Howard Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Director of Division of Employment Sec.

• Decision Date: 16 November 1955
• Citation: 130 N.E.2d 108,333 Mass. 244
• Parties: HOWARD BROTHERS MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 108

130 N.E.2d 108

333 Mass. 244

HOWARD BROTHERS MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Sept. 27, 1955.

Decided Nov. 16, 1955.

James S. Gratton, Worcester, for petitioner.

Amos E. Wasgatt, Jr., Worcester, for the respondent claimants.

George Fingold, Atty. Gen., Stephen F. LoPlano, Jr. & Lazarus A. Aaronson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the Director of the Division of Employment Security, submitted a brief.

Before QUA, C. J., and RONAN, SPALDING, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

QUA, Chief Justice.

These are appeals under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 151A, § 42, as last previously amended by St.1951, c. 763, § 18, ¹ from decisions of a judge of the Central District Court of Worcester which sustained decisions of the board of review granting benefits respectively to two groups of claimants under the employment security law. The facts, which are substantially the same in each case, are established by the decisions of the board. ² No contention is made that they were not supported by evidence. Our duty is to determine what final decision is required on the facts found. § 42.

The pertinent facts are these: The claimants were all employed as card setters by the appellant, hereinafter called the company, which manufactures card cloth and coverings. They were members of a union which was their bargaining agent. A contract was in force between the union and the company. The contract regulated the 'normal work day,' 'normal work week,' hourly wages, and other terms of employment. In article VII, under the head of 'Grievances and Disputes,' it contained this provision: 'Should any differences arise between the employer and the union or any employee, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such difference. An earnest effort shall be made to settle such differences, immediately by conferences in the following order; * * *.' Then follows a statement of successive procedures to be pursued, ending with this: 'In the event the dispute shall not be satisfactorily settled, the matter shall then be referred to the Department of the U. S. Conciliation Service, whose decision shall be final and binding on both parties.' The management of the plant and the direction of working forces, including the right 'to relieve employees because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons,' were 'vested exclusively in the company,' subject to the provisions of article VII.

On March 9, 1954, the company concluded that it could not operate at its then level of production owing to its high inventory and the falling off of orders, so that on that day it presented three plans to the union's grievance and negotiating committee, (1) a plan whereby half the card setters would work in one week, the other half in the next week and so on alternating, (2) a complete 'lay off' of twelve employees, the others to continue in full employment, and (3) a temporary 'lay off' of twelve employees. All three plans called for full utilization of the services of those who worked, and for some of them to operate machines other than their own. The employees met but could not agree on which plan they would accept. After a second conference on March 11 the committee reported that the employees could not agree and preferred that the management put into operation whichever plan it chose. The company chose plan (1) by which the groups of employees would alternate, and in accordance with seniority gave a list to the foreman indicating which employees were to work on Monday, March 15, and which were to work on Monday, March 22. But on Saturday, March 13, before either of the separate groups began to work as assigned, the employees held a meeting and all agreed not to report for work under the proposed plan. On March 18 the company notified all who were to have reported on the fifteenth that they were removed from the pay roll and no longer considered employees. When the group who were assigned for work on March 22 also failed to appear a similar notice went out to them.

Under the terms of the contract, by which the claimants were bound, Moen v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 249, 85 N.E.2d 779, 8 A.L.R.2d 429, the company did not guarantee continuous employment to any particular number of employees. It reserved the right to 'relieve' employees for lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, subject always to the negotiation and arbitration provisions. The employees had also agreed not to strike. Instead of seeking negotiation or arbitration as provided in the contract they did strike. The concerted agreement of all the employees on March 13 not to work was a strike. The board recognized it as a strike. The act, § 25(e), as amended, provides that no benefits shall be paid to an individual for 'the period of unemployment next ensuing and until the individual has had at least four weeks of work in employment subject to this chapter and in each of said weeks has earned an amount equivalent to or in excess of his weekly benefit amount after he has left his work (1) without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent.' All of the claimants voluntarily left their work by striking in violation of their contract. They could have continued to work on the reduced schedule. If this was unsatisfactory to them they could have sought arbitration according to the contract. Or they might have become entitled to benefits for partial unemployment under § 29(b), as amended. Since the claimants left their work while...