Hunsaker v. People
| Decision Date | 15 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 13SC134 |
| Citation | 351 P.3d 388,2015 CO 46 |
| Parties | William J. HUNSAKER, Jr., Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C., Norman R. Mueller, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Clifford E. Riedel, District Attorney, Eighth Judicial District, Emily Humphrey, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Katharine J. Ellison, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado
En Banc
¶ 1 We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a series of questions arising under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime SupervisionAct (“the LSA” or “the Act”), §§ 18–1.3–1001 to –1012, C.R.S. (2014), which establishes indeterminate sentencing for felony sex offenses. We primarily consider whether a minimum sentence in the aggravated range on a conviction for sexual assault on a child—pattern of abuse is legal when there is no explicit finding of aggravating circumstances. Stated differently: Is this offense subject to the same range, on the bottom end, as any other crime of violence? We also resolve three related procedural questions: Is the prosecution authorized to appeal a legal sentence entered on resentencing? If a defendant received an illegal sentence on one count, does Crim. P. 35(a) entitle him to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences? If not, does Crim. P. 35(b) nonetheless authorize a resentencing court to reconsider and reduce the defendant's legal sentences?
¶ 2 We hold: (1) when a conviction is for a sex offense that requires sentencing in accordance with the mandatory sentencing statute, the prosecution is not required to prove aggravating circumstances to support a bottom-end sentence in the aggravated range; (2) the prosecution here is authorized to appeal the post-conviction court's ruling on the defendant's Rule 35(a) motion because it challenges the legal basis for the range the post-conviction court used to impose the sentence; (3) under Crim. P. 35(a), the illegality of a sentence on one count does not entitle a defendant to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences; and (4) if a sentence is subject to correction on one count, Crim. P. 35(b) authorizes a resentencing court to reconsider and reduce the legal sentences as to all counts after it has corrected the entire sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 3 In 2006, a jury convicted William J. Hunsaker, Jr., of sexual assault on a child (count I), a class 4 felony, and sexual assault on a child—pattern of abuse (count II), a class 3 felony. See § 18–3–405(1), (2)(d), C.R.S. (2014). The trial court concluded that these offenses constituted “extraordinary risk crimes” under section 18–1.3–401(10), C.R.S. (2014). This resulted in indeterminate minimum sentencing ranges of two to eight years for count I and four to sixteen years for count II. § 18–1.3–401(10). The court sentenced Hunsaker to indeterminate terms of eight years to life imprisonment and sixteen years to life imprisonment on counts I and II, respectively.
¶ 4 In 2011, Hunsaker filed a motion to correct his sentences under Crim. P. 35(a) or, in the alternative, a motion to reduce his sentences under Crim. P. 35(b). He argued the two counts could not qualify as extraordinary risk crimes without an explicit finding of aggravating circumstances. He thus concluded that his bottom-end sentences were illegal. The prosecution conceded that neither count qualified as an extraordinary risk crime but asserted only count I's sentence was illegal. The prosecution reasoned: (1) section 18–3–405(3) expressly requires the court to sentence Hunsaker on count II in accordance with section 18–1.3–406, C.R.S. (2014), the mandatory sentencing statute for crimes of violence; (2) section 18–1.3–406 identifies a bottom-end sentencing range between the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range, which is eight to twenty-four years; and (3) the sentence for count II was lawful because it fell within this range.
¶ 5 The post-conviction court granted Hunsaker's Rule 35(a) motion. As to count I, the court determined that sexual assault on a child is not an extraordinary risk crime; therefore, the statutory presumptive range of two to six years applied. As to count II, the court concluded that it could not increase the maximum term on the bottom end to more than the presumptive maximum of twelve years. Consequently, the court reduced Hunsaker's sentence on each count to the maximum presumptive terms: six years to life and twelve years to life, respectively. The court held that because this order correcting his sentences triggered the filing deadline under Crim. P. 35(b), his alternative Rule 35(b) motion was premature.
