Howells v. McKibben
Decision Date | 08 June 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 48780.,48780. |
Citation | 281 NW 2d 154 |
Parties | Susan HOWELLS, Appellant, v. Roger McKIBBEN, Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
William B. Randall, County Atty., Daniel J. Buivid, Jr., and Kevin O'Connell, Asst. County Attys., St. Paul, for appellant.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, and Kathy King, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard before PETERSON, KELLY, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
This action was brought by plaintiff Susan Howells to adjudge defendant Roger McKibben the father of her child, Tammy Irene Howells. Plaintiff also seeks damages for the expenses resulting from her pregnancy and for the expenses attributable to the child's support, maintenance, and education.
Defendant, a Wisconsin resident, initially appeared before the district court in Ramsey County and at that time moved to quash service and dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Subsequently, the case was assigned to a referee, who denied defendant's motion. Defendant appealed from the referee's order to the district court, wherein the order was vacated and a motion to dismiss was granted for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff now appeals to this court from the district court's order. We reverse that order, vacate the dismissal, and remand for further proceedings.
In her complaint, dated December 1, 1976, plaintiff alleged that:
Additionally, in an affidavit submitted to the referee, plaintiff claims that she met defendant in Luck, Wisconsin, on or about February 16, 1974; that she first had sexual intercourse with defendant on or about February 19, 1974, at her apartment in St. Paul, Minnesota; that she had a relationship with defendant from February to May, 1974, including acts of sexual intercourse with defendant at his home in St. Croix Falls, Wisconsin; that during this time defendant visited plaintiff at her home in St. Paul and on two occasions in April 1974 defendant had dinner with plaintiff and her mother in St. Paul; that during plaintiff's pregnancy defendant telephoned her at her St. Paul residence to discuss the pregnancy; and that plaintiff last had sexual intercourse with defendant on or about February 15, 1975, in St. Paul.
There are two issues to be resolved before a Minnesota court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. It must be established:
(1) that there is appropriate state legislation or rule authorizing the court to exercise such jurisdiction (2) that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant does not offend the due process principles embodied in the United States Constitution.
1. The statute under which plaintiff attempts to proceed is Minn.St. 543.19, subd. 1(c), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Thus, in order for subdivision 1(c) to apply in this case, it must be shown that the instant action is based upon (1) a tort (2) committed "in Minnesota."
In State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 216 N.W.2d 140 (1974), this court held that a cause of action for paternity is based in "tort" and thus is within the intended scope of § 543.19. As the Nelson court reasoned:
298 Minn. 441, 216 N.W.2d 143.
Therefore, contrary to defendant's contention, the instant action for paternity clearly encompasses a tort within the meaning of § 543.19, subd. 1(c).
The standard for determining whether a tort is committed "in Minnesota," for purposes of applying the long-arm statute, was articulated by this court in Anderson v. Luitjens, 311 Minn. 203, 247 N.W.2d 913 (1976), as follows:
311 Minn. 206, 247 N.W.2d 915 (citations omitted).
See, also, Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S. L.W. 3498 (U. S. January 11, 1979) (No. 78-1100); Restatement, Conflict of Laws 2d, § 37.
In this case, damage from defendant's alleged tortious conduct did, indeed, occur in Minnesota. Plaintiff, a Minnesota resident, has suffered both physically and emotionally, in this state, as a result of bearing the child and raising it alone. She has undoubtedly incurred medical and hospital expenses in Minnesota incident to her pregnancy and the child's birth. Moreover, the expense associated with raising the child is substantial. See, State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, supra. All these damages occurred in Minnesota as a result of defendant's alleged tortious conduct. Therefore, consistent with Anderson v. Luitjens, supra, the alleged tort involved in this case was committed "in Minnesota" and, accordingly, § 543.19, subd. 1(c), authorizes a Minnesota court to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant.
2. The due process guarantees of the Constitution require that a defendant have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state so that "* * * maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' citations omitted." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945). In other words, the dictates of the due process clause are satisfied only if a sufficient nexus exists between Minnesota and defendant so that it is both fair and reasonable to require defense of the action in this state. See, Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 141 (1978).
The determination of whether "minimum contacts" are present in a given case must be made on a case-by-case basis; no hard and fast rule can be applied in resolving the question. As recently recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra:
436 U.S. 92, 98 S.Ct. 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 141.
The pertinent factors to be considered in making the "minimum contacts" determination are: (1) the quantity of defendant's contacts with Minnesota; (2) the nature and quality of those contacts; (3) the source and connection of the cause of action with those contacts; (4) the interests of the state in providing a forum; and (5) the convenience of the parties.2 Blamey v. Brown, supra; Sausser v. Republic Mortgage Investors, 269 N.W.2d 758 (Minn.1978); David M. Rice, Inc. v. Intrex, Inc., 257 N.W.2d 370 (Minn.1977); Anderson v. Luitjens, supra.
Plaintiff states, in her affidavit, that defendant visited her in St. Paul an unspecified number of times during February to May, 1974, and claims that on two occasions in April 1974 defendant had dinner in St. Paul with plaintiff and her mother. In addition, defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with plaintiff on at least two occasions in St. Paul. He also made telephone calls to plaintiff's Minnesota home. These facts, which are uncontradicted by defendant, show that the quantity and quality of defendant's contacts with Minnesota are significant.
Defendant's contacts with Minnesota also bear a direct relation to the instant cause of action. The above facts establish that a substantial portion of defendant's relationship with plaintiff was developed in this state. As part of this relationship defendant and plaintiff engaged in acts of sexual intercourse which, of course, resulted in the institution of plaintiff's suit. Moreover, in Anderson v. Luitjens, supra, this court noted that in considering the connection between defendant's contacts and...
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