, husband and wife, Defendants/Appellees. 96-0301.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 754

952 P.2d 754

191 Ariz. 110, 124 Ed. Law Rep. 721, 259 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 89

Kathy HILL, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Clint Hill, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT; B.B. Andrews and Jane Doe Andrews, husband and wife, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 96-0301.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 2, Department B.

Dec. 30, 1997.

Zachar & Doughty by Christopher J. Zachar and Sean W. Doughty, Phoenix, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Thomas & Elardo, P.C. by Neal B. Thomas, Phoenix, for Defendants/Appellees.

OPINION

ESPINOSA, Judge.

Following an argument at school, Safford High School student Scott Fast fatally shot Clint Hill, another student, after school at a location outside the city of Safford. Plaintiff/appellant Kathy Hill, individually and on behalf of Clint Hill's estate, brought an action against defendants/appellees Safford Unified School District ("the school") and B.B. Andrews, a teacher at the school, to recover damages for negligence and wrongful death. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, finding no liability as a matter of law. Appellant contends that the trial court erred because the school knew or should have known that Fast had dangerous propensities, it was foreseeable that Fast would harm or cause injury to Hill, and the school failed to take any action to prevent the events that led to his death. We affirm.

Factual Background

The facts in this case are largely undisputed and we view them, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party appealing summary judgment. Rogers v. Retrum, 170 Ariz. 399, 825 P.2d 20 (App.1991). On Friday, September 17, 1993, Hill and a friend, Justin Grotte, had a verbal altercation at school with another student, Troy White, who was a member of a small gang in Safford that called itself the "Eight Ball Posse." The altercation took place during school hours, and school officials called Safford police after questioning Grotte and White. White was taken to the police station for further questioning, and the school suspended him for five days. On Monday, September 20, another verbal confrontation took place during school, this time between Fast, a friend of White and fellow "Eight Ball Posse" member, and Grotte, who was then joined by Hill. Teachers brought Hill and Fast to the school office. After speaking with each student, the associate principal felt the situation was "defused" and allowed the boys to return to class, taking no further disciplinary action.

After classes ended, a group of students began to gather across the street from the school, apparently anticipating a fight between Fast and Grotte. Andrews happened to be driving by and he yelled, "Break it up," and, "Take it somewhere else." ¹ Police were called, but before they arrived, several vehicles loaded with students left the scene and drove to an area outside of town known as Clay Knolls. When police responded, they were informed the students may have gone to that location. Meanwhile at Clay Knolls, Fast produced a gun and, after pointing it at several other students, shot Hill in the chest. The police arrived at the scene shortly after the shooting. Fast apparently had obtained the gun from a schoolmate's vehicle during the lunch period that day. School administrators had heard rumors about the "Eight Ball Posse" and had once searched Fast's school locker after hearing a rumor that he had a gun on school premises, although no gun was found. There had been no other shootings or similar incidents at or near the school.

Standards of Review

On appeal from a summary judgment, we determine de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in applying the law. Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High School District No. 82, 184 Ariz. 419, 909 P.2d 486 (App.1995). We will affirm the trial court's decision if it is correct for any reason, even if that reason was not considered by the trial court. Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 729 P.2d 342 (App.1986); Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School District, 122 Ariz. 472, 595 P.2d 1017 (App.1979).

Duty

Appellant correctly points out that school teachers and administrators have both a statutory and common law duty not to subject students within their charge to a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm through acts, omissions, or school policy. See A.R.S. § 15-341(A)(17) (governing board shall provide for adequate supervision over pupils); Jesik v. Maricopa County Community College District, 125 Ariz. 543, 611 P.2d 547 (1980) (statute imposes duty of protection for students against torts). In a different context, our supreme court recently addressed the question of the common law duty of a premises owner to protect a guest from criminal attack. Martinez v. Woodmar IV Condominiums Homeowners Assoc., Inc., 189 Ariz. 206, 941 P.2d 218 (1997). The court acknowledged the special relationship principle set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965), which states there is

no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and the third person which imposes a duty upon the [defendant] to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and the [plaintiff] which gives to the [plaintiff] a right of protection.

