Marriage of Van Sickle, In re

• Decision Date: 30 March 1977
• Citation: 68 Cal.App.3d 728,137 Cal.Rptr. 568
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Beth and Jack VAN SICKLE. Beth VAN SICKLE, Appellant, v. Jack VAN SICKLE, Appellant. Civ. 2579.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 568

137 Cal.Rptr. 568

68 Cal.App.3d 728

In re the MARRIAGE OF Beth and Jack VAN SICKLE Beth VAN SICKLE, Appellant, v. Jack VAN SICKLE, Appellant.

Civ. 2579.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

March 30, 1977.

Hearing Denied June 9, 1977.

Jackson & Wheatley, H. Herbert Jackson, Anthony J. Scalora and Gregory F. Gilbert, Sacramento, for appellant Beth Van Sickle.

Watson & Hoffe, Francis A. Watson, Jr., and Ronald A. Rubenstein, Richmond, for appellant Jack Van Sickle.

OPINION ON REHEARING

GARGANO, Associate Justice.

This litigation originated in the court below on July 23, 1968, when appellant Beth Van Sickle, hereafter referred to as wife, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief as to the validity of a Nevada divorce obtained by her husband, appellant Jack Van Sickle, hereafter referred to as husband; in the same complaint, wife also sought a division of the parties' community property, custody of the parties' two minor children, child support, spousal support, attorney's fees and costs. Later, after the court noticed an intended decision holding that the Nevada divorce was invalid, wife amended her original pleading to include a petition for the dissolution of the marriage. Both sides have appealed from the interlocutory judgment the court subsequently entered dissolving the parties' marriage.

Briefly, the pertinent facts are these.

The parties were married on June 3, 1955; they separated nine years later, on June 19, 1964. At the time of separation the couple had two children, a daughter, Hettie, born on February 7, 1957, and a son, Wayne, born on March 3, 1963.

On June 3, 1955, when the parties were married, husband owned a parcel of land near Elk Grove in Sacramento County, part of which he had acquired from his parents, and part of which he had purchased from another individual. He also owned 508 acres of land in Douglas County, Nevada, and El Dorado County, California, which he purchased in 1941 for $7,000; this land was situated near and along the California-Nevada border at South Lake Tahoe and hereafter will be referred to as the Patterson Parcel.

After the marriage, the parties resided in a home situated on the California side of the Patterson Parcel. Thereafter, the couple worked hard to preserve and improve the land. In 1960 they acquired 240 acres of land in Douglas County, Nevada; this land, hereafter referred to as the Hansen Parcel, adjoined the Patterson Parcel.

During the parties' marriage a relatively small portion of the Patterson Parcel on the California side was subdivided into a shopping center, apartments and resort facilities. Later, ownership of the subdivided lands was transferred to three corporations in which husband was the only stockholder; at the time of trial the corporations and the remaining property were worth millions of dollars.

On June 19, 1964, when the parties separated, wife and the two minor children left the family residence at South Lake Tahoe and moved to Sacramento; husband later moved to the State of Nevada.

On January 22, 1965, husband filed a complaint in a Nevada state court to obtain a divorce from his wife. The complaint, among other things, alleged that husband and wife had purchased a 240-acre parcel of land in Douglas County in 1960 (i.e., the Hansen Parcel), and that they held title to the land as community property. In reality, the couple purchased the property as joint tenants, and before serving a copy of the complaint on wife, husband's lawyer deleted the words 'community property' from the copy and inserted in lieu thereof the words 'joint tenants;' the original complaint never was corrected.

On February 25, 1965, the Nevada court entered judgment granting husband a divorce from wife; although the court found that the 240 acres of property in Douglas County was community property, it awarded all of the property to husband. It is this judgment that the Superior Court of Sacramento County declared invalid.

At the conclusion of the trial in the present case, the court entered an interlocutory judgment dissolving the parties' marriage which contained numerous other judicial determinations. First, the judgment declared the Nevada divorce decree obtained by husband void and not entitled to full faith and credit in California; awarded joint legal custody of the minor children to the parties, with the physical custody of the girl, Hettie, going to husband, and the physical custody of the boy, Wayne, going to wife; and ordered husband to pay wife the sum of $200 a month toward the support of the minor child, Wayne.

