Holmes v. Williams

Decision Date19 May 2011
Docket NumberNo. 01–09–00991–CV.,01–09–00991–CV.
Citation355 S.W.3d 215
PartiesHarold HOLMES, Appellant, v. Amy WILLIAMS and The Office of the Attorney General of Texas, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Lauren E. Waddell, The Waddell Law Firm, P.C., Mari L. Wise, The Wise Law Firm, Houston, for Appellant.

Karen L. Marvel, Sinkin & Barretto, P.L.L.C., Steven Alan Sinkin, Law Office of Sinkin & Marvel, San Antonio, Rande K. Herrell, Assistant Attorney General, Child

Support/Appellate Litigation Section, Austin, Randy Boykin, Office of the Attorney General, Houston, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices ALCALA and BLAND.

OPINION

ELSA ALCALA, Justice.

Appellant, Harold Holmes, appeals a judgment in favor of appellee, Amy Williams, determining and rendering judgment for child-support arrearages, including accrued interest, and ordering that Williams be entitled to issue child-support liens, levies, and writs of income withholding as remedies for the collection of unpaid child support. Challenging on the grounds of dormancy and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Holmes contends that the trial court erred by determining and rendering judgment for child-support arrearages and ordering that Williams be entitled to the collection remedies. We conclude that dormancy is inapplicable to overdue child-support payments and that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine and render judgment for child-support arrearages and order that Williams be entitled to the collection remedies. Holmes also contends that Williams's notice of child-support liens was improper as a matter of law and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. We conclude that any impropriety in Williams's child-support lien or the trial court's failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law is harmless. We affirm.

Background

In June 1965, Williams and Holmes were married. In December, Williams gave birth to their only child, Glenna. The following November, the trial court entered a default final divorce decree, stating that Holmes, although legally cited to answer, failed to answer or appear at trial. The decree required that Holmes pay $10 per week in child support for Glenna. From 1966 through March 1978, Holmes failed to make any child-support payments.

In early 1978, an attorney acting on Williams's behalf contacted Holmes. Through their attorneys, Williams and Holmes entered into a verbal agreement concerning the child-support obligation. Pursuant to their agreement, Holmes paid Williams a lump sum of $1,500 in April. Beginning in May, Holmes paid Williams $125 per month in child support until Glenna turned 18 years old in December 1983.

On July 19, 2005, when Glenna was 39 years old, William filed a notice of child-support lien with the county clerks for Harris County, Texas, Fort Bend County, Texas, and Los Angeles County, California, alleging $142,090.69 as the [a]mount of child-support arrears” as of that date. The next day, Williams filed copies of the notice with financial institutions holding Holmes's financial accounts. In the accompanying cover letters, Williams stated that any accounts to which the lien applied must be immediately frozen.

Holmes responded by filing an emergency motion to release child-support liens, dispute the amount of arrearages stated in child-support liens, and resolve the ownership interest with respect to property subject to child-support liens, pursuant to section 157.323 of the Texas Family Code. Williams subsequently filed notice of writ of withholding with the trial court pursuant to section 157.301.

On December 18, 2007, the trial court heard legal arguments and evidence at the trial of this matter. Earlier that day, Holmes filed a trial brief, and the Office of the Attorney General of Texas (OAG) filed an intervention, although it did not participate in the trial.

On October 1, 2009, the trial court signed a final order stating:

IT IS ORDERED that Amy Williams in granted and rendered a judgment for child support arrearages, including accrued interest against Harold F. Holmes in the amount of $49,934.70 as of June 19, 2009, the date of rendition of this judgment, such judgment bearing interest at 6 percent simple interest per year until the judgment is paid and is rendered on June 19, 2009.

...

IT IS ORDERED that Amy Williams is entitled to issue child support liens, levies, and writs of income withholding as remedies for the collection of unpaid child support, and all remedies available to enforce the child support arrearage judgment enumerated above shall be payable as permitted by the Texas Family Code and through this Court's Employer's Order Withholding from Harold Holmes's Earnings with the following exceptions....

