Hunt v. Villmer

• Decision Date: 09 September 2022
• Docket Number: 4:16-CV-2171 NAB
• Parties: MATTHEW DE LA HUNT, Petitioner, v. TOM VILLMER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

MATTHEW DE LA HUNT, Petitioner,
v.
TOM VILLMER, Respondent.

No. 4:16-CV-2171 NAB

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

September 9, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NANNETTE A. BAKER, MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

This closed matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the Alternative for a Certificate of Appealability, together with a Memorandum in Support. (Docs. 23, 24.) Respondent filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 26.) Petitioner filed a reply. (Doc. 27.) The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 5.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or for a Certificate of Appealability is denied.

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner was convicted by a jury on the sole charge of attempted enticement of a child. After completing his appeals and post-conviction relief in state court, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and then an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docs. 1, 10.) Petitioner asserted fifteen grounds for relief in his amended petition. The Court denied the amended petition and did not grant a certificate of appealability on any ground.

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(Doc. 21.) Petitioner now asks the Court to reconsider its denial of the amended petition or, in the alternative, to grant him a certificate of appealability.^[1]

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a party to seek to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days after the entry of the judgment. Rule 59(e) was adopted to make clear that the district court possesses the power “‘to rectify its own mistakes in the period immediately following' its decision.” Banister v. Davis, 140 S.Ct. 1698, 1703 (2020) (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982)). Rule 59(e) motions are used to correct “manifest errors of law or fact, or to present newly discovered evidence.” United States v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Innovative Home Health Care, Inc. v. P.T.-O.T. Assocs. of the Black Hills, 141 F.3d 1284, 1286 (8th Cir. 1998); and Hagerman v. Yukon Energy Corp., 839 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir.1988)). “[C]ourts will not address new arguments or evidence that the moving party could have raised before the decision issued.” Banister, 140 S.Ct. at 1703.

Relief pursuant to this rule is subject to a court's broad discretion. Briscoe v. Cty. of St. Louis, Mo., 690 F.3d 1004, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2012). A court abuses its discretion when it fails to consider an important factor, assigns significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or commits a clear error of judgment weighing those factors. Simmons v. United States, No. 4:11CV01983 ERW, 2013 WL 798046, at *3 (E.D. Mo. March 5, 2013) (citing Rattray v.

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Woodbury Cty., Iowa, 908 F.Supp.2d 976, 1008 (N.D. Iowa 2012)). A court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 59 motion when the purpose of the motion is to repeat arguments the district court already rejected. See Preston v. City of Pleasant Hill, 642 F.3d 646, 652 (8th Cir. 2011).

B. Grounds 13-15: Procedurally Defaulted Claims and Application of Martinez

Petitioner claims the Court misapplied Martinez, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272, when it held Grounds 13, 14, and 15 of the amended habeas petition were procedurally defaulted. Specifically, Petitioner contends the Court erred by applying an overly strict standard in rejecting his underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as insubstantial because this Court conducted an analysis of the merits of the claim. Petitioner asserts the Court should not “perform a full merits review[,]” but instead should review the underlying claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under a standard “akin to that for determining whether a certificate of appealability should be issued.” (Doc. 24 at 5.)

Under Martinez, ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute cause to excuse a petitioner's procedural default of a claim based on post-conviction counsel's failure to properly raise a claim of ineffective trial counsel in state court when the state's collateral review proceeding was the initial review proceeding for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14, 132 S.Ct. 1309. Under this exception, the petitioner can overcome the procedural default of a claim if “(1) post-conviction counsel performed deficiently; (2) ‘there was a reasonable probability that, absent the deficient performance, the result of the postconviction proceedings would have been different'; and (3) the ‘underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one.'” Dickinson v. Shinn, 2 F.4th 851, 858 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1162, 212 L.Ed.2d 37 (2022). To meet this

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narrow exception for establishing cause, the petitioner must demonstrate that post-conviction counsel was ineffective under the standards of Strickland. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14, 132 S.Ct. 1309; Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 771, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017).

In determining whether the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is “substantial” under the third requirement, Martinez instructs “that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit[,]” similar to the showing required for a certificate of appealability. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) for the standards for certificates of appealability to issue)). In Buck, the United States Supreme Court held that while the petitioner's underlying ineffective-assistance-of counsel-claim is held to the Strickland standard, for purposes of a certificate of appealability the petitioner must only demonstrate that “jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Buck, 137 S.Ct. at 773 (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029). The Supreme Court explained that this threshold inquiry “is not coextensive with a merit analysis” and “should be decided without ‘full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.'” Id. (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029).

Petitioner contends the Court erred in finding his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims were procedurally barred because the Court conducted an “analysis of the merits” in contravention of the dictates of Buck and Martinez. Petitioner's claim misstates the Court's rulings. First, in addition to discussing Ground 15 on the merits, the Court specifically denied Ground 15 as time-barred because Petitioner failed to show that he was in custody pursuant to § 2254 when he raised Ground 15. (Doc. 21 at 10-12.) Second, in denying relief on Ground 13 related to failure

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to obtain or present certain experts, the Court found that the selection of witnesses is a matter of trial strategy, and Petitioner did not demonstrate deficient performance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to retain certain experts, nor did Petitioner demonstrate prejudice based on trial counsel's decision. (Doc. 21 at 55-61.) Petitioner does not point to specific issues regarding the Court's ruling on Ground 14, nor has he established a manifest error of law for the Court's consideration. Because Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Court made a manifest error of law in assessing, for purposes of Martinez, Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as presented in Grounds 13, 14, and 15 of the amended habeas petition, the Court finds no basis to alter or amend its judgment denying Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on this basis.

Petitioner also claims the Court erred in finding Grounds 13, 14, and 15 of the amended habeas petition were procedurally defaulted because the Court incorrectly evaluated postconviction counsel's performance under the “appellate counsel standard” of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner suggests the Court erroneously relied upon the decision in Muhammad v. Cassady, No. 4:13-cv-1816-SPM, 2016 WL 4493682, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2016) (citing Link v. Luebbers, 469 F.3d 1197, 1205 (8th Cir. 2006) and finding the that the logic in not holding appellate counsel “to be ineffective for...