Hill v. Westbrook's Estate

• Decision Date: 12 August 1952
• Citation: 39 Cal.2d 458,247 P.2d 19
• Parties: HILL et al. v. WESTBROOK'S ESTATE et al. L. A. 22227.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 19

247 P.2d 19

39 Cal.2d 458

HILL et al. v. WESTBROOK'S ESTATE et al.

L. A. 22227.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Aug. 12, 1952.

Emmett E. Patten and Glen A. Duke, Monrovia, for appellant.

Hugh E. Macbeth and Hugh E. Macbeth, Jr., Los Angeles, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment for defendant administrator in an action on a rejected claim against an estate. Plaintiff and decedent, who were not formally married, lived together as man and wife from 1930 until decedent's death in 1946. Two children were born to them. The creditor's claim was for the lump sum of $10,000 'For services rendered decedent from about August 15, 1930, to date of death (July 31, 1946), * * * consisting of keeping house for him * * *, living with him as man and wife * * *, bearing decedent two children, * * * performing the usual duties of a housewife * * *, and earning a salary from time to time during said period, all of which was turned over to said decedent.' The judgment for defendant administrator rests upon findings, supported by the evidence, that any contribution of services or moneys by plaintiff for the benefit of decedent was gratuitous and in contemplation of their reciprocal relationship. We have concluded that under the law governing appellate review (see In re Estate of Bristol (1943), 23 Cal.2d 221, 223, 143 P.2d 689; Richter v. Walker (1951), 36 Cal.2d 634, 640, 226 P.2d 593) such judgment must be affirmed.

On the first trial of this action plaintiff had judgment for $3.000. The judgment was reversed because it allowed recovery, in a lump sum, not only for services for which plaintiff might have recovered but also for living with decedent and bearing the children. (Hill v. Estate of Westbrook (1950), 95 Cal.App.2d 599, 602, 603, 213 P.2d 727.) On the first appeal the District Court of Appeal correctly said, 'When a man and woman knowingly live together in a meretricious relationship in the absence of an express agreement, oral or written, that she be compensated for services performed there is no implied obligation on the part of the man to compensate the woman for household services rendered by her. * * * Although the parties live together in illicit relationship during the time the services are performed, an express contract to compensate for services performed as a housekeeper has been held valid and enforceable unless made in contemplation of such illicit relationship * * * Whether the contract was dependent upon the illicit relationship is a question of fact.'

At the second trial plaintiff introduced evidence that when she went to live with decedent in 1930 he operated a liquor store, a small restaurant, and a rooming house, and that she rendered services for him by clerking in the store, working in the restaurant, and acting as maid and housekeeper in the rooming house. This evidence was contradicted by testimony of a witness for defendant that plaintiff did not render such services; that plaintiff was unable to work because she was ill; and that the roomers did their own cleaning. Plaintiff introduced evidence that in 1943, she, decedent and their children moved to a house in Monrovia which, decedent often stated, he had bought or was buying for plaintiff and the children; and that plaintiff worked in a shirt factory in Monrovia and contributed her earnings to the support of the family. Plaintiff's counsel announced during the second trial that she was 'seeking to recover for her work in the rooming-house, in the hamburger stand, the liquor store, and her contribution that she paid over to him from her salary in the shirt factory.'

Plaintiff introduced evidence that various witnesses had, during decedent's lifetime, seen a document in decedent's handwriting which purported to be a will of decedent and which left his property to plaintiff and the children, and evidence of declarations of decedent that he had made such a will. (What became of this will does not appear.) Also in evidence are declarations of decedent that he was grateful for plaintiff's services and that 'she would be well fixed' on his death. This evidence was introduced, plaintiff's counsel said, to 'show that he had promised our whole theory is that she expected reward and he expected to pay her' for her services.

Plaint...