Holliday v. State

• Decision Date: 26 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 20A03-9202-CR-42,20A03-9202-CR-42
• Citation: 601 N.E.2d 385
• Parties: Melvin HOLLIDAY, Appellant-Defendant Below, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff Below.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 385

601 N.E.2d 385

Melvin HOLLIDAY, Appellant-Defendant Below, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff Below.

No. 20A03-9202-CR-42.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Third District.

Oct. 26, 1992.

Transfer Denied Dec. 23, 1992.

Brent Westerfeld, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Atty. Gen., Office of Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

STATON, Judge.

Melvin Holliday appeals his conviction of burglary, ¹ a Class B felony. Holliday raises three issues for our consideration, restated as:

I. Whether the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements involving a prior unrelated crime purportedly committed by Holliday.

II. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it instructed the jury that a defendant is presumed sane.

III. Whether a jury instruction on the State's burden of proof violated Holliday's due process rights.

We affirm.

The evidence favorable to the conviction indicates that on April 3, 1990, Stephen Hunter stepped out of the shower in his Elkhart, Indiana apartment and heard someone knocking at his door. Hunter, still in the bathroom, did not answer the door. A few moments later, Hunter heard something hit his apartment door, and the door opened. After the door closed, Hunter looked out his apartment window and saw two men talking outside. Shortly thereafter, one of the two men returned to the apartment and looked through some of Hunter's belongings. Hunter confronted the intruder, who quickly fled the scene. Hunter later identified Holliday as the intruder. Holliday took Hunter's checkbook, and wrote seven checks on the account without Hunter's permission. After being taken into police custody, Holliday gave a statement in which he admitted entering the apartment and stealing Hunter's checkbook. Before trial, Holliday filed a notice of intent to interpose an insanity defense. After a three day trial, the jury found Holliday guilty of burglary, but mentally ill. Holliday appeals.

I. Hearsay Evidence

During rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of police detective Brett Coppins. Over Holliday's hearsay objection, Coppins testified that an informant and one of Holliday's relatives advised Coppins of Holliday's participation in a prior unrelated robbery. Holliday claims the State offered Coppins' testimony as evidence of the truth of the third parties' statements, and his inability to confront and cross-examine these third parties resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment. The State contends that the testimony was offered to rebut Holliday's insanity claim and to explain the actions of an arresting police officer; therefore, the testimony was not hearsay.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter therein. Williams v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 161, 162, reh'g denied. Out-of-court statements introduced primarily to explain why a particular course of action was taken during a criminal investigation are not offered for the truth of the matter, and are not, therefore, hearsay statements. Johnston v. State (1988), Ind., 530 N.E.2d 1179. Moreover, when the defendant asserts the insanity defense, evidence otherwise inadmissible may be proper to bear upon the credibility of the conclusions drawn by doctors or for relevant observations of demeanor. Benefiel v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 338, 346, and Rogers v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1259, 1261. However, when reviewing the admission of this evidence, the reviewing court requires "a reasonable level of assurance that such testimony was not offered by the proponent nor received by the trier of fact as evidence of the truth of the third party's statement." Williams, supra, at 162-63. Despite Holliday's assertions to the contrary, it is clear that such assurance was present in this case.

Holliday analogizes his case to Williams, supra, which is distinguishable from the present case. In Williams, the officer's statements went to the issue of whether Williams was involved in the charged crime, and they supported the victim's trial testimony as to the perpetrator's identity. Supra, at 163. In the present case, the statements of the informant and Holliday's relative neither addressed the issue of the perpetrator's identity in the April 3 burglary, nor corroborated Hunter's testimony that Holliday was the perpetrator of the April 3 burglary.

The statements made here are similar to the statements made in Johnston, where the statements were offered to "explain how and why the ... transactions ... were initiated." Supra, at 1181. In the present case, the statements were not offered to prove that Holliday committed the purse snatching on March 8, but to explain how Coppins was placed in a position to apprehend Holliday on March 8. The March 8 encounter served as an additional basis of personal knowledge for Coppins to observe Holliday's physical demeanor and were offered to rebut the medical experts' conclusions. Benefiel, supra, at 346, and Rogers, supra, at 1261.

