Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Woods, 09-97-172
| Decision Date | 10 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-97-172,09-97-172 |
| Citation | 949 S.W.2d 492 |
| Parties | HOUSTON CHRONICLE PUBLISHING COMPANY, Relator, v. The Honorable W.G. WOODS, Jr., Respondent. CV. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Joel R. White, Ogden, Gibson, White & Broocks, Houston, for appellant.
Michael R. Little, District Attorney, Liberty, for appellee.
Before WALKER, C.J., and BURGESS and STOVER, JJ.
This is a mandamus action. The Hearst Corporation, d/b/a the Houston Chronicle Publishing Company (Chronicle), seeks a writ ordering Judge W.G. Woods, Jr., to set aside two orders. One order denies the Chronicle's motion to produce judicial records while the other grants the State's first amended motion to seal affidavits. Both of these orders grow out of a criminal proceeding. Robert Brice Morrow was indicted, in Liberty County, for capital murder. During the course of the investigation, Judge Woods issued two search warrants. Both warrants were executed and returned. On December 23, 1996, the Chronicle filed its motion to produce judicial records. The motion requested release of all affidavits executed in support of the arrest warrant for Morrow, affidavits executed in support of any search warrants issued in the case and transcripts of any proceedings held by the court to seal any records. The motion alleged three grounds: the common law, the United States and Texas Constitutions, and TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (Vernon 1977 & Supp.1997) 1. The motion also alleged an oral motion had been made and a hearing held on December 18, 1996, with the court ruling the documents would be made available during the trial. On April 10, 1997, the State filed a motion to seal affidavits; the State then amended its motion. The motion requested the court seal any affidavits in support of any search or arrest warrants without specifying any reasons or grounds. On April 17 the court conducted a hearing on both motions. No evidence was presented, but the two search warrant affidavits were forwarded to this court under seal. Morrow's attorney stated he neither joined nor opposed either side.
On April 28 the court entered two orders. The order denying the Chronicle's motion states, in pertinent part:
The Court ... makes the following findings:
(1) The affidavits constitute inadmissible hearsay which would not be admissible before a jury in this case;
(2) The affidavits contain information that is prejudicial to the defendant in this case;
(3) The release of the affidavits would adversely affect the defendant's constitutional and statutory rights to a fair trial in this case;
(4) The defendant's constitutional and statutory rights to a fair trial are superior to any rights of the Houston Chronicle and Article 18.01(b), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure;
(5) The release of the affidavits would adversely affect the close relatives of the victim in this case;
(6) Potentially, the release of the affidavits could adversely affect the taxpayers of Liberty County in the event of a change of venue as a result of any publication of the affidavits by the Houston Chronicle; and
(7) The Houston Chronicle has been provided with a copy of the only transcript of any proceeding held prior to April 17, 1997, to seal the affidavits.
The Court has considered whether there are less restrictive alternatives to refusing the Houston Chronicle's request for access to the affidavits, but the court has determined that there are none at this time.
The order granting the State's motion states, in pertinent part:
... all search warrant affidavits and all arrest warrant affidavits, including any copies of said affidavits currently in the possession of the parties in this case ( including the Liberty County District Attorney's Office, the Defendant, and the Defendant's legal representatives), are sealed and are to be maintained in a confidential manner without any display or production whatsoever to the public, the press, and all other persons, entities, and organizations of any nature.
The Chronicle, in this proceeding, argues mandamus is appropriate because there is no adequate remedy at law, Judge Woods' refusal to comply with art. 18.01(b) is a clear abuse of discretion, 2 the orders violate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the orders violate Art. I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution.
At the April 17 hearing, the State argued: "these documents contain a great deal of inculpatory information to the defendant" [sic], the documents are hearsay, the release of the documents will jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial in that the jury pool will have access to the information and the release of the documents will impact any change of venue motion. Before this court, the State argues mandamus will not lie because there is an adequate remedy at law, i.e. an appeal under TEX.R. CIV. P. 76a(8), 3 mandamus will not lie because the Chronicle has not shown Judge Woods abused his discretion or was arbitrary, the defendant's right to a fair trial is paramount to the Chronicle's first amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and the orders do not violate the Texas Constitution.