The court also granted a judgment against Holmes for $5,000 in attorney's fees plus an additional $3,000 if he unsuccessfully appealed to an intermediate court of appeals and an additional $2,000 if he then unsuccessfully petitioned for review to the Supreme Court of Texas. The court also granted a judgment against Holmes for $552.08 in court costs.

Holmes timely filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law and timely filed a notice of past-due findings of fact and conclusions of law. After Holmes gave notice of this appeal, this Court ordered the judgment in this case be suspended until the resolution of this appeal. Within 30 days of that order, this Court withdrew it and ordered that the funds withheld from Holmes be deposited in the trial court registry pending resolution of this appeal.

Time Limitations

In his first issue, Holmes contends that the trial court erred by rendering judgment for the total amount of child-support arrearages, including accrued interest, attorney's fees, and court costs. In particular, Holmes bases this contention on the limitation of a court's jurisdiction to confirm and render a cumulative judgment for child-support arrearages, provided in Texas Family Code, and the dormancy provision, found in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem.Code §§ 31.006 (West 2008), 34.001(a) (West Supp. 2010); Tex. Fam.Code. Ann. § 157.005(b) (West Supp. 2010).

A. Standard of Review

In construing a statute, a court must “ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent.” HCBeck, Ltd. v. Rice, 284 S.W.3d 349, 352 (Tex.2009). A court begins with the “plain and common meaning of the statute's words” to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Id. (quoting Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2004)). A court considers the statute as a whole and not its provisions in isolation. City of Waco v. Kelley, 309 S.W.3d 536, 542 (Tex.2010). A court also considers the objective the Legislature sought to achieve through the statute as well as the consequences of a particular construction. HCBeck, 284 S.W.3d at 352 (citing Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.023(1), (5) (West 2005)). An appellate court reviews de novo questions of statutory construction. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 500 (Tex.2010). Similarly, an appellate court reviews de novo questions of subject-matter jurisdiction. City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Tex.2010).

B. Jurisdiction

In his first issue, Holmes contends section 157.005(b) of the Texas Family Code deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to determine and render a judgment for child-support arrearages because more than 10 years passed since his daughter attained 18 years of age and the child-support obligation terminated. Holmes interprets the jurisdictional time limit in section 157.005(b) as applying to every private enforcement mechanism contained in the Texas Family Code—cumulative money judgments, child-support liens, child-support levies, and wage withholdings. Section 157.005(b) states:

The court retains jurisdiction to confirm the total amount of child support arrearages and render a cumulative money judgment for past-due child support, as provided by Section 157.263, if a motion for enforcement requesting a cumulative money judgment is filed not later than the 10th anniversary after the date:

(1) the child becomes an adult; or

(2) on which the child support obligation terminates under the child support order or by operation of law.

Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.005(b). The plain language of section 157.003(b) unambiguously indicates that it applies only to cumulative money judgments for past-due child support as provided by section 157.263. Isaacs v. Isaacs, 338 S.W.3d 184, 187–88 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no. pet. h.), see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.005(b). Section 157.263(a) states, “If a motion for enforcement of child support requests a money judgment for arrearages, the court shall confirm the amount of arrearages and render one cumulative money judgment.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.263(a) (West 2008).

Holmes's daughter attained 18 years of age in December 1983, at which point his child-support obligation terminated. Pursuant to section 157.005(b), in December 1993, the trial court lost jurisdiction to confirm the total amount of child-support arrearages and render a cumulative money judgment for past-due child support as provided by section 157.263 because Williams had failed to file a motion for enforcement. See id. § 157.005(b). However, Williams never sought and the trial court never granted relief under section 157.263. See Isaacs, 338 S.W.3d at 187–88; Overton v. Overton, No. 14–09–00865–CV, 2011 WL 398046, at *3–4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying similar analysis under 2005 version of section 157.005(b)). A cumulative money judgment for past-due child support results only after the obligee files a motion for the enforcement of child support requesting a money judgment for arrearage. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.263(a); see Isaacs, 338 S.W.3d at 187–88; Overton, 2011 WL 398046, at *34. This...

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