The admission of the statements of the informant and of Holliday's relative did not deny Holliday his right to confrontation, because Holliday was not on trial for the March 8 robbery. Johnston, supra, at 1181. By raising the insanity defense, Holliday made Coppins' March 8 observations relevant. There was a reasonable level of assurance that Coppins' testimony was offered to explain Coppins' actions and not for the truth of the matters asserted therein.

Second, Holliday argues "[t]here is no absolute assurance that hearsay statements of third parties were considered for any purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted in their out-of-court statements." Brief of Appellant at 10. The jury received a limiting instruction as to the use of this testimony. ² On appeal, it is presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's instructions. Chandler v. State (1991), Ind., 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1237. Because the statements here are like those in Johnston, supra, the limiting instruction provides reasonable assurance that the jury did not receive the testimony about the March 8 robbery as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein.

Third, Holliday argues that the limiting instruction did not admonish the jury against considering the hearsay statements of Holliday's relative and the informant as evidence of the proof of the matter asserted therein. The jury is presumed to follow the court's instructions. Chandler, supra, at 1237. By reviewing the complete language of the limiting instruction, it explains to the jury that the testimony is to be considered not for its "truth or falsity, but only to show what the officer did on a particular occasion, or how he arrived at, in this case, arresting the defendant." Record, p. 312. The instruction reasonably explains to a jury the proper use of the information making up Coppins' testimony about the March 8 arrest.

Fourth, Holliday argues that the limiting instruction he requested conflicts with the Court's Final Instruction No. 40, ³ permitting the jury to improperly use Coppins' statements to conclude that Holliday committed the March 8 robbery. On appeal, the court presumes that the jury obeyed the trial court's instructions. Chandler, supra, at 1237.

The limiting instruction solely addressed Coppins' testimony regarding the events leading up to Holliday's arrest on March 8. Final Instruction No. 40 encompassed the other three crimes discussed by Coppins during his rebuttal testimony. We do not conclude that the jury was unable to perceive the limiting instruction an exception to the general rule stated in the final instruction. The instructions are not contradictory.

II. Presumption of Sanity

Holliday alleges error in the Court's Final Instruction No. 12, where the jury was instructed that "every person is presumed to be sane." Record, p. 72. Because Holliday failed to make a timely objection to this instruction, he raises this issue on appeal as fundamental error. Holliday argues two errors: first, Instruction No. 12 misled the jury with respect to Holliday's insanity defense; and second, the jury received no instruction explaining how the presumption of sanity could be overcome. Fundamental error requires: (1) the error to be a blatant violation of basic principles; (2) the harm or the potential harm to be substantial; and (3) the resulting error denied the defendant fundamental due process. Okuly v. State (1991), Ind.App., 574 N.E.2d 315, 316, trans. denied.

The first prong of the fundamental error test requires the error to be a violation of basic principles. Both parties agree it was error for the jury to be instructed as to the presumption of sanity after Holliday produced some evidence on that issue. See Young v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 246, 280 N.E.2d 595, reh'g denied. Contra Corbin v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 86, 91, where the court stated that Darby v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1049, "found the presumption of sanity ... instruction to be proper." In Darby, the defendant raised the insanity defense, presented evidence, and an instruction was given which stated, "[t]here is a presumption in the law that all persons are sane...." Supra, at 1055. We will accept for argument, based on Young, that the instruction was erroneous. Supra, at 597-98.

If the instruction error amounts to a blatant violation of basic principles, it would justify reversal. To justify reversal, the error must be of such a nature that the whole charge of which it forms, a part misleads the jury as to the law of the case. Sturgeon v. State (1991), Ind.App., 575 N.E.2d 679, 680.

When examining an error in a particular jury instruction, the instructions should be read as a whole and construed together. Darby, supra, at 1055. Final Instruction No. 3 stated, "In considering any one instruction, you should construe it in connection with, and in light of, every other instruction...