Holland v. State

• Decision Date: 04 May 1897
• Citation: 39 Fla. 178,22 So. 298
• Parties: HOLLAND v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

22 So. 298

39 Fla. 178

HOLLAND v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

May 4, 1897

Error to circuit court, Polk county; Barron Phillips, Judge.

Lon Holland was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The state's challenge for cause in a capital case is properly sustained where the case depends principally upon circumstantial evidence, and the proposed juror on voir dire states that, no matter how conclusive the evidence might be if it was in whole or in part circumstantial, he would not convict of a capital offense upon it.

2. In criminal trials, after a plea of not guilty, it is discretionary with the state attorney whether he will consent to take the facts from the jury by joining in defendant's demurrer to evidence, and he cannot be compelled to join in such demurrer by the court.

3. Where the state attorney fails to join in defendant's demurrer to evidence, or where the demurrer is general and no testimony is reduced to writing, or where no specific facts are admitted upon the record which loose, indeterminate, and circumstantial evidence conduces to prove, the trial court should decline to consider the questions raised by such demurrer; but if the court overrules such demurrer, and then permits defendant to withdraw it and to proceed with the trial as if it had never been interposed, the defendant is not injured, and the judgment will not be reversed because the court overruled the demurrer instead of declining to consider it.

4. Where it is shown that a confession was freely and voluntarily made, and that no improper influences were exerted to induce it, the court does not err in admitting such confession in evidence.

5. If after a confession has been admitted in evidence, it appears by subsequent evidence in the cause that the confession was not free and voluntary, the court should withdraw the evidence of such confession from the jury.

6. What circumstances constitute improper influences such as will exclude confessions are questions of law, which may be reviewed by an appellate court; but the credibility of the evidence to prove the circumstances, including conflicting evidence, is a question for the trial court, not reviewable by an appellate court unless it can see that the trial court clearly erred in its conclusion of facts, or has transcended its discretion, and a wrong may have been done thereby.

7. The court must decide in the first instance whether the evidence of the corpus delicti is prima facie sufficient to authorize the introduction of a confession by the accused in evidence.

8. The corpus delicti need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt as a basis for the introduction of a confession of the accused. If, when the confession is offered, there be already before the jury evidence tending to show that the offense to which the confession relates has been committed, the court should admit the confession, if free and voluntary.

9. The corpus delicti of an offense may be proven as well by circumstances as by positive testimony.

10. An appellate court cannot review any determination of questions of fact passed upon by either judge or jury, unless all material evidence which was before the judge or the jury is brought before the appellate court.

11. While trial courts should not permit the introduction of evidence of a defendant's confession until sufficient proof of the corpus delicti is first given, yet if the confession be admitted without such proof, and subsequently additional evidence (independent of the confession) of the corpus delicti sufficient to justify the admission of confessions is introduced, the error in prematurely admitting the confession will be cured.

12. It is not error to refuse to instruct the jury that, before they can consider any alleged confessions of defendant, they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, from other evidence in the case, of the existence of the corpus delicti. The confessions of a defendant, when admitted, are to be weighed and considered by the jury with all the other evidence positive and circumstantial; and if, upon the whole evidence the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt both as to the corpus delicti, and the identity of the defendant as the guilty perpetrator, it becomes their duty to find him guilty.

13. The court determines the admissibility, and the jury the credibility, of confessions. It is not error, therefore, for the court to refuse to charge the jury that if they believe from all the evidence that defendant's confession was procured from fear or terror, or hope of reward, they should disregard the confession in making up their verdict.

14. Assignments of error not argued are considered abandoned.

COUNSEL

W. R. Anno, for plaintiff in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

CARTER J.

Plaintiff in error was indicted at the spring term, 1896, circuit court of Polk county, for the murder of Joel W. Walker, and tried and convicted, with recommendation of mercy, with sentence to life imprisonment, at the fall term, 1896, from which sentence this writ of error was sued out.