Id. at 207-08, 941 P.2d at 219-20. The teacher-student relationship is a special relation that creates a duty of due care. See Rogers; see also Fedie v. Travelodge International Inc., 162 Ariz. 263, 782 P.2d 739 (App.1989). Hence, the relationship between the school and Hill imposed an additional obligation on the school to take reasonable precautions for Hill's safety. That the school owed duties of supervision and care to Hill, however, is not dispositive of the question whether summary judgment was appropriate. The essence of those duties is to exercise reasonable care in light of foreseeable and unreasonable risks. See Martinez; Rogers. Thus, the essential question is whether, on the undisputed material facts, a reasonable jury could conclude the school breached its duties to Hill. See Orme School v Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 802 P.2d 1000 (1990). We conclude it could not.

Alleged Breach of Duty

Ordinarily, it is a jury's function as fact finder to determine whether a risk of harm created by a defendant was foreseeable and unreasonable. See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of America, 163 Ariz. 539, 789 P.2d 1040 (1990). However, "in approaching the question of negligence or unreasonable risk, 'the courts set outer limits' " and where reasonable persons could not differ, the court properly takes the issue from the jury. Rogers, 170 Ariz. at 402, 825 P.2d at 23 quoting Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts § 15.3 at 355 (2d ed. 1986); see also Orme School; Flowers v. K-Mart Corp., 126 Ariz. 495, 616 P.2d 955 (App.1980); Morris v. Ortiz, 103 Ariz. 119, 437 P.2d 652 (1968). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, "we look at whether sufficient evidence of foreseeability and possible prevention was presented to create a genuine issue of material fact." Martinez, 189 Ariz. at 211, 941 P.2d at 223; see Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 691 P.2d 1078 (1984) (summary judgment proper if insufficient evidence of breach of duty).

In its extensive minute entry, the trial court observed:

At the oral argument, this Judge repeatedly asked counsel for the Plaintiff what it was that the school district did, or what it was that the school district failed to do, that constituted the negligence for which it should be held liable. Essentially, the answer that the court was given was that they should have done something to keep Clint Hill from being killed, and because he was killed the district was liable. The Court does not believe that the responsibility of the school goes so far as to impose what is essentially strict liability for anything that might happen to a student.

We note that appellant's briefs on appeal display a similar generality, primarily maintaining that the school "knew or should have realized that Scott Fast might avail himself of the opportunity to commit a tort or crime towards Clint Hill," and "[it] failed to provide any security or disciplinary measures to protect [him]." To determine the propriety of the trial court's ruling, we differentiate and address two recurring claims underlying appellant's argument and the evidence with respect to each.

1. School's Obligation to Supervise and Discipline

Appellant contends that the school created an unreasonable risk to Hill when it failed to properly supervise Fast on May 20 by not disciplining him pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 15-341(A)(13) and (A)(14), ² which provide:

A. The governing board shall:

* * *

13. Hold pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct on school property.

14. Discipline students for disorderly conduct on the way to and from school.

Appellant argues that this statute imposes liability on a school for the tortious conduct of a student whether committed on or off school premises, and that the school "should have perceived a risk to Clint Hill that Scott Fast would act irrationally because of his [gang] affiliation, and that irrational conduct may result in injury or death" to Hill. Although we agree with appellant that liability for supervisory omissions may not necessarily be circumscribed by school boundaries, Rogers, we cannot find that the school either failed to meet its statutory duty or created an unreasonable risk of harm to Hill.

Sections 15-341(A)(13) and (14) require schools to proscribe, judge and rectify student conduct. See also A.R.S. § 15-843(B). ³ Although not determinative on the question of negligence, this court has previously held that student discipline is a matter entrusted to schools and their governing boards' discretion, and judicial intervention is...