Howard v. Estate of Harper ex rel. Harper

Citation947 So.2d 854
Decision Date26 October 2006
Docket NumberNo. 2005-IA-00117-SCT.,No. 2005-IA-00115-SCT.,2005-IA-00115-SCT.,2005-IA-00117-SCT.
PartiesGuy J. HOWARD and Joyce Howard v. The ESTATE OF Earline B. HARPER, by and through Talmadge L. HARPER, Administrator of the Estate of Earline B. Harper, and for the use and Benefit of the Estate of Earline B. Harper, and for the Use and Benefit of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Earline B. Harper. Guy J. Howard and Joyce Howard v. The Estate of Melvin Thead, by and through Sandra Patton, Administratrix of the Estate of Melvin Thead, for the use and Benefit of the Estate of Melvin Thead, and for the Use and Benefit of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Melvin Thead.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

William W. McKinley, Jr., and Amanda Benefield Quave, Biloxi, attorneys for appellants.

Douglas Bryant Chaffin, Anthony Lance Reins, Susan Nichols Estes, Kenneth Luke Connor, and Stephen B. Jackson, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellees.

EN BANC.

SMITH, Chief Justice, for the Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 1. On October 6, 1997, Melvin Thead, in a state of deteriorated health, including age-related dementia and impaired cognitive skills, was admitted to a Benchmark Healthcare nursing home in Marion, Mississippi. Likewise, on December 30, 1997, Earline B. Harper, with similar health problems, was also admitted to Benchmark's Marion facility.

¶ 2. Representatives of both the Estates of Melvin Thead and Earline B. Harper (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed suit on April 12, 2002, and May 21, 2002, respectively, against Benchmark Health Care, Inc., and Benchmark Management and Investment, Inc. (collectively "Benchmark"), "John Does 1 through 10," and "Unidentified Entities 1 through 10." The Plaintiffs also filed suit against Joyce Howard in her capacity as administrator of Benchmark, as well as Guy J. Howard in his capacity as licensee of Benchmark, alleging (1) simple negligence, (2) medical malpractice (3) malice and/or gross negligence, (4) fraud, (5) breach of fiduciary duty, (6) survival claim, and (7) wrongful death.1

¶ 3. Subsequently, both Joyce and Guy J. Howard filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims against them arguing that under Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court denied the motion, as well as a certification of its ruling for interlocutory appeal. The Howards filed petitions for interlocutory appeal to this Court. This Court granted the petitions, stayed proceedings in the trial court pending appeal, and consolidated both cases. See M.R.A.P. 5.

¶ 4. Finding error by the trial court, we reverse the circuit court's denial of the Howards' Motions to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

ISSUES

I. Whether a Common Law Duty of Care Is Owed by a Nursing Home Administrator and Licensee to Nursing Home Patients.

II. Whether a Statutory Duty Is Owed by a Nursing Home Administrator or Licensee to Nursing Home Patients.

III. Whether the Howards, as Administrator and Licensee, May Be Held Liable for Medical Malpractice.

IV. Whether the Howards, as Administrator and Licensee, May Be Held Liable for Fraud.

V. Whether the Howards, as Administrator and Licensee, May Be Held Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) raises an issue of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo." Sennett v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 757 So.2d 206, 209 (Miss. 2000) (citations omitted). "When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of her claim." Liggans v. Coahoma Sheriff's Dep't, 823 So.2d 1152, 1154 (Miss.2002). Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Rein v. Benchmark Constr. Co., 865 So.2d 1134, 1143 (Miss. 2004); Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 174 (Miss.1999).

ANALYSIS

¶ 6. In their complaints, Plaintiffs allege defendant Joyce Howard, as administrator, was responsible for management and supervision of the nursing home, and was therefore negligent by failing to hire an adequate amount of nursing personnel, to supervise and train the personnel, as well as prepare and maintain adequate records, among other allegations. The Plaintiffs also allege defendant Guy J. Howard, as licensee, failed to provide a sufficient number of qualified personnel, including nurses and other staff to meet the needs of the Plaintiffs, in addition to other allegations.

