Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital

• Citation: 82 P.2d 849,59 Idaho 350
• Decision Date: 23 June 1938
• Docket Number: 6484
• Parties: DONNA IRENE WILCOX, a Minor Who Sues by Her Guardian Ad Litem, GURNEY WILCOX, Respondent, v. IDAHO FALLS LATTER DAY SAINTS HOSPITAL, a Corporation, and FRANCES LONG, Appellants
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

82 P.2d 849

59 Idaho 350

DONNA IRENE WILCOX, a Minor Who Sues by Her Guardian Ad Litem, GURNEY WILCOX, Respondent, v. IDAHO FALLS LATTER DAY SAINTS HOSPITAL, a Corporation, and FRANCES LONG, Appellants

No. 6484

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 23, 1938

CHARITIES-CHARITABLE HOSPITAL-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE - EXEMPTION - CHARACTER OF HOSPITAL - EVIDENCE-ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION-PRESUMPTION.

1. In action against hospital for injuries received by 2 1/2 year old infant who was burned while receiving diathermic treatments, evidence that a skin grafting operation was made necessary by the burn, and the extent of it, was admissible.

2. In action against hospital for injuries sustained when 2 1/2 year old infant was burned while receiving diathermic treatments, which necessitated a skin grafting operation admission of testimony detailing circumstances of operation and the apparent suffering of brother of the infant, from whom skin was taken for operation, was prejudicial error.

3. A county hospital which accepts patients who are able to pay for hospitalization renders itself liable to such patients the same as the owner of a private, noncharitable hospital would be, for damage resulting from negligence. (I. C. A secs. 30-2904 to 30-2906, 30-3301, 30-3303.)

4. A county, in providing for care and comfort of its indigent sick, is not extending charity, but is performing a statutory duty, since a charitable institution extends charity to those needing and deserving it, not because of a law requiring it to do so, but because of the charitable inclinations of those promoting it. (I. C. A., secs. 30-2904 to 30-2906, 30-3301, 30-3303.)

5. A hospital which is conducted in the interest of charity is exempt from liability to its paying patients who have suffered injury due to the negligence of the hospital's employees.

6. One who accepts the benefit of a charity enters a relation which exempts the benefactor from liability for the negligence of his servants in administering the charity.

7. The exemption of charitable hospitals from liability for injuries to their patients caused by negligence of hospitals' employees should not be limited by requiring that hospitals exercise due care in selection of their employees.

8. In action against hospital for injuries sustained by patient due to negligence of hospital's employee, burden of proving defense that hospital was a charitable institution was on hospital.

9. In action against hospital for injuries sustained by patient because of negligence of hospital's employee, where hospital defended on ground that it was a charitable institution, hospital's articles of incorporation and an amendment thereto should have been admitted in evidence to show purpose for which hospital was organized.

10. In a patient's action against hospital for negligence of hospital's employee, the introduction in evidence of hospital's articles of incorporation establishes the hosptal's character, whether charitable or not, prima facie.

11. It will be presumed that a hospital is conducting its business according to the declarations contained in its articles of incorporation as respects question whether hospital is a charitable institution not liable for its employee's negligence, but it may be shown that the hospital's business is being conducted in a manner inconsistent with the declarations in the articles of incorporation.

The foregoing syllabus is by West Publishing Company, that following is by author of opinion.

I. In an action against a hospital for injuries to an infant patient, who was burned while receiving a diathermic treatment, evidence that a skin grafting operation was made necessary by the burn, and the extent of it, was admissible but admission of testimony detailing the circumstances of the operation and the apparent suffering of the brother of the infant, from whom skin was taken for the operation, was prejudicial error.

II. A county hospital which accepts patients who pay for hospitalization is liable to them the same as is the owner of a private, noncharitable hospital, for damages resulting from negligence in their care and treatment.

III. A county, in providing for the care and comfort of its indigent sick, is not engaged in extending charity, but is performing a statutory duty.

IV. A hospital which is conducted in the interest of charity is exempt from liability to its paying patients due to the negligence of its employees. This opinion is based upon implied contract, that by accepting the benefits of the charity, the patient waives liability on the part of the hospital for negligence of its servants in administering it.

V. The rule of exemption of charitable hospitals from liability for injuries to their patients, caused by negligence, should not be limited by a proviso that they exercise due care in the selection of their employees.

