Houck v. Bd. of Park Commrs.

• Decision Date: 25 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006-1262.,2006-1262.
• Citation: 876 N.E.2d 1210,2007 Ohio 5586,116 Ohio St.3d 148
• Parties: HOUCK et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF PARK COMMISSIONERS OF THE HURON COUNTY PARK DISTRICT et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

876 N.E.2d 1210

116 Ohio St.3d 148

2007-Ohio-5586

HOUCK et al., Appellants, v. BOARD OF PARK COMMISSIONERS OF THE HURON COUNTY PARK DISTRICT et al., Appellees.

No. 2006-1262.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 24, 2007.

Decided October 25, 2007.

Rengel Law Office, Jeffery Rengel, and Thomas R. Lucas, for appellants.

Spengler Nathanson, P.L.L., Joan C. Szuberla, Teresa L. Grigsby, and Gary D. Sikkema, Toledo; Tomino & Latchney, L.L.C., and John D. Latchney, Medina; Baumgartner & O'Toole, L.P.A., and Abraham Lieberman, Sheffield Village; and Kuhlman & Beck and Ladd W. Beck, Gibsonburg, for appellees.

Nan Still, urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and Huron County Farm Bureau.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, L.L.P., and C. Craig Woods, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Board of Park Commissioners, Columbus and Franklin County Metropolitan Park District.

Thompson Hine L.L.P., and Robert M. Curry, Dayton, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Board of Park Commissioners, Five Rivers Metroparks.

Isaac, Brandt, Ledman, & Teetor, L.L.P., Mark Landes, and David G. Jennings, Columbus, urging affirmance for amici curiae County Commissioners' Association of Ohio, Ohio Municipal League, Ohio School Boards Association, and Ohio Township Association.

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} The issue before this court is whether real property owned by a park district established under R.C. Chapter 1545 can be acquired by adverse possession. Because the underlying legal principles of adverse possession do not apply to park districts, we answer that question in the negative and affirm the court of appeals.

II. Facts and Procedure

{¶ 2} Appellants, Richard Houck and others,¹ own property near a corridor of property that was once owned by a railroad and accommodated railroad tracks. Sometime prior to 1979, the railroad ceased its operations and removed the track, ties, ballast, and other fixtures from its property ("railroad property").

{¶ 3} Appellants allege that they entered the railroad property in 1979 and constructed a road, installed a cable to limit access to the road, planted crops, and otherwise used a drainage ditch in cultivating their farm land.

{¶ 4} In 1997, the Northwest Ohio Rails to Trails Association, Inc. ("NORTA"), purchased the railroad property. A year later NORTA sold the railroad property to appellees, six park districts,² as tenants in common for the purpose of constructing a segment of a recreational trail that will run through several northern Ohio counties.

{¶ 5} In February 2001, the Huron County Park Department sent a letter to appellants explaining that the railroad property would be used for a recreational trail when finances permitted, but until then, appellants were welcome to use the property.

{¶ 6} In October 2003, appellants filed suit asking the court to quiet title to the railroad property in their favor, arguing that they had acquired title to the railroad property by adverse possession, i.e. they had engaged in at least 21 years of continuous, exclusive, open, and notorious possession adverse to the owners. Appellants alleged that the adverse possession of approximately one-third of the railroad property began in 1949 by a prior property owner, and therefore tacking that period of possession onto appellants' possession of the property, beginning in 1979 satisfied the required 21-year period of continuous possession before the park districts even acquired the property. Appellants alleged that their possession of the remaining two thirds of the property began in 1979.

{¶ 7} The trial court found that the prior owner's claimed possession of the one-third part of the property entailed cultivating the railroad property up to the tracks, which was not hostile for purposes of adverse possession. See Barnhart v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton RR. Co. (App. 1929), 8 Ohio Law Abs. 22, 1929 WL 2879. Thus, the trial court found that appellants' possession of the entire railroad property did not begin until 1979 when they entered the property. However, the court then held that a park district is immune from a claim of adverse possession and that the park districts' purchase of the railroad property in 1998 terminated the appellants' continuous possession of the property at 19 years, two years short of the 21 years required by adverse possession. The court of appeals affirmed.

{¶ 8} This cause is now before this court pursuant to our acceptance of a discretionary appeal.

