Hughley v. Frazier, No. A01A2462
Decision Date | 27 March 2002 |
Docket Number | No. A01A2462, No. A01A2463. |
Citation | 254 Ga. App. 544,562 S.E.2d 821 |
Parties | HUGHLEY v. FRAZIER et al. Frazier v. Hughley. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
W. Dent Acree, Atlanta, for appellant.
McLain & Merritt, M. David Merritt, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Thomas S. Carlock, Mary K. Greene, Michael A. Stickland, Atlanta, for appellees.
Austin Hughley brought this medical malpractice action against Dr. Mary Frazier and Dr. Raymond Rubin alleging that as a result of their misdiagnosis of his medical condition, surgery was required, which rendered him permanently incontinent. Both defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two-year statute of limitation had run on Hughley's claims. The trial court granted Dr. Rubin's motion but denied that of Dr. Frazier, concluding that under the "continuous treatment" doctrine discussed in Williams v. Young, 247 Ga.App. 337, 543 S.E.2d 737 (2000), questions of fact existed as to whether Frazier's treatment of Hughley was terminated within the applicable statute of limitation. In Case No. A01A2462, Hughley appeals from the grant of Dr. Rubin's motion for summary judgment, and in Case No. A01A2463, Frazier appeals from the denial of her motion. Because Hughley failed to bring his action against Dr. Rubin within two years from the date of his injury as required by OCGA § 9-3-71(a), we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to him. As for Dr. Frazier's motion, however, although the "continuous treatment" doctrine was struck down in Young v. Williams, 274 Ga. 845, 560 S.E.2d 690 (2002), we conclude that she failed to pierce the pleadings with respect to Hughley's claim that she committed fraud that tolled the statute of limitation. We therefore affirm the denial of summary judgment to Dr. Frazier.
Sometime in March or April 1996, Hughley sought treatment from Dr. Frazier for rectal complaints. The parties dispute the dates of treatment concerning those complaints. Frazier testified by affidavit, and Hughley's medical records show, that she first treated this condition on April 29, 1996. Hughley testified, however, that on April 1, 1996, Dr. Frazier examined him and diagnosed him as having "`external hemorrhoids' with large rectal opening" and began treatment for that condition. On April 11, Hughley was referred to Dr. Rubin, a gastroenterologist who performed various tests on that date and again on May 2 and diagnosed Hughley as having internal and external hemorrhoids, without any thrombosis. Dr. Rubin testified that he performed no further examinations after May 2, 1996.
This complaint was originally filed on May 18, 1998, but was later dismissed. The action was refiled as a renewal action on April 17, 2000. The central issue on appeal is whether the original action was filed against Dr. Frazier and Dr. Rubin within the two-year statute of limitation for medical malpractice actions.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ford v. Dove, 218 Ga.App. 828, 830(3), 463 S.E.2d 351 (1995), overruled in part on other grounds, Ezor v. Thompson, 241 Ga.App. 275, 279(1), 526 S.E.2d 609 (1999). See also Crawford v. Spencer, 217 Ga.App. 446, 448, 457 S.E.2d 711 (1995);1 Frankel v. Clark, 213 Ga.App. 222, 223, 444 S.E.2d 147 (1994).
The record is undisputed that Rubin did not treat Hughley after May 2, 1996. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Crown Ford, Inc. v. Crawford, 221 Ga.App. 881, 885(3), 473 S.E.2d 554 (1996). Dr. Rubin's alleged misdiagnosis, which occurred no later than May 2, 1996, occurred outside the two-year statute of limitation for medical malpractice claims, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to this defendant.
Hughley cites several cases in support of his argument that summary judgment was improperly granted to Dr. Rubin. But we find the facts and reasoning of those cases to be inapplicable. Relying on Stephen W. Brown Radiology Assoc. v. Gowers, 157 Ga.App. 770, 278 S.E.2d 653 (1981), and Whitaker v. Zirkle, 188 Ga.App. 706, 374 S.E.2d 106 (1988), Hughley contends that the confidential relationship between him and Dr. Rubin prevented him from discovering his injury until May 16, 1996. But Gowers was not a misdiagnosis case, and some evidence showed that defendants treated plaintiff within two years of plaintiff's filing of his lawsuit. Here, however, Dr. Rubin's treatment of Hughley ended May 2, 1996, outside the limitation period.
Whitaker, supra, can also be distinguished. In Whitaker, this court did create a limited exception to the general rule that a misdiagnosis constitutes the injury under OCGA § 9-3-71. We stated that Id. at 708(1), 374 S.E.2d 106. But the facts of that case differ from those here. There, the record showed that defendants misdiagnosed the presence of cancer in a mole removed from plaintiff's back in 1978. Id. at 706, 374 S.E.2d 106. For approximately seven years, plaintiff remained free of cancer symptoms, but in 1985, a biopsy of tissue from the mole revealed the presence of cancer. Id. She filed suit against her doctor and others in May 1986, within a year of her diagnosis of cancer. Id. Noting that plaintiff suffered no symptoms of cancer for several years after the misdiagnosis, this court concluded that questions of fact existed as to whether the subsequent metastasis was a separate injury. Id. at 708(1), 374 S.E.2d 106. But here, Hughley had been continuously experiencing the effects of his condition when he was diagnosed by Dr. Rubin. In fact, his complaint alleges that the anal fistula existed before his first visit with Dr. Rubin. Therefore, any injury he may have sustained occurred at the time of the misdiagnosis.
Hughley also argues that the permanent incontinence occasioned by his subsequent surgery was a new injury. We first note that the surgery, and the allegedly resultant incontinence, was part of the course of treatment of his condition resulting from the alleged misdiagnosis and was not a new injury. See Surgery Assoc. v. Kearby, 199 Ga.App. 716, 718, 405 S.E.2d 723 (1991), citing Whitaker, supra; Stone v. Radiology Svcs., 206 Ga.App. 851, 852-853, 426 S.E.2d 663 (1992) (physical precedent only) (Whitaker not applicable because injury had manifested itself at time plaintiff examined by defendants). This case is also distinguished from Walker v. Melton, 227 Ga.App. 149, 489 S.E.2d 63 (1997), and Staples v. Bhatti, 220 Ga.App. 404, 469 S.E.2d 490 (1996), cited by Hughley. In Walker, manifestations of the plaintiff's injury subsided for a time after the misdiagnosis, so that the date of any "new injury" was impossible to determine. Id. at 150-151(1), 489 S.E.2d 63. Similarly, in Staple...
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