Hounkpatin v. State

• Decision Date: 17 May 2022
• Docket Number: S22A0564
• Citation: 313 Ga. 789,873 S.E.2d 201
• Parties: HOUNKPATIN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

313 Ga. 789

873 S.E.2d 201

HOUNKPATIN

v.The STATE.

S22A0564

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: May 17, 2022

G. Richard Stepp, G. Richard Stepp, P.C., P.O. Box 749, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30046-0749, for Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Emily Rebecca Polk, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Patsy A. Austin-Gatson, District Attorney, Lee Franklin Tittsworth, A.D.A., Clifford Louis Kurlander, A.D.A., Gwinnett County District Attorney's Office, 75 Langley Drive, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30046, for Appellee.

Peterson, Justice.

Bertrand Hounkpatin was convicted of felony murder for the death of his two-year-old stepson, Noel Johnson.¹ On appeal, Hounkpatin argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) admitting other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) ("Rule 404 (b)") that he physically assaulted his stepchildren and (2) preventing him from presenting Rule 404 (b) evidence that two of his stepchildren, who were State's witnesses, had been violent toward Noel and each other. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Hounkpatin's conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence showing that Hounkpatin squeezed Noel and one of his siblings around their ribs; that evidence was relevant to whether Hounkpatin had the intent to commit the predicate felony of cruelty to children in the first degree and otherwise met the requirements of Rule 404 (b). Any error in admitting other evidence that Hounkpatin slapped or hit the children was harmless. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence about the witnesses’ conduct that did not bear on whether they were responsible for Noel's death. We therefore affirm.

The trial evidence showed that Hounkpatin and Donique Howell met in early 2012 and married less than two years later. By January 2014, the couple had a child, E. H., together and lived with Howell's minor children from prior relationships — K. H., C. H., R. H., A. H., and Noel, who was two years and nine months old.

On the morning of January 25, Howell left the children in Hounkpatin's care when she went to work. Before leaving, Howell said goodbye to the older children, checked on the younger ones who were still sleeping, and gave a kiss to Noel, who moved but did not get out of bed.

After the children ate breakfast, Hounkpatin took E. H., a baby, into his room while the rest of the children watched a movie in their room. Hounkpatin then called A. H., who was three years old, and Noel into his bedroom. Soon after, K. H., who was 11 years old, heard hitting noises and crying; R. H., who was 7 years old, heard beating or slapping and crying; and C. H., who was 9 years old, heard crying and two hitting sounds. Once the crying stopped, Hounkpatin returned to the children's bedroom, carrying Noel, who appeared to be asleep, and placed him on a bed.

Hounkpatin left the room but returned later in what K. H. described as a "very short time ... so there wasn't any time for us to move about anything much." Hounkpatin appeared to wake Noel by shaking him and putting him in the shower. Noel was unresponsive, and Hounkpatin called 911. Paramedics arrived, found Noel to have no pulse or respiration, and performed CPR continuously while transporting him to a hospital. When Howell arrived at the hospital a short time later, she was informed that Noel had died.

Medical examiner Dr. Carol Terry, who performed an autopsy, concluded that Noel's manner of death was homicide and the cause of his death was asphyxia from chest compression that fractured his ribs. Dr. Terry concluded that severe compression deprived Noel's brain of oxygen for a significant period of time. Another doctor who was qualified as an expert in child-abuse pediatrics testified that Noel's autopsy revealed several fractures of consecutive ribs — some that were healing and some that had healed and were re-fractured — and the fractures were posterior and lateral. This pediatrician testified that posterior and lateral fractures of consecutive ribs were indicative of "an adult" placing "their hands around" a young child's chest and squeezing with a "significant" or "violent" force. The pediatrician also testified that it is "exceedingly rare" for children to suffer rib fractures from having CPR performed on them; fractures caused by CPR are usually anterior and not posterior; and, based on the degree to which some of Noel's fractures were healing, any CPR causing them would have to have been performed 10 to 14 days before his death.

