Holzman v. City of Spokane
| Decision Date | 07 June 1916 |
| Docket Number | 12966. |
| Citation | 91 Wash. 418,157 P. 1086 |
| Parties | HOLZMAN v. CITY OF SPOKANE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Bruce Blake Judge.
Suit by William Holzman against the City of Spokane and another. Decree for plaintiff, and the City appeals. Reversed and remanded.
H. M. Stephens, Ernest E. Sargeant, and Dale D Drain, all of Spokane, for appellant.
Post. Avery & Higgins, of Spokane, for respondent.
The plaintiff, William Holzman, seeks foreclosure of a certificate of delinquency for general taxes due upon a lot in the city of Spokane, issued to him by the treasurer of Spokane county. The city of Spokane, as well as the owner of the lot, was made a defendant because it has liens upon the lot for local assessments levied to pay the cost of street improvements. The validity of these liens is not questioned by counsel for plaintiff, but they contend that he is entitled to foreclose his general tax certificate of delinquency as a superior lien to that of the local assessment liens without being required to proceed as prescribed by that portion of the local improvement law which reads as follows:
'The holder of any certificate of delinquency for general taxes shall, before commencing any action to foreclose the lien of such certificate pay in full all local assessments or instalments thereof outstanding against the whole or any portion of the property included in such certificate of delinquency, or, he may elect to proceed to acquire title to such property subject to certain or all local assessments a lien thereon, in which case the complaint, decree of foreclosure, order of sale, sale, certificate of sale and deed shall so state.' Laws of 1911, p. 467, § 40.
This law was in force when the plaintiff acquired his delinquent certificate on September 7, 1911. The superior court rendered judgment of foreclosure as prayed for by plaintiff, decreeing sale of the lot to satisfy the general taxes, and that the assessment liens thereon held by the city, as well as all interest of the owner therein, be forever barred and foreclosed by such sale and the issuance of the tax deed thereon. From this disposition of the case the city has appealed to this court.
Counsel for respondent contend, and the trial court decided, that the above-quoted portion of section 40 of the local improvement law of 1911 is unconstitutional and of no effect because of the violation, in its enactment, of sections 19 and 37 of article 2 of our Constitution, reading as follows:
The local improvement law of 1911, containing the above-quoted provisions in section 40 thereof, looking to the enforcement of local assessment liens and in effect making them of equal rank with general tax liens when the latter has been transferred by the county to private individuals, is a general law complete within itself upon the subject of local improvements, including local assessments and the liens thereof, and purports to cover the whole subject-matter of which it treats. Its title reads:
'An act relating to local improvements in cities and towns, and repealing certain acts and parts of acts.' Laws of 1911, p. 441.
This title, it is insisted by counsel for respondent, does not sufficiently express the subject-matter included in the provisions of section 40 above quoted. This court has always liberally construed the constitutional requirement that the subject-matter of an act of the Legislature shall be expressed in its title, and has deferred to legislative discretion touching that requirement, except in cases of its plainest violation. The doctrine that all reasonable doubts as to the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature should be resolved in favor of upholding the act has peculiar force in the solution of the question of whether or not the act has been in form constitutionally passed, because such a constitutional question has to do with legislative procedure. In other words, it has to do with the methods of transacting public business by a co-ordained branch of the state government, and not with those constitutional guaranties of personal rights which it is the peculiar province of the courts to protect.
In Lancey v. King County, 15 Wash. 9, 45 P. 645, 34 L. R. A. 817, the court observed:
'An act of the Legislature will not be declared void except in cases where the violation of this constitutional inhibition is most clear, and sound policy and legislative convenience require that this provision should be liberally construed.'
The title of the act there involved was 'An act to grant and prescribe power to counties relative to public works, * * *' and notwithstanding the title made no mention of the power of eminent domain it was held sufficient to authorize the granting of such power in the body of the act.
In Callvert v. Winsor, 26 Wash. 368, 67 P. 91, an act entitled 'An act providing for the location, construction and maintenance of the University of Washington * * *' was held sufficient to authorize in the body of the act the sale of the old university site in the city of Seattle, notwithstanding the title of the act did not in terms mention that subject.
In State ex rel. McFadden v. Shorrock, 55 Wash. 208, 104 P. 214, an act entitled 'An act to establish a general and uniform system of public schools' was held sufficient to authorize a provision in the act prescribing vaccination of children as a prerequisite of their right to attend the public schools, though the subject of vaccination was not in terms mentioned in the title.
In State v. Montgomery, 57 Wash. 192, 106 P. 771, it was held that an act entitled 'An act relating to trade-marks' authorized provisions in the act prescribing penalties for its violation, though no mention was made of that specific subject in the title.
In State ex rel. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Wash. 572, 123 P. 996, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 793, the title of an act reading 'An act providing for the formation of corporations' was held sufficient to authorize the conferring upon corporations of the power of eminent domain.
Among numerous other decisions showing the liberal tendency of the court and its deference to legislative discretion upon this subject, the following may be noted: Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 28 P. 520; Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138, 32 P. 1077; Johnston v. Wood, 19 Wash. 441, 53 P. 707; State v. Moran, 46 Wash. 596, 96 P. 1044; State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 P. 728; State v. Asotin County, 79 Wash. 634, 140 P. 914; Cawsey v. Brickey, 82 Wash. 653, 144 P. 938.
Counsel for respondent suggests some doubt as to the subject of local assessments being a proper subject of legislation within the title of this act, since the words 'local improvements' only are used therein as descriptive of the subject-matter of the act. We do not understand this thought to be advanced as a serious argument against the propriety of including the subject of local assessments in the body of the act. This, however, as a preliminary suggestion is worthy of notice. We think whatever contention might be made to that effect would find its answer in the fact that the term 'local improvements' suggests to the common understanding 'local assessments' to pay the cost of such improvements. When a street improvement is constructed by a city and the whole cost thereof paid by the city from its general funds, such improvement does not differ in its legal aspects from any other public improvement. Indeed the only thing that substantially differentiates a local improvement from any other public improvement is the manner of exercising the taxing power to pay for its construction. In other words, it is a local improvement when it is of that nature which entitles the city to cause it to be paid for by local assessments against property which is benefited by its construction, and when the city elects to so treat it. It seems quite plain to us that the term 'local improvements' as used in the title of this act is inclusive of the subject of local assessments.
It is contended in respondent's behalf that the restrictions upon the rights of lienholders of certificates of delinquency for general taxes prescribed by section 40 of the local improvement law above quoted is not germane to the subject of local assessments and the liens therefor. The argument seems to go even farther than this and proceeds to a considerable extent upon the theory that the subjects of general taxation and local assessments are so separable as to preclude legislation thereon in the same act without violating section 19 of article 2 of the Constitution, above quoted, requiring that no bill shall embrace more than one subject. We are unable to assent to these views. It seems to us that in this local improvement law, dealing as it rightfully does, as far as its...
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