Monroe v. Basis Sch., Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA–CV 2013–0047.,2 CA–CV 2013–0047.
• Citation: 234 Ariz. 155,680 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 20,318 P.3d 871
• Parties: Jennifer MONROE, A Single Woman, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BASIS SCHOOL, INC., An Arizona Corporation, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

234 Ariz. 155

318 P.3d 871

680 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 20

Jennifer MONROE, A Single Woman, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.BASIS SCHOOL, INC., An Arizona Corporation, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 2 CA–CV 2013–0047.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 2.

Feb. 10, 2014.

Monroe McDonough Goldschmidt & Molla, P.L.L.C., Tucson By Karl E. MacOmber, for Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Grasso Law Firm, P.C., Chandler By Robert Grasso, Jr. and Kim S. Alvarado, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee.

Judge MILLER authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge VÁSQUEZ and Chief Judge HOWARD concurred.

OPINION

MILLER, Judge.

¶ 1 Jennifer Monroe appeals from the judgment dismissing her negligence action against BASIS School, Inc. This appeal requires us to determine whether a charter school has a duty of care to its students as they travel to and from school. The trial court found BASIS owed no duty to Monroe and, even assuming a duty, there had been no breach. Because we agree BASIS did not owe a duty to Monroe, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 The following facts are undisputed. On October 17, 2003, Monroe, then an eleven-year-old, fifth-grade student at BASIS, a charter school, was struck by a truck in a busy intersection crosswalk as she rode her bicycle from the school to her home. As a result of the accident, Monroe was in a coma for two weeks and suffered permanent injury. The intersection where the accident occurred is located approximately one block from BASIS. The intersection was equipped with marked crosswalks and traffic lights, including a walk/don't walk pedestrian light and left turn arrow. No crossing guards were present at the intersection.

¶ 3 Monroe filed her complaint after her eighteenth birthday, claiming BASIS had been negligent for failing to post a crossing guard at the intersection. Although not alleged in her complaint, Monroe also contends that BASIS negligently located its school in close proximity to the subject intersection. BASIS moved for summary judgment on the basis of duty.¹ The trial court granted the motion finding that BASIS owed no common law or statutory duty to Monroe. Monroe timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–2101(A)(1).

Discussion

¶ 4 Monroe contends that BASIS owed a duty to protect her from an unreasonable risk of harm on her way from the school to her final destination. Whether a duty exists “is a matter of law for the court to decide,” while the remaining elements are factual issues typically decided by the jury. Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (2007). Duty is defined as a legal obligation that requires a defendant “to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm.” Markowitz v. Ariz. Parks Bd., 146 Ariz. 352, 354, 706 P.2d 364, 366 (1985). “Whether the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care is a threshold issue; absent some duty, an action for negligence cannot be maintained.” Gipson, 214 Ariz. 141, ¶ 11, 150 P.3d at 230. Accordingly, when no duty exists, a defendant cannot be found liable. See Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 356, 706 P.2d at 368.

Does the Student–School Relationship Impose a Duty To Students Traveling To and From School?

¶ 5 A duty of care may arise from the relationship between the parties. See Stanley v. McCarver, 208 Ariz. 219, ¶ 7, 92 P.3d 849, 851 (2004) (duty may arise from special relationship between parties, based in contract, family relations, or joint undertakings). The student-school relationship is one that can impose a duty within the context of the relationship. Hill v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist., 191 Ariz. 110, 112, 952 P.2d 754, 756 (App.1997); see also Gipson, 214 Ariz. 141, ¶ 19, 150 P.3d at 232; Restatement (Third) of Torts (Physical and Emotional Harm) § 40 (2012) (special relationships giving rise to a duty include a school with its students). Schools have “both a statutory and common law duty not to subject students within their charge to a[n] ... unreasonable risk of harm through acts, omissions, or school policy.” Hill, 191 Ariz. at 112, 952 P.2d at 756;see alsoA.R.S. § 15–341(A)(16) (governing board shall provide for adequate supervision of pupils in instructional and non-instructional activities).