I. The court below sustained the state's challenges for cause to four jurors, who each answered on voir dire that, no matter how conclusive the evidence might be, if it was in whole or in part circumstantial, they would not convict of a capital offense upon it. The case depending principally upon circumstantial evidence, there was no error in these rulings. Olive v. State, 34 Fla. 203, 15 So. 925.

II. After the state rested its case, and before offering any evidence, the defendant, according to the statement in the bill of exceptions, 'files a demurrer, which demurrer the court overrules, to which ruling of the court defendant by counsel excepts, whereupon counsel for the defense withdraws said demurrer.' This statement, no doubt, refers to a demurrer to evidence copied in the bill of exceptions, by which the defendant demurred 'to the evidence of the state, the state having rested its case; the evidence taken by the state being admitted by the defendant as being true, for the sake of this demurrer,' upon the grounds--First, that the state had not proved the corpus delicti; second, that the presumption of defendant's innocence had not been overcome. The bill of exceptions further states that the demurrer coming on to be heard, defendant being present, and the court having heard the argument of defendant's counsel, and duly considered same, it overruled the demurrer, and thereupon defendant withdrew the demurrer and introduced evidence in his behalf. It nowhere appears that the state attorney joined in the demurrer, or that he argued same to the court. The state's testimony was largely circumstantial, and the entire testimony was in parol. No part of the testimony was ever reduced to writing until long after the trial of the case, nor until the bill of exceptions was made up and filed. This court has often passed upon questions involved in demurrers to evidence in civil causes, and it has been uniformly held that where the evidence is loose and indeterminate, or when it is circumstantial, the opposite party cannot be compelled to join in a demurrer to evidence unless the demurring party expressly admits on the record every fact that the loose and indeterminate and circumstantial evidence conduces to prove, thereby relieving the court from the task of weighing doubtful and uncertain evidence. Without an express admission of this nature, the other party is not bound to join, and, if he does, the court can pronounce no judgment on the demurrer. Higgs v. Shehee, 4 Fla. 382; Morrison v. McKinnon, 12 Fla. 552; Hinote v. Simpson, 17 Fla. 444; Wilkinson v. Railroad Co., 35 Fla. 82, 17 So. 71; Fee v. Manufacturing Co., 36 Fla. 612, 18 So. 853. In this case the demurrer was general, nothing was reduced to writing, no specific facts were admitted upon the record, and there was no joinder on demurrer. Consequently the court should have declined to consider the questions proposed to be raised by it. Hinote v. Simpson, 17 Fla. 444; Duncan v. State, 29 Fla. 439, 10 So. 815. In the latter case, which seems to be the only criminal case in which a demurrer to evidence was ever passed upon by this court, it was distinctly ruled that where defendant, upon arraignment, has put himself upon the country by a plea of not guilty, it is discretionary with the state attorney whether he will consent to take the facts from the jury by joining in defendant's demurrer to evidence, and that the court cannot compel the state's counsel to join in such demurrer. Where there is no voluntary joinder in demurrer to evidence in such cases, the court should strike it, or disregard it, by refusing to entertain it, and submit the facts in regular order to the jury. In this case the court overruled the demurrer, and thereupon it was withdrawn, and defendant permitted to introduce evidence. Under these circumstances, we discover no injury resulting to defendant by the action of the court in overruling a demurrer which it never should have considered at all.

III. It is insisted that the court erred in admitting in evidence an alleged confession made by defendant to one H. H. Fertic shortly after his arrest for the crime of which he stands convicted. It was shown before the confession was admitted that it was freely and voluntarily made, and that no improper influences were exerted to induce the confession. Consequently the court did not err in admitting it. Metzger v. State, 18 Fla. 481; Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636; Coffee v. State, 25 Fla. 501, 6 So. 493; Murray v. State, 25 Fla. 528, 6 So. 498; Leslie v. State, 35 Fla. 184, 17 So. 559; Spicer v. State, 69 Ala. 159; Jackson v. State, Id. 249.

IV. After this confession...