VI. In an action against a hospital for injuries sustained by a patient, due to negligence of its employees, the burden of proving the defense that it is a charitable institution is on the hospital.

VII. In such an action the articles of incorporation of the hospital are admissible in evidence to show the purposes for which it was organized.

VIII. There is a disputable presumption that a hospital has conducted its business according to the declarations contained in its articles of incorporation, but if its business has been carried on in violation of, or inconsistent with, its articles that fact may be shown.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, for Bonneville County. Hon. C. J. Taylor, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injury. Judgment for plaintiff. Reversed.

Reversed and remanded with direction. Costs awarded to appellants.

Merrill & Merrill, Attorneys for Appellant Hospital, and A. A. Merrill, Attorney for Appellant Long.

Proof that the defendant was a charitable corporation exempt from liability for the torts of its alleged agents may be made by an introduction of a certified copy of its articles of incorporation. (Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Assn., 32 Utah 46, 88 P. 691, 8 L. R. A., N. S., 1161; Brown v. St. Luke's Hospital Assn., 85 Colo. 167, 274 P. 740; Southern Methodist Hospital and Santitorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P.2d 118.)

Under some circumstances additional proof may be offered to show that the corporation is pursuing the objects stated in its articles of incorporation. (Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanitorium v. Wilson, supra; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App. (2d) 429, 57 P.2d 740.)

A corporation organized and maintained for charitable purposes and not for profit and without corporate stock is not liable for the torts of its alleged agents and this is particularly true where it has used due care in the selection of its agents, servants or employees. The fact that some patients, who are able to pay, do so, does not affect this immunity. (Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanitorium v. Wilson, supra; Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal.App. 310, 173 P. 1008; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal.App. (2d) 429, 47 P.2d 740; Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal.App. (2d) 656, 62 P.2d 1075; Baker v. Board of Trustees of Leland Standford Jr. University, 133 Cal.App. 243, 23 P.2d 1071.)

The admission of immaterial evidence which prejudicially affects the rights of a litigant constitutes error. (Aldrich v. Columbia etc. Ry. Co., 39 Ore. 263, 64 P. 455; Marsteller v. Leavitt, 130 Cal. 149, 62 P. 384; Hanks v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 112 Kan. 92, 209 P. 977; Peterson v. Pittsburg Silver Peak etc. Co., 37 Nev. 117, 140 P. 519.)

Otto E. McCutcheon and Anderson, Bowen & Anderson, Attorneys for Respondent.

The pleading of this case seeks immunity on account of the so-called trust fund doctrine and not on the ground of waiver of liability by accepting benefits. The trust fund doctrine is no longer recognized. (13 R. C. L., p. 946, sec. 10.)

The defendant hospital in this case could not claim immunity from liability without pleading and proving that the plaintiff or her parents had accepted benefits from the defendant charity, and therefore waived any right to claim damages. This is the modern rule of nonliability of charities. (13 R. C. L., p. 947, sec. 11.)

A question of charity is not determinable by the articles of incorporation. (Hamilton v. Corvallis General Hospital, 146 Ore. 168, 30 P.2d 9; 30 C. J. 462.)

The better rule is that even a charity is liable to one who is not the object of its charity, but is paying for the services rendered. (Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Assn., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, L. R. A. 1915D, 1167; Shawnee v. Roush, 101, Okla. 60, 223 P. 354; Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675, Mulliner v. Evangelischer, etc., 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699; Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Branton, 216 Ala. 326, 113 So. 79; 218 Ala. 464, 118 So. 741.)

This court, in accord with the great weight of authority has permitted great latitude in testimony as to physical injuries and certainly it is not error to permit the plaintiff's mother to described the depth and appearance of the burn. (Herring v. Davis, 47 Idaho 211, 273 P. 757; 22 C. J. 618; Birkel v. Chandler, 26 Wash. 241, 66 P. 406.)

MORGAN, J., HOLDEN, C. J. Ailshie, J., concurs, HOLDEN, C. J., BUDGE, J., GIVENS, J., concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.

OPINION

MORGAN, J.

Respondent a child two years and two months old, was taken by her father and mother to Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital for treatment for pneumonia. Arrangement were made by her father with the hospital, acting through one of its agents, for a room for respondent and for her care and treatment therein, for which he agreed to pay. Her physician directed that she be given diathermic...