Horsley v. Trame

• Decision Date: 14 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–2846.,14–2846.
• Citation: 808 F.3d 1126
• Parties: Tempest HORSLEY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Jessica TRAME, in her official capacity as Chief of the Illinois State Police Firearms Services Bureau, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

808 F.3d 1126

Tempest HORSLEY, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Jessica TRAME, in her official capacity as Chief of the Illinois State Police Firearms Services Bureau, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14–2846.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 17, 2015.

Decided Dec. 14, 2015.

Thomas G. Maag, Maag Law Firm, LLC, Wood River, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Stephen Soltanzadeh, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before POSNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and WOOD, District Judge.¹

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Tempest Horsley's application to possess an Illinois Firearm Owner's Identification Card, commonly known as a "FOID card," was returned to her as incomplete because she was over 18 but not yet 21 and her application did not contain a parent or guardian signature. Although she could have under Illinois law, she did not seek further review from the Director of the Illinois State Police. We disagree with Horsley that the Illinois statutory scheme violates her rights under the Second Amendment. Illinois does not impose a categorical ban on firearm possession for 18–to–20–year–olds whose parents do not consent. Rather, when an applicant cannot obtain a parent or guardian signature, he or she may appeal to the Director for a FOID card, and the Director will make a determination. We conclude that this process for 18–to–20–year–olds is not unconstitutional, so we affirm the decision of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

A few months after Tempest Horsley turned 18, she mailed in an application for an Illinois FOID card along with the requisite check for $10. Horsley's application was returned to her. The accompanying cover letter informed her that the application was incomplete because she was not yet 21 years old and her application did not contain the signature of a parent or guardian. Horsley did not appeal or seek further review from the Director of the Illinois State Police.

Instead, Horsley filed this lawsuit against Jessica Trame, the Chief of the Illinois State Police Firearms Services Bureau, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Horsley asserted in her complaint that she seeks to possess a double-barrel shotgun or other firearm for self-defense inside her home and that her parents will not sign her application for a FOID card. Horsley contends that the Illinois parent or guardian signature provision for FOID card applicants who are at least 18 but less than 21 years old violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. Her complaint sought an order directing that her application be processed without a parent or guardian signature and an injunction preventing the Illinois State Police from rejecting an application for a FOID card to a person at least 18 years of age on the basis of a lack of parent or guardian signature.

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and they stipulated that the legal issue to be resolved by the court was whether the age provision in Illinois's FOID Card Act is constitutional. After a hearing, the district court granted Trame's motion for summary judgment and denied Horsley's motion. Horsley appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

In Illinois, most persons may not lawfully possess or acquire a firearm without a FOID card issued by the Illinois Department of State Police. 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1). An applicant for a FOID card must complete a form prepared by that department. 430 ILCS 65/4(a)(1). The applicant must submit evidence that, among other things, the applicant has not been convicted of a felony, has not been adjudicated as a person with a mental disability

, and is not addicted to narcotics. 430 ILCS 65/4(a)(2)(ii), (iii), (xv). Another provision in the Illinois FOID Card Act—the one relevant here—states that if under 21 years of age, the applicant must submit evidence that

he or she has the written consent of his or her parent or legal guardian to possess and acquire firearms and firearm ammunition ... provided, however, that such parent or guardian is not an individual prohibited from having a Firearm Owner's Identification Card....

430 ILCS 65/4(a)(2)(i). The Department of State Police must approve or deny an application within 30 days of receipt. 430 ILCS 65/5.

Horsley's application was rejected because she was under 21 years old and her application did not contain the written consent of a parent or guardian. See 430 ILCS 65/8(b). With exceptions not relevant here, when an application for a FOID card is denied, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Director of State Police for a hearing. 430 ILCS 65/10(a). The Director may grant relief to a person who lacks a parent or guardian signature if the applicant establishes to the Director's satisfaction that the applicant has not been convicted of a forcible felony within a certain number of years, the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, and granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest or to federal law. 430 ILCS 65/10(c) ; O'Neill v. Director of Ill. Dep't of State Police, 390 Ill.Dec. 367, 28 N.E.3d 1020, 1024 (Ill.App.Ct.2015). A decision from the Director denying an appeal is subject to judicial review under Illinois's Administrative Review Law, 735 ILCS 5/3–101 et seq .430 ILCS 65/11(a). Horsley did not seek any relief from the Director.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment in Trame's favor de novo. Spierer v. Rossman, 798 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.2015). In doing so, we use the familiar standard that summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). There are no disputes of material fact in this case, and the only questions are ones of law.

Trame first argues that Horsley's case is not ripe for our review because Horsley did not ask the Director of State Police to grant her a FOID card after her application was returned to her. "Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’ " Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 806, 123 S.Ct. 2026, 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003) (citation omitted).

Although she did not appeal to the Director, it is clear that the Department of State Police will not process Horsley's application in the same way that it will process applications that contain parent or guardian signatures. Applications with such signatures can only be denied by the Department of State Police on certain statutorily enumerated grounds. 430 ILCS 65/8. Someone in Horsley's position, however, must pursue a different procedure of review from the Director. See 430 ILCS 65/10(a), (c).

In addition, to the extent that Trame is arguing that we should not review this case on the basis that Horsley failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, we disagree. An "exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate." Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). There is no general duty to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before pursuing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, however. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) ("exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983"); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146–47, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988).

Trame argues that the rule the Supreme Court pronounced in Patsy does not control here, and she points to our decision in Daniels v. Area Plan Commission of Allen County, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir.2002) for the proposition that exhaustion of state court remedies is sometimes a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim. But Daniels is a Takings Clause case. Id. at 454. Suits alleging Takings Clause claims are one of the few exceptions the Supreme Court has recognized to the general rule it announced in Patsy that § 1983 suits do not require exhaustion of remedies. See Peters v. Village of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 730 n. 4 (7th Cir.2007). The exhaustion requirement in Takings Clause cases "stems from the Fifth Amendment's proviso that only takings without ‘just compensation’ infringe that Amendment." Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734, 117 S.Ct. 1659, 137 L.Ed.2d 980 (1997) ; see also Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186–87, 105 S.Ct. 3108. And the exhaustion requirement in the other exception, prisoner suits alleging constitutional deprivations while incarcerated, comes straight from a statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508, 102 S.Ct. 2557. Neither exception is present here.

We now turn to the merits. The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Second Amendment includes an individual right to keep and bear arms in the home for the purpose of self-defense. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). This Second Amendment right applies to the states through its incorporation in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010). The Supreme Court has made clear...