Hubert v. State

• Citation: 312 S.W.3d 554
• Decision Date: 26 May 2010
• Docket Number: No. PD-0493-09.,PD-0493-09.
• Parties: Douglas Michael HUBERT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

312 S.W.3d 554

Douglas Michael HUBERT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-0493-09.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 26, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Blanca A. Medina, Corpus Christi, for Appellant.

Lisa C. McMinn, Asst. State's Atty., Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

PRICE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, HOLCOMB and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

In this case, the appellant's grandfather allowed the police to enter and search the appellant's bedroom in the house they shared. The question is whether the grandfather had actual authority to consent to the search of the bedroom and, failing that, whether the police could reasonably rely on his apparent authority to consent to the search. We hold that the grandfather had actual authority to consent to a search of the appellant's bedroom. Because we hold that the grandfather had actual authority, we need not address whether the apparent-authority doctrine would validate his consent to a search of his grandson's room. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

In 2004, the appellant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. He served a portion of this sentence before being released on parole. In September 2007, the appellant's grandfather, Myron Reed, informed the appellant's parole officer that the appellant had been driving without a license, had left the state, and was in possession of firearms—all violations of his parole conditions. Acting on this information, the appellant's parole officer, Aaron Garcia, issued a warrant for the appellant's arrest. Garcia forwarded the arrest warrant to Gilberto Casas, Jr., an officer with the Nueces County Constable's Office. After receiving the warrant, Casas went to the house that the appellant shared with Reed, accompanied by Officer Valverde. When they arrived at the house, the officers found the appellant on the porch. They arrested the appellant and placed him in their squad car before searching the entire house, including the appellant's bedroom. The officers found weapons and ammunition. The appellant was subsequently charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.¹

The appellant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search of his bedroom violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution, and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.² At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Garcia testified that he had issued a blue warrant for the appellant after receiving a tip from Reed that the appellant had violated his parole conditions. Asked whether Reed was the owner of the home in which the appellant resided, Garcia replied, "That I'm aware of, yes ma'am." Officer Casas testified that he had executed the blue warrant and searched the house. He stated that he spoke with Reed prior to the search and affirmed that he had obtained the consent of "the owner" of the home before conducting the search. He did not expressly testify who the owner was. On cross-examination, Casas was specifically questioned about searching the appellant's bedroom. Casas testified that the door to the appellant's bedroom had been closed and that Reed had opened the door for the officers. On cross-examination he acknowledged that he had been aware that the bedroom was occupied by the appellant and that nothing in the circumstances indicated that Reed "lived" in the appellant's bedroom. While searching the bedroom, Casas discovered a weapon on top of the entertainment center, a weapon inside of the closet, and ammunition inside the dresser.

Officer Valverde also testified about the weapons found during the search and stated that, as "far as he knew, the house belonged to Mr. Reed." On cross-examination, Valverde conceded that he had been aware at the time of the search, based on Reed's claims, that only the appellant and occasionally the appellant's fiancée slept in the bedroom. Valverde admitted that he had asked Reed no further questions regarding whatever permission Reed may have had to enter the appellant's bedroom. Reed himself did not testify at the suppression hearing.

After the State presented its evidence, the defense called Rose Carabajar, the appellant's fiancée, to testify. She stated that the appellant co-owned the house with Reed, that Reed was "excluded" from the appellant's bedroom, not allowed to enter it without express permission, and that the door to the bedroom was kept closed. Finally, the defense called the appellant to testify that he co-owned the house. The defense attempted to introduce what were represented to be certified copies of deeds reflecting such co-ownership through both of its witnesses, but the trial court sustained the State's objections and refused to receive the evidence.³

The trial court denied the appellant's motion to suppress, and the appellant subsequently entered into a plea bargain with the State whereby he pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm in exchange for five years' imprisonment. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court did not file written findings of fact or conclusions of law. The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred in denying his motion to suppress because Reed lacked actual and apparent authority to consent to a search of the appellant's bedroom.⁴ The court of appeals held that the officer's testimony did not "amount to any evidence that Reed exercised actual control over the appellant's bedroom" and that the circumstances that the officers encountered at the appellant's house—a closed door, Reed's statement that he did not sleep in the bedroom, and Reed's opening the door to the room— were "ambiguous at best, and a reasonable person in the officer's place would have inquired further."⁵ Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress and remanded the case to the trial court.⁶

The State filed a petition for discretionary review challenging the court of appeals's holding that Reed lacked actual authority to consent "just because he did not sleep in the appellant's bedroom" and that the police could not reasonably rely on Reed's apparent authority to consent to the search absent some further clarification.⁷ We granted review to examine the court of appeals's holding with respect to Reed's lack of authority, real or apparent, to consent to the search of the appellant's bedroom.⁸ We now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

APPLICABLE LAW

Standard of Review

In reviewing a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review.⁹ We will review de novo a trial court's application of law to the facts, but we will defer to the trial court on determinations of credibility and historical fact.¹⁰ Whether consent was given voluntarily under the Fourth Amendment is a fact question to be given deference.¹¹ Texas courts have not explicitly declared that the determination whether third-party consent is valid is a question of law or a question of fact.¹² As a matter of practice, however, they have analyzed the matter as a mixed question of law and fact, to be reviewed de novo, as evidenced by opinions that weigh the facts that are in the record on appeal and then make an independent legal determination.¹³ The federal circuits have been more explicit about how they review these issues on appeal, generally concluding that whether it is reasonable for the police to credit the purported consent of a third party to conduct a particular search should be treated as a mixed question of law and fact, to be reviewed by appellate courts on a de novo basis.¹⁴ Because we find that the analysis of whether a third party had authority to consent involves an application of legal principles to facts, we now hold that whether a third party had actual authority to consent to a search of another's property and whether an officer was reasonable in finding that a third party had apparent authority to consent are mixed questions of law and fact which reviewing courts should examine de novo. If, as in this case, a trial court does not enter findings of fact, a reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's rulings and assume that the trial court resolved any issues of historical fact or credibility consistently with its ultimate ruling.¹⁵

Third Party Consent

The Fourth Amendment provides protection from "unreasonable" searches and seizures by government officials.¹⁶ Over the years, the Supreme Court has examined the boundaries of reasonableness in a variety of contexts.¹⁷ Generally, searches conducted without a warrant are deemed unreasonable.¹⁸ There are, however, several well-settled exceptions to the warrant requirement.¹⁹ One such exception arises when a person voluntarily consents to a search.²⁰ Whether it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for an officer to rely on consent is a question to be determined by examining the totality of the circumstances.²¹

A third party can consent to a search to the detriment of another's privacy interest if the third party has actual authority over the place or thing to be searched. The third party may, in his own right, give valid consent when he and the absent, non-consenting person share common authority over the premises or property.²² Although property interests are relevant to this determination, the commonality of authority to consent is not determined solely by the law of property.²³ Instead, common authority is shown by

mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the

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