Holden v. Weidenfeller
| Decision Date | 30 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-95-00351-CV,04-95-00351-CV |
| Citation | 929 S.W.2d 124 |
| Parties | Donald L. HOLDEN and Wife, Jewell Jones Holden, Appellants, v. Charles Travis WEIDENFELLER; Roy Weidenfeller; Dayton Weidenfeller; Wilbert Roger Weidenfeller and James Darvin Lester Weidenfeller, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Randall B. Richards, The Law Offices of Randall B. Richards, Boerne, for Appellants.
Lavern D. Harris, Harris & Harris, P.C., Kerrville, for Appellees.
Before CHAPA, C.J., and HARDBERGER and GREEN, JJ.
This is an appeal from the trial court's judgment asserting that appellees possess an easement over appellants' property. In five points of error, appellants contend that (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings, (2) the trial court erred in denying appellants injunctive relief, and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellees' legal expert to testify. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed as reformed.
This is a dispute over appellees' right to use a road travelling over a portion of appellants' ranch in order to access their own ranch. The boundaries and roads in question are reproduced below.
Around the turn of the century, Henry Meier owned what is now the Holden ranch ("Meier/Holden ranch"). His daughter, Bertha Schupp, and her husband owned a portion of what is now the Weidenfeller ranch ("Schupp/Weidenfeller ranch"). In 1909, Meier conveyed a 53 acre tract of land to his daughter. This 53 acre tract of land is the only unity of ownership between the two properties at issue.
A portion of the deed transferring the 53 acre tract reads as follows:
... Provided however that the grantor herein [sic] right of way over the said premises and the said Bertha Schupp shall keep open a private road across the S.W. portion of said premises as now traveled, for the public generally, until permission to close same up, is given by the grantor herein.
The deed clearly indicates, that at the time of conveyance, there was a road ("old road") in existence between the two properties. The old road still exists.
It is undisputed that the old road travels from Highway 1376, the Sisterdale Road, through the Meier/Holden ranch, enters for a short distance the Schupp/Weidenfeller ranch, reenters the Meier/Holden ranch and stops at the interior thereof. There was never an express or written easement granted by Meier or his successors in title to the Schupps or their successors in title regarding the old road, but apparently the road has been used continually to access the Schupp/Weidenfeller ranch from the Sisterdale road. The old road has been the only means of ingress and egress between a public road and the Schupp/Weidenfeller ranch.
Part of the controversy in this case arises from 4.7 acres of land from what is known as the Brodbeck survey. This strip of land lies between the Meier/Holden ranch and the Sisterdale Road. It is undisputed that this strip of land is now part of the Meier/Holden ranch. The Holdens received a declaratory judgment to this effect in 1994. The Weidenfellers contend, and the trial court found, that the 1994 judgment just reiterates the fact established long ago--that the 4.7 acres has always been a part of the Meier/Holden property.
The trial court found that, at the time of the conveyance of the 53 acre tract to his daughter, Meier believed that he possessed an unsurveyed 5,092.62 acre tract of land. When the land was ultimately sold by Meier's sons, it was finally surveyed. At that time, it was discovered that the tract actually contained 5,155.20 acres, including 4.7 acres in the Brodbeck survey. Nevertheless, the Holdens contend that, at the time of the conveyance of the 53 acres, the 4.7 acres was owned by someone else.
The Holdens contend that when they bought their ranch, there was no evidence of any type of easement over their land, and that they never saw anyone use the old road until a year after they took possession. They further argue that they have maintained the road at their own expense. They allege that they gave the Weidenfellers permission to use the old road, but not a legal right to do so.
In 1975, a controversy arose regarding the old road between the Sisterdale Road and the Weidenfeller property. Apparently, the Weidenfellers were leasing their property to hunters and had given the keys to the gates at the Sisterdale Road and the ranch itself to several individuals. This resulted in quite a bit of traffic on the old road, which created muddy and dusty conditions on the road. Also, the lights of the cars traveling the road shone into the Holdens' home and into the home of their ranch foreman.
In response to this inconvenience, the Holdens built a new road for the Weidenfellers to use. The new road comes off of the Sisterdale road, bypasses the residences on the Meier/Holden ranch, and ends at a point on the Schupp/Weidenfeller ranch which was not part of the original 53 acre transfer. The Holdens notified the Weidenfellers that they were to finish the new road from that point, having it end at any point they wished on the Weidenfeller property. The Weidenfellers, however, claimed a right to use the old road and refused to construct the remainder of the new road. They continued to use the old road.
The Holdens sued for a declaratory judgment that the Weidenfellers have no easement or other legal right to enter the Meier/Holden ranch at all, and, in the alternative, if the Weidenfellers do have an easement, for a permanent injunction prohibiting the use of the Meier/Holden ranch to access the Schupp/Weidenfeller ranch. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it determined that the Weidenfellers have both an easement by estoppel and an easement appurtenant by implied grant across the Holden property.
The trial court concluded that the easement begins at the Sisterdale Road and continues along the old road up to the point that the Holdens constructed a new road, the easement then continues along the new road until it reaches the Weidenfeller property. The trial court further concluded that if for any reason it is determined that the Weidenfellers do not possess an easement by estoppel or by implied grant, the road in question is a public road.
In their first, third, and fourth points of error, appellants contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that the Weidenfellers have an easement appurtenant by implied grant, an easement by estoppel, or that the road in question is a public road.
When a case is tried to the court and findings of fact and conclusions of law are entered, the findings are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence by the same standards that are applied in reviewing the jury's answers in a jury trial. Zieben v. Platt, 786 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
When reviewing a legal insufficiency point, we consider only the evidence favorable to the decision of the trier of fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Weirich v. Weirich, 833 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Tex.1992). If there is any evidence of probative force to support the trial court's finding, the point must be overruled and the finding upheld. Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.1989). As such, if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal insufficiency point fails. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987).
When reviewing a factual sufficiency point, we must consider all of the evidence that both supports and is contrary to the trial court's finding. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.1989). Once the evidence has been examined, the finding shall be set aside only when the supporting evidence is so weak that the result is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986).
The elements of an easement appurtenant by implied grant are as follows: 1) unity of ownership between the dominant and servient estate; 2) apparent use of the easement at the time the dominant estate was granted; 3) use of the easement was continuous so that the parties intended its use to pass by grant with the dominant estate; and 4) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate. Bickler v. Bickler, 403 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex.1966); Ortiz v. Spann, 671 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The burden of establishing these elements is on the party claiming the easement. Wilson v. McGuffin, 749 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). Whether these requirements have been met are to be determined at the time of severance. Westbrook v. Wright, 477 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ).
The Holdens contend that the elements of an implied easement cannot be established on the facts of this case. We agree. The trial court determined that the Weidenfellers possess[ed] an implied easement along the new road that appellants constructed. This road enters the Schupp/Weidenfeller ranch at a point that was not a part of the original 53 acre conveyance from Henry Meier to his daughter. Therefore, there was never unity of title between the dominant and servient estates.
The Weidenfellers argue that appellants may not now complain that the easement does not connect to the original 53 acres because they moved the easement themselves and insisted that appellees use the new road. However, the fact that appellants moved the road in question does not dispense with the requirement that there be...
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