Hughs v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 April 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:15-06079-CV-RK
• Parties: RHONDA HUGHS, NEXT FRIEND TO TSG; RANDY GROVES, T.S.G., MINOR, BY NEXT FRIEND RHONDA HUGHS; Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

RHONDA HUGHS, NEXT FRIEND TO

TSG; RANDY GROVES, T.S.G., MINOR,BY NEXT FRIEND RHONDA HUGHS; Plaintiffs, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

Case No. 5:15-06079-CV-RK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI ST. JOSEPH DIVISION

April 14, 2017

ORDER

Now pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Preemption. (Doc. 36.) In their supporting and opposing suggestions, the parties dispute whether certain claims asserted by Plaintiffs are preempted by federal law or otherwise fail as a matter of law. After careful review, the Defendant's motion (doc. 36) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background

This action for wrongful death arises from an automobile/train collision that occurred at a public railroad grade crossing in Trenton, Missouri. The accident occurred when a car driven by Nancy Groves ("Decedent") collided with a train owned by Defendant. The resulting collision killed Decedent and her two passengers. Plaintiffs allege a number of ways in which Defendant was negligent. Defendant asserts that many of Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by federal law or fail for other reasons.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A party who moves for summary judgment bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). An issue of fact is only genuine if it has a real basis in the record, and is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. at 248. When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must scrutinize the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party "must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Mirax Chem. Prods. Corp. v. First Interstate Commercial Corp., 950 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).

In resisting summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but must, by affidavit and other evidence, set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) ("mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond the nonmoving party's own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment"). In so doing, the nonmoving party "cannot create sham issues of fact in an effort to defeat summary judgment." RSBI Aerospace, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 399, 402 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Specifically, "[f]ederal preemption is an affirmative defense, and therefore the Defendant bears the burden of proof." Janero v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 1:13-CV-155-TLS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36822, at *13 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 15, 2017) (discussing federal preemption with respect to the Federal Railroad Safety Act).

III. Discussion

In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant raises the following preemption challenges to a number of Plaintiffs' claims: (A) federal law preempts Plaintiffs' claims that the train was traveling at an excessive speed; (B) federal law preempts Plaintiffs' claims related to the train's horn based on its sound, pattern and maintenance; and (C) federal law preempts Plaintiffs' claims for negligent training. Specifically, Defendant contends that the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq, and the Locomotive Inspection Act ("LIA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq, preempt these claims.

The purpose of the FRSA is to promote "safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents." See 49 U.S.C. § 20101. The FRSA has an express preemption and savings provision which states in relevant part:

(a) National uniformity of regulation.

(1) Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety and laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad security shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.

(2) A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), . . . prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or order-

(A) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard;

(B) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States Government; and

(C) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.

(b) Clarification regarding State law causes of action.

(1) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt an action under State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property damage alleging that a party-

(A) has failed to comply with the Federal standard of care established by a regulation or order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), . . . covering the subject matter as provided in subsection (a) of this section;

(B) has failed to comply with its own plan, rule, or standard that it created pursuant to a regulation or order issued by either of the Secretaries; or

(C) has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order that is not incompatible with subsection (a)(2).

49 U.S.C. § 20106.

Pursuant to the LIA, a railroad carrier can use a locomotive only when the locomotive's "parts and appurtenances":

(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury;

(2) have been inspected as required under this chapter [49 USCS §§ 20701 et seq.] and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this chapter [49 USCS §§ 20701 et seq.]; and(3) can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter [49 USCS §§ 20701 et seq.].

49 U.S.C. § 20701. "The LIA regulates the design and construction of locomotives, and the Supreme Court has held that it preempts conflicting state laws concerning locomotive equipment." Bates v. Mo. & N. Ark. R.R. Co., 548 F.3d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926)).

A. Excessive Speed Claims

Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs' claims that the train was operating at an excessive speed are preempted by federal law because the train was traveling within the speed limit set by federal law. Here, the parties' briefs address four different bases for the excessive speed claims. The parties do not dispute that the train was traveling within the speed limit set by federal law.

"Federal law generally preempts state law claims based on excessive speed in train accidents. In order to avoid preemption a plaintiff must show that [his or her] claim is an exception to the general rule." Rawls v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 1:09-cv-01037, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77253, at *8 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 22, 2011). The FRSA has established regulations setting the maximum train speeds for different classes of track. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9. Generally, "if the train was traveling within the federal speed limit, then the FRSA preempts any state or common law claim as to excessive speed." Peters v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 455 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (citing CSX Transp. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675 (1993)). An exception to such preemption is a claim for failure to slow or stop to avoid a specific individual hazard. Id. at 1002 (collecting cases). "Generally, courts considering this issue have ruled that a 'specific individual hazard' must be a discrete and truly local hazard[.]" O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R., 960 F. Supp. 1411, 1420 (W.D. Mo. 1997). The local hazards "must be aberrations which the Secretary could not have practically considered when determining train speed limits under the FRSA." Id. at 1420 (citation omitted). More precisely stated, "the 'local hazard' cannot be statewide in character and cannot be capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform, national standards." Id. at 1420-21 (citations omitted).

1. Unwavering Approach

As one basis for an excessive speed claim, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant operated the train at an excessive speed for local hazards including the unwavering approach of Decedent's car. Plaintiffs' claim that Defendant operated the train at an excessive speed given this known, specific individual hazard - the car's unwavering approach - is not preempted by the FRSA.Peters, 455 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (holding unwavering approach by a vehicle constitutes a local safety hazard therefore plaintiff's excessive speed claim was not preempted by the FRSA); see also Alcorn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 50 S.W.3d 226, 242 (Mo. banc 2001) (overruled on other grounds) ("A specific, individual hazard can include the 'unwavering approach' of a vehicle that the train crew either knew or should have known about.") (citing Griffin v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 965 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo. App. 1998)). Defendant concedes in its reply suggestions that this claim is not preempted, but maintains that it is more properly characterized as a claim that the crew should have taken evasive action rather than a claim that the train was traveling too fast. The Court will not address the merits of this claim here as they are addressed in its Order on Defendant's other motion for summary judgment (doc. 38). Therefore, D...