The State argues "[a]lthough not expressly referenced in the State's motion to seal the affidavits, its motion was presumptively governed by Rule 76a[ 4] for the reason that there is no other statute or rule in Texas (either civil or criminal) which governs the sealing of court records." They further argue the Chronicle was not a party to the criminal proceeding and thus the motion was ancillary to the criminal proceeding and civil in nature. Furthermore, since the 253rd District Court is a court of general jurisdiction hearing both civil and criminal matters, Judge Woods was authorized to consider the State's motion in accordance with Rule 76a.
In State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389, 393 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(quoting Curry v. Wilson, 853 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex.Crim.App.1993)), the Court of Criminal Appeals, in discussing this issue stated:
While no rule precisely defines the limits of a criminal law matter, we enunciated a general rule in Curry v. Wilson .... We explained that criminal law matters are those: "... Disputes which arise over the enforcement of statutes governed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and which arise as a result of or incident to a criminal prosecution...."
Curry v. Wilson, 853 S.W.2d at 40, involved a trial judge attempting to recoup legal fees paid to Curry's court appointed attorney, after Curry's acquittal, because the judge believed Curry was no longer indigent. The court noted the judge's authority to order recoupment arose from the Code of Criminal Procedure and the legal services were incurred in the course of a criminal trial. Id. at 43. The court concluded the dispute was a criminal law matter and had jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. 5
Since this dispute arises incident to a criminal prosecution and is based, in part, on the enforcement of a provision of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, it is, undoubtedly, a criminal law matter.
The courts of appeals have mandamus jurisdiction over criminal law matters concurrent with the mandamus jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Dickens, 727 S.W.2d at 548. See Eagle Printing Co. v. Delaney, 671 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)(mandamus appropriate when newspaper seeks to set aside judge's order closing proceedings to the press). 6 Baize v. Shaver, 935 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding) (citing State ex rel. Healey v. McMeans, 884 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)); Braxton v. Dunn, 803 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
The Code of Criminal Procedure acknowledges the right of a defendant, in any criminal action, to appeal 7 and the entitlement of the State, in a criminal case, to limited appeals 8. Generally only parties are allowed to appeal. 9 See Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Crapitto, 907 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding)(newspaper had no right to appeal closing of voir dire, thus mandamus appropriate). As previously noted, the State argues this is a civil matter and thus Rule 76a applies 10 and specifically, on this issue, Rule 76a(8). They would be correct if this were a civil matter, 11 see State Bar of Texas v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575, 40 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 463 (April 2, 1997), but it is not. Consequently, the Chronicle has no adequate remedy at law.
An act is ministerial "when the law clearly spells out the duty to be performed ... with such certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion or judgment." State ex rel. Healey, 884 S.W.2d at 774 (quoting Texas Dept. of Corrections v. Dalehite, 623 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex.Crim.App.1981)). Therefore, if the language of art. 18.01(b), "[t]he affidavit is public information if executed," is not ambiguous, i.e, if it is truly public information without any exceptions, the release of the information is ministerial and nothing is left to Judge Woods' discretion.
The statute, on its face, does not contain any exceptions. In other words, it does not read, "the affidavit, if executed, is public information, unless the trial judge, in his discretion, orders the affidavit sealed," or words to that effect. Our duty is to determine the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute, that is, did the legislature intend an exception? See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Whitten v. Vehicle Removal Corp.
...of a statute only if an examination of the literal text discloses some obfuscation or patent ambiguity. See Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Woods, 949 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no writ). If possible, we must ascertain legislative intent from the language used in the statute ......
-
Robinson v. Budget Rent a car Systems
...statutes in accordance with their plain meaning without making an inquiry into the legislative history. See e.g., Houston Chronicle Publ'g. Co. v. Woods, 949 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1997, no writ) (looking to legislative history for assistance in construing a statute "only if an......
-
City of Beaumont v. Spivey
...has "hamstrung" the city and this court must interpret the laws rather than make them. See, TEX. CONST. art. II, 1; Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Woods, 949 S.W.2d 492, 498 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1997, no writ)(citing State v. Mancuso, 919 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. In summary, I commiser......
-
Martinez v. Lakshmikanth
...This Court will not invade the legislative prerogative by reading into the statute what simply is not there. See Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Woods, 949 S.W.2d 492, 497-98 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1997, no writ) (quoting Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991): "This met......