III. Analysis

{¶ 9} The critical issue in this case is whether appellants continuously possessed the railroad property for 21 years from the time they first entered the property in 1979. In order to answer that question, we must determine whether park districts are immune from a claim of adverse possession. If they are, then NORTA's sale of the railroad property to the park districts in 1998 effectively terminated appellants' continuous possession of the railroad property approximately two years short of the required 21 years. If park districts are not immune from a claim of adverse possession, then appellants continuously possessed the railroad property for more than the required 21 years, from 1979 until 2001 (the date of the letter from the Huron County Park District notifying appellants of the park districts' intended use of the property), and they will be successful in their adverse-possession claim.

{¶ 10} Under the doctrine of adverse possession, a plaintiff can acquire legal title to another's real property if he or she proves exclusive possession and open notorious, continuous, and adverse use for a period of 21 years. Grace v. Koch (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 577, 580-581, 692 N.E.2d 1009. The court of appeals applied the general rule that adverse possession cannot be invoked against the state and its political subdivisions. Further, finding that the law disfavors adverse possession, the court of appeals declined to adopt appellants' argument that adverse possession can be used to acquire property owned by park districts.

{¶ 11} Appellants argue that the state's waiver of sovereign immunity makes park districts amenable to suit, and that the reasoning in Brown v. Monroeville Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 68, 49 O.O.2d 347, 253 N.E.2d 767, compels this court to hold that adverse possession may be used to acquire property owned by a park district.

A. Park-District Liability

{¶ 12} We begin our analysis by examining appellants' argument that common-law waiver of immunity opens the door for individuals to invoke adverse possession against a park district. In Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks Sys. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 21 O.O.3d 19, 426 N.E.2d 784, the park district owned and operated a zoo. A patron sued the park district in tort for an injury. Applying the common law and statutory rules of tort liability applicable to municipal corporations, and analogizing them to park districts, this court concluded that park districts were not liable for injuries that arose in their exercise of governmental functions, but were liable for injuries that arose in their exercise of proprietary functions. Id. at 38, 21 O.O.3d 19, 426 N.E.2d 784. The court found that owning and operating a zoo was a proprietary function and held the park district liable for the patron's injury.

{¶ 13} In Marrek v. Cleveland Metroparks Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 9 Ohio St.3d 194, 9 OBR 508, 459 N.E.2d 873, the court recognized that the "governmental-proprietary dichotomy" had been abolished in Haverlack v. Portage Homes, Inc. (1982), 2 Ohio St.3d 26, 2 OBR 572, 442 N.E.2d 749, and applied the dichotomy for purposes of determining a park district's liability. Thus, the court in Marrek held:

{¶ 14} "No tort action will lie against a board of commissioners of a park district for those acts or omissions involving the exercise of a legislative or judicial function or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion. However, once the decision has been made to engage in a certain activity or function, a board of commissioners of a park district will be held liable, the same as private corporations and persons, for the negligence of its employees in the performance of the activities." (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 15} Schenkolewski and Marrek permitted the public to recover for injuries caused by the negligence of a park district. In the instant case, appellants seek to divest park districts of real property though adverse possession. Thus, Schenkolewski and Marrek are distinguishable from the instant case.

{¶ 16} Thus, we find that the common law on park-district tort liability is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether adverse possession may be invoked against a park district.

B. Adverse Possession of Government Property

{¶ 17} Determining whether adverse possession can be applied against a park district is an issue of first impression for this court. However, the common law addressing whether adverse possession applies to various government entities provides guidance to our analysis.

{¶ 18} The general rule is that adverse possession does not apply against the state. See, e.g., Haynes v. Jones (1915), 91 Ohio State 197, 110 N.E. 469, syllabus ("No adverse occupation and user of land belonging to the state of Ohio, however long continued, can divest the title of the state in and to such lands"). Early cases recognized that the state, as a sovereign, was not subject to adverse possession; but they declined to extend that immunity to other subdivisions of the state. See Lessee of Cincinnati v. First Presbyterian Church (1838), 8 Ohio 298, 310 (municipalities are not immune from adverse possession); Cincinnati v. Evans (1855), 5 Ohio St. 594 (relied on First Presbyterian to hold that municipalities are not immune from adverse possession); Oxford Twp. v....