¶ 6 The scope of the duty imposed by the student-school relationship is not limitless. See Hill, 191 Ariz. at 112, 952 P.2d at 756 (school owes duty to students within its charge); Restatement § 40 cmt. f (duty arising within and confined by relationship does not extend to risks outside relationship). “The relationship between a school and its students parallels aspects of several other special relationships—it is a custodian of students, it is a land possessor who opens the premises to a significant public population, and it acts partially in the place of parents.” Restatement § 40 cmt. l. Where a duty arises from a special relationship, the duty is tied to expected activities within the relationship. Id. Therefore, in the student-school relationship, the duty of care is bounded by geography and time, encompassing risks such as those that occur while the student is at school or otherwise under the school's control.² Restatement § 40(b) (5) and cmt. f, l; see also Norton v. Canandaigua City Sch. Dist., 208 A.D.2d 282, 624 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (N.Y.App.Div.1995) (school's duty to student strictly limited by time and space and student-school relationship “exists only so long as a student is in its care and custody during school hours,” terminating when child has departed from school's custody); Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 52 P.3d 1230, ¶ 14 (Utah 2002) (extent of student-school relationship limited to school's custody over that student).

¶ 7 It is the general rule that “absent a statute to the contrary or an undertak[ing] specifically assumed, an educational institution has no duty ‘to conduct or supervise school children in going to or from their homes.’ ” 5 James M. Rapp, Education Law, § 12.10[5], at 12–296.5 (2013), quoting Gilbert v. Sacramento Unified Sch. Dist., 258 Cal.App.2d 505, 65 Cal.Rptr. 913, 916 (1968); see also Wright v. Arcade Sch. Dist., 230 Cal.App.2d 272, 40 Cal.Rptr. 812, 813–16 (1964) (holding no common law duty to transport pupils between home and school and thus school district had no duty to pupil injured crossing busy intersection on way to school). Based on this general principle, a school has no affirmative, common law duty to provide school crossing guards. 5 Rapp, supra, § 12.10[5]; see also Young, 52 P.3d 1230, ¶ 16 (concluding school district had no common law duty to provide crossing guard at crosswalk located opposite school).

¶ 8 Arizona law recognizes, however, that if a school voluntarily undertakes to provide protection at a street crossing, a duty of care is imposed on that conduct. For instance, in Alhambra School District v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 38, 796 P.2d 470 (1990), our supreme court considered a school district's affirmative duty to persons using a school crosswalk. By establishing a “marked crosswalk where none previously existed, the District created a relationship with those who would use the crosswalk and thereby assumed a duty of reasonable care with respect to its operation.” Id. at 42, 796 P.2d at 474. Thus, the school owed a duty of reasonable care to any pedestrian who used the crosswalk, not just its students. See id. at 43, 796 P.2d at 475. Similarly, the Attorney General relied on Alhambra when opining that although schools do not have “blanket ‘portal-to-portal’ liability,” affirmative action by the school may create a relationship that could establish a duty.³ 1994 Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen. I94–001.

¶ 9 Here, Monroe left BASIS's custody to travel from the school to her home. Because BASIS did not have custody, it did not have a protective obligation and lacked the special, student-school relationship with Monroe after she left the school. See Young, 52 P.3d 1230, ¶ 16 (“Given that the [school district] did not have custody of [the student] at the time he suffered his injury, it lacked a special relationship with him at that time.”); Pratt v. Robinson, 39 N.Y.2d 554, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749, 349 N.E.2d 849, 853 (school district lacked custody once it safely dropped off student at bus stop just as it would if “the child had been hurt while walking home from a neighborhood school”). Moreover, BASIS did not undertake any affirmative action regarding crosswalks or crossing guards at the subject intersection. See 5 Rapp, supra, § 12.10[5], at 12–296.5; cf. Alhambra, 165 Ariz. at 42, 796 P.2d at 474 (creation of marked crosswalk created relationship between school district and all potential crosswalk users). Thus, BASIS did not owe a duty of care to protect Monroe traveling to and from school.

¶ 10 Monroe also contends that the school's proximity to a busy intersection rendered its location ⁴ dangerous to elementary students and that, as a result, BASIS had a duty to provide a crossing guard at the subject intersection. In support of this argument, Monroe relies on Warrington v. Tempe Elementary School District No. 3, 187 Ariz. 249, 928 P.2d 673 (App.1996); see also Warrington v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 197 Ariz. 68, ¶ 9, 3 P.3d 988, 990 (App.1999)(“Warrington I”). In Warrington, this court considered a school's affirmative duty to students using school bus transportation concerning the placement of bus stops. 187 Ariz. at 250, 253, 928 P.2d at 674, 677. There, a school bus dropped off a seven-year-old student near a busy intersection and, while walking home from the bus stop, the child was seriously injured after he ran into the street and was hit by an automobile. Id. at 250, 928 P.2d at 674. The court's analysis focused on whether school bus stop placement involved a fundamental governmental policy determination and therefore was subject to absolute immunity under A.R.S. § 12–820.01(B), which bars tort liability for public entities. Id. at 253, ...