Housden v. Wilke Global, Inc.
Decision Date | 27 September 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17AP-420,17AP-420 |
Citation | 2018 Ohio 3959,111 N.E.3d 1264 |
Parties | Marchell HOUSDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILKE GLOBAL, INC., and Michael Wilke, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
On brief: The Spitz Law Firm, LLC, Brian D. Spitz, and Barry R. Murner, for appellant. Argued: Barry R. Murner.
On brief: Bricker & Eckler LLP, Katherine Spies Giumenti, and Jill K. Bigler, for appellees. Argued: Katherine Spies Giumenti.
DECISION
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Marchell Housden, appeals the May 26, 2017 judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Wilke Global, Inc. ("Wilke Global") and Michael Wilke ("Wilke") (collectively "appellees"). For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Wilke is the CEO and President of Wilke Global, a company that develops and sells software systems. In 2007, Wilke hired appellant to work as a salesperson for Wilke Global. Appellant was hired to sell Wilke Global's main product, the consumer response system ("CRS") to new customers. Appellant's job duties also included managing existing accounts and selling additional products or modules to existing customers. When appellant was hired she was given the existing customer accounts located to the west of the Mississippi River from Leo Corrigan, the only other person on the sales team. Appellant received compensation both in the form of salary and commissions from new sales.
{¶ 3} In January 2010, Jason Dichter was hired by Wilke Global for its sales team. At the time of hiring, Dichter received compensation in the form of salary, which was $36,000 higher than appellant's salary at the time of her hiring, and a guaranteed monthly commission rate. After his initial year, Dichter received compensation only in the form of salary because he and Wilke Global could not agree on a commission plan. Initially, Dichter's responsibilities included only new sales, as he was not given any existing accounts to manage. However, when Dichter made a sale to a new customer, he received that account to manage. When Corrigan retired, Dichter received most of Corrigan's existing accounts.
{¶ 4} In 2013, Wilke informed appellant she was not bringing enough value to the company. In September 2013, Tim Nichols, the chief strategy officer for Wilke Global, began working with appellant to develop a new compensation plan with the goal of incentivizing appellant to make more new sales. Appellant prepared several drafts of compensation plans in conjunction with Nichols. On November 17, 2013, Wilke rejected the compensation plan as proposed by appellant and Nichols.
{¶ 5} In 2014, Arthur Rohde was hired by Wilke Global for its sales team. Initially, Rohde was hired to make sales to large accounts, and he was not given any existing accounts to manage at the time of his hiring. However, Rohde's responsibilities eventually transitioned to a mix of account management and sales. Rohde received compensation in the form of salary, which was equal to Dichter's at the time of hiring, and commissions based on a percentage of the revenue generated by sales.
{¶ 6} On September 30, 2014, Wilke sent appellant a draft of a new compensation plan that lowered appellant's base salary and restructured her commission plan. Wilke planned to implement appellant's compensation plan on December 1, 2014, but did not implement the plan until January 2015.
{¶ 7} On January 26, 2015, appellant called Diane Moore, Wilke Global's office manager and bookkeeper, and left a voicemail expressing her dissatisfaction with the new compensation plan. On January 27, 2015, Moore sent appellant an e-mail responding to the voicemail. On the same day, appellant replied to Moore's e-mail. When Moore received appellant's e-mail response, she forwarded the e-mail to Wilke, left the office, and did not return to work until February 2, 2015. On January 27, 2015, appellant, after sending her e-mail to Moore, sent an e-mail to Wilke regarding the changes to her compensation plan, to which Wilke responded.
{¶ 8} On February 2, 2015, Wilke and Moore spoke about Moore's reaction to appellant's communications. On February 5, 2015, Wilke sent appellant an e-mail terminating appellant's employment effective the same day. At the time of her termination, appellant was one of three members on the sales team, including Dichter and Rohde. On February 8, 2016, Wilke Global hired Kyle Spittler, a 28-year-old male, to work for the sales team.
{¶ 9} On October 16, 2015, appellant filed a complaint in the trial court asserting claims of gender discrimination, age discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On December 17, 2015, appellees filed an answer and motion to dismiss. On January 5, 2016, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to appellees' motion to dismiss and a motion for leave to amend the complaint. On January 12, 2016, appellees filed a memorandum contra appellant's motion for leave to amend the complaint. On the same date, appellees filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss.
{¶ 10} On August 19, 2016, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 3, 2016, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment. On October 13, 2016, appellees filed a reply in support of their motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 11} On December 14, 2016, the trial court filed a decision and entry granting in part and denying in part appellees' December 17, 2015 motion to dismiss and granting in part and denying in part appellant's January 5, 2016 motion to amend her complaint. On December 19, 2016, appellant filed her first amended complaint. On December 28, 2016, appellees filed an answer to appellant's first amended complaint. On May 25, 2017, appellant filed a notice of dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On May 26, 2017, the trial court filed a decision and entry granting appellees' August 19, 2016 motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 12} Appellant appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for our review:
Because some of appellant's assignments of error are interrelated, we shall address them together.
{¶ 13} An appellate court reviews summary judgment under a de novo standard. Brisco v. U.S. Restoration & Remodeling, Inc. , 10th Dist. No. 14AP-533, 2015-Ohio-3567, 2015 WL 5120865, ¶ 19, citing Coventry Twp. v. Ecker , 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41, 654 N.E.2d 1327 (9th Dist.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor. Civ.R. 56(C) ; State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd. , 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997).
{¶ 14} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the court must deny the motion for summary judgment; however, if the moving party satisfies its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate unless the non-moving party responds, by affidavit or otherwise as provided under Civ.R. 56, with specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue exists for trial. Id. ; Hall v. Ohio State Univ. College of Humanities , 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1068, 2012-Ohio-5036, 2012 WL 5336049, ¶ 12, citing Henkle v. Henkle , 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 735, 600 N.E.2d 791 (12th Dist.1991).
{¶ 15} R.C. Chapter 4112 governs anti-discrimination actions brought under Ohio law. "The overall purpose of R.C. Chapter 4112 is to prevent and eliminate discrimination." Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Triangle Invest. Co. , 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1117, 2012-Ohio-1069, 2012 WL 909303, ¶ 9, citing Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. , 45 Ohio St.3d 131, 133-34, 543 N.E.2d 1212 (1989). See Osborne v. AK Steel/Armco Steel Co. , 96 Ohio St.3d 368, 2002-Ohio-4846, 775 N.E.2d 483, ¶ 5, quoting Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank , 60 Ohio St.3d 135, 137, 573 N.E.2d 1056 (1991) ( ).
{¶ 16} R.C. 4112.02(A) provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice "[f]or any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment." R.C....
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