R. H., C. H., and K. H. testified at Hounkpatin's trial about what they overheard on the morning of Noel's death. Under Rule 404 (b), the children were also allowed to testify about prior occasions on which Hounkpatin had hit them or their siblings. R. H. testified that she had seen Hounkpatin hit Noel once, and had heard slapping noises similar to those she heard on the day of Noel's death "a good amount" of the time when Noel or A. H. were in another room with Hounkpatin. C. H. testified that Hounkpatin had hit him previously, and that he saw Hounkpatin hit other siblings, including Noel, a "few times." K. H. said she saw Hounkpatin hit C. H., A. H., and Noel "a couple of times" and saw Hounkpatin squeeze Noel and A. H. around the rib cage, causing them to cry or strain to speak.

Hounkpatin testified in his own defense at trial. He denied ever squeezing Noel or harming Noel or the other children, and said that K. H. would beat the other children. Hounkpatin also mentioned an incident when he noticed that Noel was not walking properly and asked C. H. and R. H. if anything had happened. According to Hounkpatin, C. H. reported that K. H. "threw" Noel into his crib and Noel's leg got caught, while R. H. said that it was C. H. who "push[ed]" Noel into the crib. Hounkpatin also testified that Howell had reported to him about a month before Noel's death that Noel had fallen down the stairs at his grandmother's house, but that other than a bump on Noel's head and his having a fever, Hounkpatin could not tell if Noel was hurt or acted any differently.

Hounkpatin also called a forensic expert, Dr. Kris Sperry, who testified that the autopsy report showed that Noel had only rib fractures and no other signs of an acute injury indicative of being squeezed strongly, such as skin bruising or hemorrhaging of the eyes, the surface of the lungs, or other body parts. Dr. Sperry also testified that the rib fractures that occurred at the time of Noel's death could have occurred from forceful CPR and that prior fractures could have occurred from a fall or some other abuse. Dr. Sperry opined that, based on a review of Noel's autopsy and medical records, he died as a result of a seizure based on a preexisting brain injury, without any contribution from the rib fractures.

The State then recalled Dr. Terry, who testified that, upon receiving the defense expert's report, she questioned whether Dr. Sperry had actually reviewed slides containing samples of Noel's brain because his opinion was so inconsistent with her observations and Dr. Sperry did not include the slides in listing the items he reviewed. Dr. Terry explained that she later confirmed that Dr. Sperry had not reviewed the slides, as she received his request for them after he prepared his report.²

1. Hounkpatin argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction because the evidence was purely circumstantial and there was evidence — adduced at trial and proffered in support of his denied Rule 404 (b) motion — that others had both the opportunity and propensity to commit the charged acts.³ We disagree.

When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In doing so, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the resolution of such things to the discretion of the [jury]." Wilkerson v. State , 307 Ga. 574, 574, 837 S.E.2d 300 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

As a matter of Georgia statutory law, to convict a defendant based on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt. See OCGA § 24-14-6. "Not every hypothesis is reasonable, and the evidence does not have to exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis; it need rule out only those that are reasonable." Cochran v. State , 305 Ga. 827, 829 (1), 828 S.E.2d 338 (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). It is for the jury to determine whether an alternative hypothesis is reasonable, and we will not disturb the jury's finding unless it is unsupportable as a matter of law. See Outler v. State , 305 Ga. 701, 703 (1) (a), 827 S.E.2d 659 (2019).

The felony murder count of which Hounkpatin was convicted charged him with the predicate offense of cruelty to children in the first degree — causing Noel's death "by unlawfully and maliciously causing him cruel and excessive physical pain through asphyxiation [.]" The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction on this count. Although there was conflicting opinion testimony regarding Noel's cause of death, the jury was entitled to credit the State's two experts’ testimony that Noel died from an acute injury — asphyxia from a chest compression that fractured Noel's ribs — and that a significant...