Howell v. Eastern Idaho RR, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 25867.,25867.
• Citation: 135 Idaho 733,24 P.3d 50
• Parties: Kyle HOWELL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EASTERN IDAHO RAILROAD, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

24 P.3d 50

135 Idaho 733

Kyle HOWELL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. EASTERN IDAHO RAILROAD, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 25867.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, March 2001 Term.

May 8, 2001.

Berman, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage & Campbell, Salt Lake City, UT; Ingram Law Office, Burley, for appellant. Casey K. McGarvey argued.

The Crow Law Firm, Sacramento, CA; Robert O. Eldredge, Pocatello, for respondent. Donald S. Britt argued.

EISMANN, Justice.

Eastern Idaho Railroad, Inc., appeals from a judgment entered against it under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. We affirm the judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 26, 1996, Kyle Howell was injured while employed by the Eastern Idaho Railroad, Inc. (Railroad). He was part of a three-man crew whose job it was to pick up full railroad cars from industrial customers and deliver empty cars to them. At the time of the accident, they were going to pick up a railroad car located on a siding called the Snake Lead. The engineer and another trainman were in one of two locomotives that were pushing two empty cars down a siding called the Snake Lead. Howell was riding on a ladder on the right side of the lead railroad car. It had previously snowed, and the snow on the track caused the lead railroad car to derail. When the car derailed, it moved to the right towards a building located next to the track, crushing Howell between the railroad car and the building. Had the car not derailed, Howell would not have been injured.

Howell sued the Railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (FELA). Under the FELA, railroad workers can sue their employers for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the employers or fellow employees. Liability is founded upon common law concepts of negligence and injury, although Congress has abrogated the common law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994). Although contributory negligence does not bar recovery, any damages awarded to the worker are reduced in proportion to the amount of his or her negligence. 45 U.S.C. § 53.

This case was tried to a jury, who found that both Howell and the Railroad were negligent, that Howell's injuries were caused 20% by his negligence and 80% by the Railroad's negligence, and that Howell's damages totaled $900,000. Judgment was entered in favor of Howell in the sum of $720,000, and the Railroad appealed.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the Railroad a judgment notwithstanding the verdict?

B. Did the trial court err in its evidentiary rulings?

C. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury?

III. ANALYSIS

A. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the Railroad a judgment notwithstanding the verdict?

The Railroad timely moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alleging that Howell's injuries were caused solely by his own negligence. The Railroad argued that because Howell knowingly violated a company rule when he rode on the building side of the railroad car, his injuries were caused entirely by his own negligence. Had he obeyed the rule and ridden on the other side of the railroad car, the Railroad alleged that Howell would not have been injured when the railroad car derailed.

Under FELA, there can be more than one cause of an employee's injury. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). The statute expressly imposes liability upon the employer to pay damages for injury or death due "in whole or in part" to its negligence. Id. Once it is shown that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury, a jury verdict for the employee may not be overturned on the basis of his own negligence, no matter how substantial it may have been, although the jury may, of course, take the employee's contributory negligence into account in arriving at their verdict. Dennis v. The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 375 U.S. 208, 84 S.Ct. 291, 11 L.Ed.2d 256 (1963). Where there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, it is free to disregard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its verdict. Id.

In reviewing a trial court's decision to deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court when it originally heard the motion. Leavitt v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 991 P.2d 349 (1999). When deciding a motion for judgment n.o.v., a court cannot reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Id. The moving party must admit the truth of all the adverse evidence, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. The court must simply determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Id. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. J.R. Simplot Company v. Enviro Clear Company, Inc., 132 Idaho 251, 970 P.2d 980 (1999).

Evidence was introduced that the Railroad had a policy that required a railroad track to be cleared of snow before pushing unloaded cars down the track due to the risk that snow on the rails can cause the cars to derail. The track was usually cleared of snow by running a locomotive down it. Because a locomotive is several times heavier than an empty railroad car, it is much less likely to be derailed by the buildup of snow or ice on the track. A locomotive is also required to have a snowplow or a plate across the front of the wheels on its lead end to push snow off the track. Before pushing the two empty cars down the Snake Lead, the engineer and the person in the cab with him discussed whether they should first run the locomotives down the track in order to clear the snow. The engineer suggested that they do so, but the other person objected because it was late in the day and it would take too long to disconnect the empty cars so that they could run the locomotives down the track. The engineer therefore decided to proceed down the track without first clearing it to reduce the risk of derailment. When he began moving onto the siding, the engineer could see that Howell was riding on the building side of the lead car.

There was also evidence that the Railroad had failed to provide adequate training to those operating the train on the day of the accident. Howell and the engineer both testified that they did not think the snow could derail a railroad car if they were traveling at a slow speed. The engineer stated that he thought that at a slow speed he could stop before anything happened. Howell also stated that he did not think there was enough snow on the tracks to cause a derailment.

Howell testified that he chose to ride on the building side of the railroad car because he had been taught to stay on the same side of the train as the engineer so that they could be in visual contact. At the time of the accident, the engineer had chosen to sit on the right (the fireman's) side of the engine. Howell therefore climbed onto the right side of the railroad car, even though it was the side next to the building. Although Howell had a radio with which to communicate with the engineer, there was expert testimony that it was the best and safest procedure for a trainman to ride on the same side as the engineer was sitting because the radio batteries go dead. Howell testified that the battery in his radio would not last an entire 12-hour day if they were busy.

There was also testimony that the rule against riding on the building side of railroad cars was not enforced by the Railroad. Another employee, who had been working for the Railroad for approximately two years prior to the accident, testified that when he was a conductor it was common practice to ride on the building side of the railroad car when working the Snake Lead. The engineer also testified that the Trainmaster for the Railroad, who oversaw this part of the Railroad's operations, had seen him riding on the building side of the track at the Snake Lead and that neither the Trainmaster nor anyone else told him not to ride on the building side of cars when working on the Snake Lead. The person who was the General Manager of the Railroad at the time of the accident testified that it was the custom and practice of most of the Railroad's employees to ride on the building side of railroad cars when there was enough clearance.

The trainman riding on the side of the railroad car signaled the engineer when to stop so that the car would be positioned where the customer wanted it. Because that spot was often related to a particular building feature (e.g., a building door), it was easier for the trainman to properly line up the car if he was located between the car and the building.

When denying the Railroad's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district court held that the evidence was of a sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. The district court did not err in denying the motion for judgment n.o.v.

B. Did the trial court error in its evidentiary rulings?

This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of discretion standard. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000). Any error in the admission of evidence that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties will be disregarded. Hake v. DeLane, 117 Idaho 1058, 793 P.2d 1230 (1990); I.R.E. 103; I.R.C.P. 61. This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision regarding the relevancy of evidence. Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 886 P.2d 330 (1994). All relevant evidence is generally admissible. Id.; I.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence...