Hornady Truck Line, Inc. v. Meadows

• Decision Date: 16 August 2002
• Citation: 847 So.2d 908
• Parties: HORNADY TRUCK LINE, INC. v. Don Emerson MEADOWS et al. Hornady Truck Line, Inc. v. Mildred Dorman. Stephen Lawrence Martin and Alabama Education Association v. Don Emerson Meadows et al. Stephen Lawrence Martin and Alabama Education Association v. Mildred Dorman.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

847 So.2d 908

HORNADY TRUCK LINE, INC. v. Don Emerson MEADOWS et al. Hornady Truck Line, Inc. v. Mildred Dorman. Stephen Lawrence Martin and Alabama Education Association v. Don Emerson Meadows et al. Stephen Lawrence Martin and Alabama Education Association v. Mildred Dorman.

1010955, 1010956, 1006.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

August 16, 2002.

Rehearing Applications Denied October 11, 2002.

C.C. Torbert, Jr., and J. Fairley McDonald III of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Montgomery; and E.L. McCafferty III of Vickers, Riis, Murray & Curran, L.L.C., Mobile, for Hornady Truck Line, Inc.

Edward G. Bowron, John P. Kavanagh, Jr., and J. Robert Turnipseed of Pierce, Ledyard, Latta, Wadsden & Bowron, P.C., Mobile, for Stephen Lawrence Martin and Alabama Education Association.

George B. Breedlove, David G. Wirtes, Jr., and George M. Dent III of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder & Brown, L.L.C., Mobile; and R. Blake Lazenby of Wooten, Thornton, Carpenter, O'Brien, Lazenby & Lawrence, Talladaga, for Don

Meadows, Sandra Meadows, and Chantz Meadows.

Andrew T. Citrin and Michael S. McGlothren of Citrin & McGlothren, P.C., Daphne, for Mildred Dorman.

HOUSTON, Justice.

The defendants Stephen Lawrence Martin, the Alabama Education Association ("AEA"), and Hornady Truck Line, Inc. ("Hornady"), appeal from judgments entered on jury verdicts for the plaintiffs Don Emerson Meadows, Sandra Meadows, Chantz Meadows, and Mildred Dorman in consolidated cases all arising out of a single automobile accident. The plaintiffs asserted claims of negligence and wantonness against Hornady, Martin, and the AEA and a claim of negligent entrustment against the AEA.

The defendants argue that the trial court erred in not granting their motions for judgments as a matter of law, in not granting their motions for a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence, and in certain of its evidentiary rulings. The defendants also contend that the following compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiffs are excessive: Don Meadows— $2,000,000; Sandra Meadows—$1,000,000; Chantz Meadows—$1,500,000; and Mildred Dorman—$1,750,000. The jury awarded no punitive damages. We affirm.

In resolving issues concerning the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, this Court is to view the facts and all inferences that could be drawn from those facts most favorably toward the nonmovants, the plaintiffs in this case. This Court stated the standard for reviewing a ruling on a motion for a judgment as a matter of law in Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 830-31 (Ala.1999):

"When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML [judgment as a matter of law], this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in granting or denying a JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case or the issue to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). For actions filed after June 11, 1987, the nonmovant must present `substantial evidence' in order to withstand a motion for a JML. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So.2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Motion Industries, Inc. v. Pate, 678 So.2d 724 (Ala.1996)."

As to a denial of a motion for a new trial, this Court stated in Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Brown, 832 So.2d 1 (Ala.2001):

"The denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Williams v. Williams, 786 So.2d 477, 479 (Ala.2000)....

"`"The jury's verdict is presumed to be correct, and that presumption is strengthened by the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial."' Williams, supra, 786 So.2d at 480 (quoting Friendly Credit Union v. Campbell, 579 So.2d 1288, 1291 (Ala.1991)) (other citations omitted). Moreover, `[t]his Court will not reverse a judgment on a jury verdict on a weight-of-the-evidence basis unless the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, shows that the verdict was plainly and palpably wrong and unjust.' Id."

