Hobbs v. Hobbs, No. 1D19-1269

• Citation: 290 So.3d 1092
• Decision Date: 27 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1D19-1269
• Parties: James E. HOBBS, Appellant, v. Leslie J. Howells HOBBS, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

290 So.3d 1092

James E. HOBBS, Appellant,

v.Leslie J. Howells HOBBS, Appellee.

No. 1D19-1269

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 27, 2020

Ross A. Keene of Ross Keene Law, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

Rowe, J.

James E. Hobbs appeals an order denying his motion to dissolve an almost twenty-year-old injunction against domestic violence. Because Mr. Hobbs showed that the circumstances underlying the original injunction no longer exist and that continuing the injunction would no longer serve a valid purpose, we reverse and remand with directions to dissolve the injunction.

Facts

In June 2000, the parties lived in Pensacola, were going through their second divorce, and had separated. One night, Mr. Hobbs asked his stepdaughter to allow him to enter the former marital home. When he walked into the master bedroom, Mr. Hobbs found Ms. Hobbs in bed with another man. Mr. Hobbs pushed Ms. Hobbs. She pushed him back and punched him in the face. Mr. Hobbs left the home. He returned a few hours later with a law enforcement officer to retrieve a gun he kept at the home. Ms. Hobbs petitioned for an injunction for protection against domestic violence. She described the incident at her home and alleged that Mr. Hobbs had stalked her. The petition for injunction was granted. Soon after, Ms. Hobbs moved away from the area.

Eighteen years later, Mr. Hobbs applied for a concealed weapons license. He learned that the injunction remained in place when his application was denied. Mr. Hobbs moved to dissolve the injunction.

At the hearing on Mr. Hobbs' motion, Ms. Hobbs testified that Mr. Hobbs never contacted her after the injunction was entered and had never violated the injunction. But she maintained that the only reason Mr. Hobbs had not violated the injunction was because she moved away from Pensacola after the divorce. In 2018, Ms. Hobbs moved back to the area. She testified that she felt safe returning to Pensacola because the injunction remained in place. But after she returned, Ms. Hobbs claimed that third parties approached her to report that Mr. Hobbs was still "crazy about her" and talked about her.

Mr. Hobbs testified that he knew nothing about Ms. Hobbs' relocation or whereabouts in the years following the 2000 incident. Mr. Hobbs did not realize that the injunction remained in effect after the marriage was legally dissolved. He testified that he never tried to contact Ms. Hobbs after the injunction issued. After the divorce, Mr. Hobbs retired from his job as a firefighter and obtained a pilot's license. He flew for Air Force fire patrols, volunteered for the civil air patrol, and was pursuing a commercial pilot's license. He testified that he did not wish to contact Ms. Hobbs or appear at her home or work locations.

Even so, the trial court denied Mr. Hobbs' request to dissolve the injunction. But the court added that it would be willing to revisit the request in the future. This timely appeal follows.

Standard of Review

Trial courts have "broad discretion in granting, denying, dissolving, or modifying injunctions, and unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated, appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's decision." Noe v. Noe , 217 So. 3d 196, 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (quoting Simonik v. Patterson , 752 So. 2d 692, 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) ). But whether the evidence is legally sufficient to justify dissolving an injunction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Pickett v. Copeland , 236 So. 3d 1142, 1144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Wills v. Jones , 213 So. 3d 982, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ).

Analysis

A court may grant an injunction for protection against domestic violence when the party seeking the injunction is a victim of domestic violence or has a reasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence. § 741.30(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). When determining whether the petitioner's fear is objectively reasonable, the trial court considers the current allegations, the behavior of the parties in the relationship, and the history of the relationship. Mitchell v. Mitchell , 198 So. 3d 1096, 1100 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). But after an injunction has been entered, either party to the injunction may move to modify or dissolve the injunction at any time. § 741.30(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; Trice v. Trice , 267 So. 3d 496, 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) ("[B]ecause permanent injunctions are open-ended and everlasting, they must be subject to dissolution when the circumstances that justified such an injunction are no longer operative.").

Although the domestic violence statute is silent on the burden of proof required of a party moving to dissolve an injunction, this Court has explained that the movant must "show changed circumstances." Alkhoury v. Alkhoury , 54 So. 3d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). To show that the circumstances have changed, the movant must "demonstrate that the scenario underlying the injunction no longer exists so that continuation of the injunction would serve no valid purpose." Id.

