Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles v. Cordova

• Decision Date: 19 January 1955
• Citation: 279 P.2d 215,130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 883
• Court: California Superior Court
• Parties: 130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 883 HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, California, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jim C. CORDOVA et al., Defendants and Appellants. C. A. 8550. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California

Page 215

279 P.2d 215

130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 883

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, California, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jim C. CORDOVA et al., Defendants and Appellants.

C. A. 8550.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California.

Jan. 19, 1955.

Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, Los Angeles, for appellants.

James J. Arditto, Los Angeles, for respondent.

PATROSSO, Judge.

This case and three companion cases [Civ. A. 8551, 8552 and 8553] present the same questions, and this opinion is equally applicable to each.

The complaint is in the usual form of an action in unlawful detainer, alleging that defendants are the tenants of a unit in a housing development operated by the plaintiff under a month to month tenancy evidenced by a written agreement providing that it may be terminated by either party upon ten days' written notice to the other; and that plaintiff elected to so terminate defendants' tenancy by giving the requisite notice, but that defendants have refused to surrender possession thereof and unlawfully continue to occupy the same. Defendants answered, admitting generally the allegations of the complaint except that they denied that their tenancy had been lawfully terminated, and alleging that such purported termination was unlawful and unauthorized in that the only reason therefor was defendants' refusal to sign a certificate that they were not members of any one of a list of numerous organizations described as those 'designated by the Attorney General of the United States as within Executive Order No. 10450 (18 F.R. 2489),' and that eviction from the premises for the reason stated was in violation of their constitutional rights. Plaintiff thereupon moved the court for summary judgment upon the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute a defense. The motion was granted, and defendants appeal from the resulting judgment.

In support of the judgment plaintiff contends that the reason for its action in terminating defendants' tenancy is immaterial, the argument being that it, like a private proprietor, may terminate a monthly tenancy by giving the requisite notice with or without cause, and that the reason underlying its action in so doing may not be inquired into in a proceeding seeking to recover possession of the premises following such termination. Defendants reply that plaintiff, as a public body, does not occupy the same status as a private proprietor, and that it may not terminate their tenancy if its action in so doing is arbitrary or in violation of their constitutional rights, as they allege to be the situation here. Plaintiff replies that, assuming its action in terminating defendants' tenancy was for the reason stated, it is not arbitrary nor is it violative of any of defendants' constitutional rights.

In the present posture of the case, it must be taken as true that the sole and only reason for the termination of defendants' tenancy is the fact that they refused to execute the certificate previously referred to; and hence the question presented is whether, if this fact be established upon the trial, such proof would have constituted a good defense to the action.

Plaintiff's argument that it may terminate the tenancy of those occupying its public housing projects with or without reason may readily be disposed of. We believe it fairly obvious that a public body, a housing authority as here, does not possess the same freedom of action as a private landlord, who is at liberty to select his tenants as he pleases, and in the absence of a letting for a prescribed term, may terminate their tenancy either without any reason or for any reason regardless how arbitrary or unreasonable it may be. Thus he may refuse either to rent to or permit the continued occupancy of his premises by persons of a particular race or religion or political affiliation. A housing authority, however, has no such freedom of action. See Banks v. Housing Authority, 1953, 120 Cal.App.2d 1, 8, et seq., 260 P.2d 668. And if it may not discriminate arbitrarily between persons and classes in leasing its premises, we see no reason why like considerations do not preclude arbitrary discrimination as between existing tenants in their right to continue such occupancy. See Chicago Housing Auth. v. Blackman, 1954, 4 Ill.2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522.

We pass, therefore, to the vital question as to whether plaintiff's action in undertaking to terminate defendants' right to continue the occupancy of the premises for the sole reason that they refused to execute the certificate previously referred to, may legally be sustained.

While the arguments of counsel upon his question take a wide range, we find it unnecessary to notice all of them is detail, although each has received careful consideration. In essence, plaintiff's argument is this: The right to occupy low-rent housing units is in the nature of a bounty which the state is not required to extend to those of its citizens who are disloyal or are engaged in activities designed to destroy our form of government by force or violence or other unconstitutional means. It is to be noted, however, that, if the facts alleged in defendants' answer be taken as true (as they must for present purposes), the defendants are not being evicted because they are in fact disloyal or engaged directly or indirectly in advocating the overthrow of our government by unconstitutional means, but only because they refuse to sign a certificate that they are not members of certain organizations. Implicit in plaintiff's argument, therefore, is the assertion that failure or refusal of defendants to disavow membership in any of said organizations is in itself proof that they are disloyal or subversive. Upon this premise plaintiff argues that the case here is comparable to those in which it has been held that a public employee may be required, as a condition to his right to retain public employment, to take an oath that he had not advised, advocated, or taught, and is not a member in any organization which teaches or advocates the overthrow of our form of government by force or violence or other unlawful means. Garner v. Board of Public Works of L. A., 1952, 341 U.S. 716, 71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317. Without undertaking to so decide, we may concede, for the purposes of this discussion, that if defendants were being evicted because of their refusal to take an oath similar to that involved in the Garner case they could not successfully challenge the action of the plaintiff. In such circumstances, it might reasonably be inferred that a refusal to take such oath constituted an admission that they in fact advocated the overthrow of our form of government by unlawful means. As indicated, however, this is not the situation here--rather the question is whether they may be evicted from public housing premises for their failure or refusal to sign a statement that they are not members of any one of a large number of organizations designated by the Attorney General 'as within Executive Order 10450' (18 F.R. 2489, 5 U.S.C.A. § 631 note), namely: 'Totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive' or which advocates or approves 'the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the...