State v. Nichols

• Decision Date: 13 October 1908
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ZENT v. NICHOLS, Secretary of State.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

97 P. 728

50 Wash. 508

STATE ex rel. ZENT v. NICHOLS, Secretary of State.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 13, 1908

Four original applications for writs of mandate by the state, one on the relation of W. W. Zent, another on the relation of E K. Pendergast, another on the relation of C. E. Coon, and another on the relation of W. H. White, all but the last-named to be directed to Sam. H. Nichols, as Secretary of State, and that one to be directed to the superior court of King county. Applications denied.

McBurney & Cummings, for plaintiffs Zent and White.

Troy & Sturdevant, for plaintiff Pendergast.

Harry Ballinger, P. C. Sullivan, and Gordon Mackay, for plaintiff coon.

John D Atkinson, for respondent.

FULLERTON, J.

In these proceedings the several relators named assail the constitutionality of the act of March 15, 1907, known as the 'Primary Election Law' (Laws 1907, p. 457, c. 209). While the questions presented are not the same in all the proceedings, they present many common questions, and can best be considered by treating the several proceedings as one noticing under each separate title only those questions applicable to that particular proceeding. It is proper to mention, also, that the exigencies of the case require an immediate decision, and that it is for this reason that our discussion of the questions presented is somewhat perfunctory; not that we do not realize their importance and difficulty. With this explanation we pass directly to the consideration of the merits of the controversy.

It is first contended that the act is in violation of article 11, § 19, of the Constitution which provides that: 'No bill shall embrace more than one subject and that shall be expressed in its title.' The argument is that the act contains matters not germane to its title, so intermingled with matters that are germane that the valid portion cannot be separated from the invalid portion without leaving the act meaningless; and that the act, being thus void in part, and the portions remaining failing to constitute a complete and uniform act, it is void as a whole. The title of the act is as follows: 'An act relating to, regulating and providing for the nomination of candidates for public office in the state of Washington, and providing penalties for the violation thereof, and declaring an emergency.' This court has often held that the title of an act, in order to comply with the constitutional provision above quoted, need not be an index to the contents of the act; that the purpose of the title is to call attention to the subject-matter of the act, so that any one reading it may know what matter is being legislated upon, and it is sufficient when it is broad enough to accomplish that purpose. For the various provisions constituting the act the body of the act must be consulted; the title being neither expected nor required to give details. State v. Scott, 32 Wash. 279, 73 P. 365; State v. Fraternal Knights & Ladies, 35 Wash. 338, 77 P. 500; Weed v. Goodwin, 36 Wash. 31, 78 P. 36; State ex rel. Osborne, Tremper & Co. v. Nichols, 38 Wash. 309, 80 P. 462; State ex rel. Zenner v. Graham, 34 Wash. 81, 74 P. 1058; Shortall v. Puget Sound Bridge, etc., Co., 45 Wash. 290, 88 P. 212; State v. Winsor (Wash.) 97 P. 446. The title of the act in question, it will be observed, is at once broad and comprehensive. Any provision which legitimately relates to, regulates, or provides for, the nomination of candidates for public office in the state of Washington can be enacted thereunder. So measured, we do not find anything within the act that is not strictly within the title.

The provisions most especially dwelt upon as being outside of the title are sections 30 and 31, which provide that candidates who contest for a primary nomination must file an itemized statement of their expenditures incurred while endeavoring to secure a nomination, under a penalty for failure so to do; those parts of sections 7, 9, 10, 24, and 36, and other sections, which relate to the nomination of candidates for members of the House of Representatives and United States senator; section 5 providing for the payment of fees by candidates for congressional office; and section 38 providing who shall be considered as nominees at the primary election, and entitled to have their names appear on the official ballot. But we think even these sections fairly germane to the title. The sections relating to filing itemized statements of the expenditures incurred are objectionable on account of their indefiniteness rather than for the reasons suggested; but the legislative intent is clearly understood even on this point, and this is sufficient to comply with the constitutional requirements. The indefiniteness relates to the time when these statements are required to be filed, but in such a case the rule is that they must be filed within a reasonable time. But more than this, these sections could be eliminated without affecting the remainder of the act, and it is of but little moment, in so far as the cases of these relators are concerned, whether we hold the provisions valid or invalid. The nomination of candidates for the House of Representatives in Congress is clearly a matter for state regulation, and such regulation may be properly provided under a title relating to the nomination of candidates for public office in the state of Washington. The title does not necessarily mean that the office for which the person is nominated shall be in the state of Washington; it is enough if the nomination itself is to be made therein. The provisions regulating candidates for the United States Senate fall within the same rule. It must be remembered that we are discussing the question whether such a provision may properly be enacted under a title such as this act possesses, not the effect or binding force of a nomination obtained thereunder. This latter question is not in these proceedings, and we express no opinion thereon. Again, it can be said of these provisions, as was said of the provision relating to the filing of the lists of expenditures, they can be eliminated without affecting any of the rights of these relators or the validity of the remainder of the act. The provision in relation to fees is within the scope of the act. The right to exact a reasonable fee for the privilege of running for office may be sustained, on the principle that fees in actions and proceedings in courts, and for filing and recording papers, are sustained; namely, that those who seek the benefit of a particular proceeding provided by law may be compelled to reimburse the state for a portion of the costs the state incurs in maintaining the instrumentalities necessary to carry into effect the particular proceeding. In other words, the state but asks the candidates for office under a particular law to reimburse it for a part of the expenses it incurs in carrying that law into effect. This clearly the state may lawfully do. Lastly, under this head it is objected that the Legislature cannot, under an act providing for the nomination of candidates, legislate with reference to the ballot to be used at the general election. But we think this contention untenable. The only purpose of the primary election was to select candidates whose names shall appear on the official ballot, and, this being its sole purpose, any provision relating to that purpose must be germane to the act. We conclude, therefore that the act in its entirety is within the scope of its official title.

It is next contended that the act is in violation of section 37, art. 2, of the Constitution. That section provides that no act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length. The evil which this provision of the Constitution was intended to remedy was the habit, which often proved pernicious, of amending statutes by inserting therein certain words, or substituting one phrase for another, without setting forth the act or section as it would read with the amendment inserted. This form of amendment was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effects, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in that form for the express purpose of misleading, and the Constitution makers wisely put a check upon it. But the provision was never intended to prevent the enactment of statutes, complete in themselves, which repealed or amended existing statutes. Indeed, the very purpose of a statute is to change the existing laws as to the particular matter legislated upon; and, if the Legislature is without power to pass such an act without first hunting up all of the provisions of the existing laws affected by it, and setting them forth as they will stand as amended, legislation is at a standstill. The act in question, as we view it, is a complete act within itself. While it necessarily changes existing statutes by superseding some and limiting the effect of others, it requires no reference to other statutes to determine its meaning in the sense prohibited by the Constitution. True it refers to other statutes in terms, and provides that in certain instances the statute referred to shall not be affected by the terms of the new statute, yet this, we think, is not amending or revising an act by mere reference to its title. The act referred to is in no wise altered or amended. No change is made in its text. Its scope only is limited to the particular cases enumerated. This we hold does not require the setting forth at full length of the statute affected. The case of Copeland v. Pirie, 26 Wash. 481, 67 P. 227, 90 Am. St. Rep. 769, is not contrary to this view. As explained in the case of In re Dietrick, 32 Wash. 471, 73 P. 506, we there held that the statute under consideration...