And in determining whether an injunction continues to serve a valid purpose, the trial court considers whether the victim "reasonably maintain[s] a continuing fear of becoming a victim of domestic violence." Id. (finding no evidence to show that the former wife's continuing fear was unreasonable); Noe , 217 So. 3d at 199 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to dissolve where appellant testified about her continuing fear and appellee's multiple violations of the injunction); Trice , 267 So. 3d at 501 ("Because a reasonable fear of imminent violence is a legally necessary predicate to the issuance and extension of a domestic violence injunction, it follows that a reasonable fear of imminent violence is also necessary to justify denying a motion to dissolve a domestic violence injunction that is otherwise supported by the requisite change in circumstances."). Here, the trial court erred in denying the motion to dissolve the injunction because the evidence was legally insufficient to show that Ms. Hobbs' continuing fear of domestic violence is objectively reasonable.

Mr. Hobbs alleged a significant change in circumstances since the injunction was entered. Nineteen years earlier, the parties were going through a contentious divorce and Ms. Hobbs had young children living in the former marital home. Fast-forward to 2019. The parties' marriage had long since been dissolved; Ms. Hobbs' children had reached the age of majority. Mr. Hobbs was 63 years old and testified that he had not contacted Ms. Hobbs in almost two decades.

Still, Ms. Hobbs testified that she remained fearful that Mr. Hobbs would harm her. She testified at length about the original incident that triggered the injunction in June 2000, the months leading up to the incident, and the fear she experienced afterwards. But she offered no testimony of any violence or even a single threat of violence from Mr. Hobbs after June 2000.

Instead, Ms. Hobbs' testimony about Mr. Hobbs' post-2000 conduct consisted of speculation and rumors. After nineteen years with no contact with Mr. Hobbs, Ms. Hobbs assumed nonetheless that he may yet harm her. Ms. Hobbs presumed that the only reason Mr. Hobbs had not violated the injunction was that she moved away from Pensacola and he did not know where she was located. She reasoned that after her return to Pensacola, a location close to Mr. Hobbs' home in Cantonment, Mr. Hobbs posed a threat to her—even though Mr. Hobbs had not contacted her once in the six months since her return to town.

The trial court found that this testimony by Ms. Hobbs showed an objectively reasonable fear that Mr. Hobbs continued to present a threat to Ms. Hobbs. But no competent evidence supports the trial court's finding. See Trice , 267 So. 3d at 500. The possibility of future contact between the parties is not, without more, sufficient to conclude that the circumstances underlying the injunction remain the same. Id. Ms. Hobbs' "merely speculative fear of future violence" is legally insufficient "to justify the never-ending existence of an injunction." See id. at 500-01.

Besides speculating that Mr. Hobbs would harm her, Ms. Hobbs also testified about rumors she heard that caused her to believe that Mr. Hobbs remained a threat. She claimed that people reported to her that Mr. Hobbs told them he still had feelings for her and revealed intimate details about their sex life during the marriage. But Ms. Hobbs' testimony about Mr. Hobbs' alleged comments to third parties does not, standing alone, show that she had a reasonable fear that she was in danger of domestic violence. See Bacchus v. Bacchus , 108 So. 3d 712, 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (observing that evidence of communication through third parties is not enough, standing alone, to show a reasonable fear of continuing violence). Indeed, the trial court found there was no evidence to suggest that Mr. Hobbs directed or instructed any third parties to contact Ms. Hobbs. And most importantly, even if taken at face value, no threat of violence was conveyed by any of the alleged comments. The third-party reports were thus legally insufficient to support a finding that Ms. Hobbs' fear of a threat of violence from Mr. Hobbs was objectively reasonable.¹

Even though Ms. Hobbs' testimony consisted of speculation and hearsay, the trial court found Ms. Hobbs' fear of violence from Mr. Hobbs was objectively reasonable. The court found that Ms. Hobbs had been absent from the Pensacola area for almost eighteen years and had returned only six months before the hearing. The trial court observed Ms. Hobbs's demeanor and body language and found that she was still "very, very angry at what [Mr. Hobbs] did in the year '99/2000." The trial court found that she "looked scared." The record supports these findings. But these findings only show that Ms. Hobbs had a subjective fear of Mr. Hobbs. And subjective fear is not...