Second, the judgment delineated with particularity each item of property the court Determined was community property of the marriage. However, because one of the corporations the court found to be community property was involved in a lawsuit with a third party over a leasing agreement, and because the resolution of the lawsuit could substantially affect the value of the stock of that corporation, the court did not fix the value of the stock or any other community property asset; nor did the court divide any of the community property between the parties. Instead, the court reserved jurisdiction to fix the value of the respective community property assets and to divide the community property at a later date, pursuant to the authority of subdivision (a) of the section 4800 of the Civil Code.

Third, the judgment terminated all temporary spousal support orders and directed wife to reimburse husband, either directly or from her share of the community property, at the time the community property was divided, for all of the court-ordered temporary spousal support payments husband made to her and for certain obligations he paid on her behalf. It also directed the parties to make certain adjustments for specified sums of money each party owed the corporations found to be community property, and ordered husband to pay wife the sum of $3,000 a month until such time as the community property was divided, the payments to be charged to her share of the community property. The court did not award spousal support but retained jurisdiction over that issue.

While both parties have appealed, the focal point of the appeals is on that part of the interlocutory judgment which delineates the community property; several weeks of trial were spent in the court below on this hotly contested issue, and neither party is satisfied with the court's conclusions in this respect. The central question, therefore, is whether the court's decision delineating the community property of the marriage, without fixing the value of the assets or dividing the community property between the parties, is appealable Merely because the decision is embodied in an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage which is made appealable by statute. (See Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (j).)

We have concluded that the answer to this question is in the negative. First, it is a settled principle of appellate practice that unless otherwise provided by statute, an appeal lies only from a judgment that terminates the proceeding in the lower court by disposing of all issues of law and fact, insofar as the court has the power to do so. (Bank of America v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 697, 701--702, 128 [68 Cal.App.3d 735] P.2d 357; Nolan v. Smith (1902) 137 Cal. 360, 361--362, 70 P. 166; Vallera v. Vallera (1944)64 Cal.App.2d 266, 270, 148 P.2d 694; see Tenhet v. Boswell (1976) 18 Cal.3d 150, 153, 133 Cal.Rptr. 10, 554 P.2d 330; Bakewell v. Bakewell (1942)21 Cal.2d 224, 226--227, 130 P.2d 975.) This principle, known as the 'one final judgment' rule is grounded on the theory that '. . . piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.' (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 36, p. 4050; accord Knodel v. Knodel (1975) 14 Cal.3d 752, 760, 122 Cal.Rptr. 521, 537 P.2d 353; Efron v. Kalmanovitz (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 149, 154, 8 Cal.Rptr. 107; Brown v. Memorial Nat. Home Foundation (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 448, 455, 322 P.2d 600.) Furthermore, while an exception is made as to a matter which is collateral to the main controversy, the exception applies only if the matter is severable from the general subject of the litigation, and then Only if a decision thereon determines finally the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, leaving no further judicial acts to be done by the court in regard to that matter. Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 369, 134 Cal.Rptr. 197, 556 P.2d 297; Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213, 216--217, 288 P.2d 267; Spencer v. Spencer (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 683, 688--689, 60 Cal.Rptr. 747; see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 38, 39, pp. 4052--4053.)

Second, California adheres to the concept of 'divisible divorce' (Lopez v. Lopez (1965) 63 Cal.2d 735, 737, 48 Cal.Rptr. 136, 408 P.2d 744; Hull v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 139, 147, 5 Cal.Rptr. 1, 352 P.2d 161), and, hence, controversies over division of marital property, custody of minor children and, under appropriate circumstances, spousal support need not be litigated in the proceeding brought to dissolve the marriage; such controversies may be litigated in a separate action. (Hudson v. Hudson (1959) 52 Cal.2d 735, 744--745, 344 P.2d 295; Estate of Williams (1950) 36 Cal.2d 289, 292--293, 223 P.2d 248; In re Marraige of Fink (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 362, 126 Cal.Rptr. 626; Callnon v. Callnon (1935) 7 Cal.App.2d 676, 680, 46 P.2d 988; see Hull v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.2d 139, 147--148, 5 Cal.Rptr. 1, 352 P.2d 161; cf. See v. Superior Court (1960) 55 Cal.2d 279, 280--281, 10 Cal.Rptr. 634, 359 P.2d 32; Chichester v. Chichester (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 491, 495--496, 39 Cal.Rptr. 553.) Since...