¶ 7. The Plaintiffs argue the both the administrator2 and licensee3 owe a common-law duty of care to nursing home residents, owe a statutory duty of care to nursing home residents, and that state regulations create a private cause of action for damages for deprivations or infringements of a resident's right to proper care. The Howards, on the other hand, argue no such duty exists under any legal theory. This issue is of first impression before this Court.

I. Whether a Common Law Duty of Care Is Owed by a Nursing Home Administrator and Licensee to Nursing Home Patients.

¶ 8. It is well settled that a nursing home or its proprietor or owner can be held liable under general principles of tort law for negligent acts or omissions regarding the care of its residents. See Dupree v. Plantation Pointe, L.P., 892 So.2d 228, 235 (Miss.2004) (sufficient evidence existed to support a jury's finding that nursing home was not negligent in treatment and protection of a resident); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So.2d 507, 513-25 (Miss.2005) (certain provisions of an arbitration agreement found enforceable where a plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against a nursing home); Lagrone v. Helman, 233 Miss. 654, 103 So.2d 365, 368 (Miss.1958) (jury was properly instructed that nursing home had a duty to use reasonable care for the safety of the plaintiff). The Plaintiffs argue this duty extends to administrators and licensees because they are involved with a nursing home's operations.

¶ 9. The Plaintiffs cite Bremenkamp v. Beverly Enter.—Kan., Inc., 762 F.Supp. 884, 891 (D.Kan.1991) (citing Juhnke v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 6 Kan.App.2d 744, 634 P.2d 1132, 1136 (1981)), for its holding that "the administrator of an adult care center or nursing home is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to patients." However, we find that the United States District Court for the District of Kansas used the term administrator in a different sense than is used today. This Court's concludes that in using the term administrator the district court was actually referring to the nursing home facility itself, since the nursing home was the only defendant named in the suit. Similarly, the Juhnke opinion does not discuss administrator liability. The Juhnke decision, where the only defendant was a nursing home, merely stated that "the proprietors of a nursing home are under a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuries to patients. . . ." Juhnke, 634 P.2d at 1136.

¶ 10. The Plaintiffs also cite Beverly Enter.—Fla., Inc. v. Spilman, 661 So.2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), for what the Plaintiffs contend is support for the imposition of a common law duty on nursing home administrators and licensees owed to nursing home patients. The Plaintiffs point out the court's discussion of the administrator's responsibilities:

[The facility's] administrator testified that she had not been familiar with [the patient's] plight. Surely she was familiar with the rapid transformations to neatness and cleanliness when a state inspection was imminent. She testified that she was aware of the incompetency of the director of nursing in "managerial organizational skills." It is difficult to imagine that an employee with managerial responsibilities either knew of [the patient's] plight and failed to take any action to assist this totally dependent human being or so totally ignored the operation of the nursing facility that [the patient's] plight went unnoticed. Either situation exhibits a reckless disregard of human life or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or reckless indifference to the rights of [the patient]. . . .

Id. at 873-74. We disagree with the Plaintiffs' contention. First, as in Juhnke, the only defendant in the case was the nursing home itself. Furthermore, the court's discussion was made in the context of whether the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages based on the nursing home's treatment of the plaintiff. No discussion of administrator liability exists in the Spilman decision.

¶ 11. The Plaintiffs seek to expand the current common law duty that a nursing home or its proprietor or owner can be held liable under general principles of tort law for negligent acts or omissions regarding the care of its residents. Based on the absence of statutory law from the Legislature and the absence of case law calling for the expansion of this duty, as well as the fact that such expansion would be duplicative of the duty already owed by the nursing home business owner or proprietor, we decline to impose the same common law duty upon a nursing home licensee or administrator.

II. Whether a Statutory Duty of Care Is Owed by a Nursing Home Administrator or Licensee to Nursing Home Patients.

¶ 12. The Plaintiffs also argue Mississippi statutes and regulations charge administrators and licensees with a duty of care owed to nursing home residents. The Plaintiffs cite Miss.Code Ann. Sections 43-11-1, et seq., Rules, Regulations, and Minimum Standards for Institutions for the Aged and Infirm, and Miss.Code Ann. Sections 73-17-1, et seq., asserting these statutes and regulations establish such a duty.

¶ 13. An "institution for the aged or infirm" is required to obtain a license in order to operate legally in the state of...

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