¶ 6 The prosecution appealed the post-conviction court's order. In response, Hunsaker argued: (1) a finding of aggravating circumstances must support a bottom-end sentence that exceeds the presumptive maximum; (2) the prosecution could not appeal the propriety of a corrected sentence; and (3) an illegal sentence on one count entitled him to resentencing on both counts. The court of appeals resolved these issues in the prosecution's favor. See People v. Hunsaker, 2013 COA 5, ––– P.3d ––––.
¶ 7 First, the court of appeals held that the mandatory sentencing statute, section 18–1.3–406, does not require the prosecution to establish aggravating circumstances where the defendant's conviction is for a sex offense that constitutes a crime of violence. Id. at ¶ 40. It reasoned that sexual assault on a child—pattern of abuse constitutes a “per se” crime of violence, which “is itself an extraordinary aggravating circumstance that requires [bottom-end] sentencing in the aggravated range” of between the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range—here, eight to twenty-four years. Id. (citing § 18–1.3–401(8)(a)(I) ). The court of appeals then vacated the post-conviction court's minimum twelve-year sentence on count II and reinstated the trial court's sentence of sixteen years to life. Id. at ¶ 46.
¶ 8 Second, the court of appeals concluded that under section 16–12–102(1), C.R.S. (2014), the prosecution can appeal “any decision of a court in a criminal case upon any question of law.” Id. at ¶ 18. The court held that whether the post-conviction court miscalculated the sentencing range for count II in ruling on Hunsaker's Rule 35(a) motion “falls squarely within the ambit of section 16–12–102(1).” Id.
¶ 9 Third, the court of appeals held that if a court can correct an illegal sentence on a count merely by removing the excess time that renders the sentence illegal, a defendant is not entitled to resentencing on other counts with legal sentences. Id. at ¶¶ 21–22. Thus, count I's illegal sentence did not implicate count II's legal sentence. Id. at ¶ 22. Although Hunsaker also questions whether the resentencing court can nonetheless reconsider and reduce his legal sentence under Crim. P. 35(b), the court of appeals did not address this issue when it instructed the resentencing court to reinstate the sixteen-year sentence on count II. Id. at ¶ 46.
¶ 10 We granted Hunsaker's petition for certiorari.1
¶ 11 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 780 (Colo.2005). Our goal is to effectuate the legislature's intent. Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 444 (Colo.2007). If statutory language is clear, we apply its plain and ordinary meaning. Williams v. Kunau , 147 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo.2006). “If the statute is reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations, it is ambiguous and we determine the proper construction by examining the legislative intent, the circumstances surrounding its adoption, and possible consequences of various constructions.” Id.
¶ 12 In 1998, the General Assembly adopted the LSA to ensure that, when necessary, convicted sex offenders receive treatment and supervision for the remainder of their lives. § 18–1.3–1001 (“Legislative declaration”). The Act therefore clearly established indeterminate sentencing. As pertinent here, it mandates a top-end, or maximum, sentence of the defendant's natural life and a bottom-end, or minimum, sentence within a “presumptive range.” § 18–1.3–1004.
¶ 13 What is less clear is the interplay between the LSA and Colorado's pre-existing mandatory sentencing statute for crimes of violence, now codified at section 18–1.3–406. Under the mandatory sentencing statute, those convicted of a crime of violence must be sentenced for a term of incarceration of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense. § 18–1.3–406. The span between the top of the presumptive range and twice that is generally referred to as the “aggravated range.” It is that aggravated range that is at issue here.
¶ 14 Because it represents the heart of this case, we first address whether a bottom-end sentence in the aggravated range on a conviction for sexual assault on a child—pattern of abuse (count II) is legal when there has been no explicit finding of aggravating circumstances. To answer this question, we examine the statute defining the offense and the language of section 18–1.3–406. Because that language is ambiguous, we consult traditional statutory construction aids to discern legislative intent. We conclude that sexual assault on a child—pattern of abuse is a per se crime of violence with a bottom-end mandatory sentencing range of the midpoint in the presumptive range for that offense to twice the maximum of the presumptive range, or eight to twenty-four years. Therefore, the trial court's original sentence on this count was legal.
¶ 15 We then address related...
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