The injuries to the Meadowses and Dorman occurred when an automobile, owned by the AEA and being driven by Martin, an AEA employee acting in the line and scope of his employment, which was headed north on Interstate 65, crossed the grass median separating the northbound and southbound lanes of traffic, entered the southbound lane, and crashed into the Meadowses' vehicle, which was traveling in the southbound lane. The Meadowses' vehicle was being driven by Don at a speed of between 50 and 55 miles per hour (less than the 70 miles per hour posted speed) because of weather conditions. Don testified that the AEA vehicle looked like a "silver blur" before it crashed into the Meadowses' vehicle, injuring the occupants—Don, Sandra, and Chantz. Mildred Dorman, a passenger in the front seat of the AEA vehicle, was also injured. It is undisputed that Don could have done nothing to avoid the accident. It is also undisputed that a northbound automobile is prohibited from driving in the southbound lane of an interstate highway. It is undisputed that each of the Meadowses and Mildred Dorman were injured as a result of this collision.

Martin and the AEA contend that Hornady and Lonnie Johnson, an employee of Hornady who was driving a Hornady truck and acting within the line and scope of his employment,¹ were responsible for the accident; Hornady contends that Martin was responsible for the collision. The jury found that negligence and wantonness on the parts of Martin, the AEA, and Hornady combined to cause the accident and the plaintiffs' injuries.

On June 16, 2000, Johnson, who was driving an 18-wheel tractor-trailer truck owned by Hornady, and Martin, who was driving an AEA-owned Ford Crown Victoria automobile, were both traveling north on I-65 during a severe thunderstorm. There had been a downpour of rain, and it was still raining at the time of impact. Johnson, occupying the right lane of I-65 north, was traveling alone and was driving the tractor-trailer truck at 65 miles per hour. Martin was traveling with Dorman in the front passenger seat and was operating his vehicle, with the cruise control set at a little under 70 miles per hour, and his headlights were on. Johnson admitted that, minutes before the accident, there was a "big downpour" of rain, and that it was "still coming down pretty good" when the accident occurred. Don, who was traveling south on I-65 at the same time with his wife Sandra and son Chantz, testified as to the weather conditions; from his testimony it could reasonably be inferred that he believed 50 to 55 miles per hour was the maximum safe operating speed based on the weather and the condition of the road.

"Q. And why did you reduce your speed to 50 or 55?

"A. Because it was so wet and so much water was on the road, heavy downpours and low visibility. I just couldn't see far out."

Evidence was presented indicating that partial hydroplaning of a vehicle can occur at speeds as low as 35 miles per hour and total hydroplaning can occur at around 50 miles per hour. Martin was driving the AEA automobile at a speed of a little less than 70 miles per hour, or almost 20 miles per hour beyond the speed at which total hydroplaning can occur. Johnson testified that, although he was driving the Hornady tractor-trailer truck at a speed of 65 miles per hour, he was aware that "[y]ou can hydroplane at 45 miles an hour."

The trial court charged the jury, without objection, that the Alabama rules of the road require every person to drive "at a safe and appropriate speed ... when special hazards exist ... by reason of weather or highway conditions." Ala.Code 1975, § 32-5A-170; Clayton ex rel. Clayton v. Fargason, 730 So.2d 160, 163-64 (Ala.1999). Unchallenged jury charges become the law of the case, Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Atkins, 435 So.2d 1275 (Ala.1983), even if they are erroneous. Clark v. Black, 630 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Ala. 1993).

The jury could reasonably have found that the speeds at which Martin and Johnson were driving were unsafe, although they were both driving within the posted speed limit.

The collision occurred as Martin and Johnson approached the bridge at Exit 34 on I-65. Despite the facts that the vehicles were approaching a bridge and that visibility was poor as a result of the rain and the spray from the tractor-trailer truck, Martin elected to pass the truck. To do so, he moved from the right lane into the left lane when he was five or more car lengths behind the tractor-trailer truck. Martin took no measures to slow down; he did not disengage the cruise control. As Martin was passing the Hornady tractor-trailer truck, in the spray of standing water thrown up by the tractor-trailer truck's nine left-side tires, his vehicle collided with the tractor-trailer truck.

According to Martin and Dorman, as Martin was attempting to pass the Hornady truck, the truck moved into the left lane without warning, struck the AEA vehicle on the passenger side, and knocked the vehicle across the grass median into the southbound lanes of I-65 and directly into the path of the Meadowses' vehicle. Although at trial Martin did not recall having said so, the investigating state troopers testified that Martin told them at the scene and in the hospital that at some point in the chain of events the AEA automobile hydroplaned and hit the tractortrailer truck.

Johnson testified that he remained at all times in the right lane...