Huntamer v. Coe

• Decision Date: 14 July 1952
• Docket Number: No. 32201,32201
• Citation: 246 P.2d 489,40 Wn.2d 767
• Parties: HUNTAMER et al. v. COE, Secretary of State.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 767

40 Wn.2d 767

246 P.2d 489

HUNTAMER et al. v. COE, Secretary of State.

No. 32201.

Supreme Court of Washington, en Banc.

July 14, 1952.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 29, 1952.

Smith Troy,

Lyle, L. Iverson, Olympia, for appellant.

Hatten & Lesser, Seattle, for respondent.

Kenneth A. MacDonald, Seattle, amicus curiae.

FINLEY, Justice.

Plaintiffs, seeking an adjudication of alleged rights under our declaratory judgment act, instituted this suit in the superior court for Thurston county against the secretary of state, Earl Coe, in his capacity as chief election officer of the state of Washington. Specifically, plaintiffs sought to have § 16, and subsection (e) of § 1, of chapter 254, Laws of 1951, adjudged unconstitutional, null, and void.

The trial court took jurisdiction of the case on the basis that the declaratory judgment act was applicable, and adjudged the above provisions of chapter 254, supra (hereinafter referred to as chapter 254), to be unconstitutional, null, and void. The secretary of state has appealed.

The facts in this case may be briefly stated as follows: As found by the trial court, L. C. Huntamer, Thomas C. Rabbitt, Florence M. Morrissey, and James A. McDaniel, residents and electors of this state, desire and intend to become candidates, respectively, for governor, United States Congress and the state legislature.

The secretary of state has indicated that, in connection with the filing of declarations of candidacy, and pursuant to § 16 and subsection (e) of § 1 of chapter 254, he, or the proper county election officials, will require that candidates for governor, United States Congress, and the state legislature execute an affidavit as follows:

'Declaration and Affidavit of Candidacy

'(For Partisan Offices)

Defendant's Exhibit No. 1

Thurston County Cause No. 26451

Date Admitted 5/26/52

'State of Washington

'County of _____} ss.

'Declaration

'I, (Please print name), declare upon honor that I reside at (Street and number, or, rural route), of (Name of city or town) County of _____, State of Washington, and am a qualified voter therein, and a member of the (Political party affiliation) Party; that I hereby declare myself a candidate for nomination to the office of _____ to be made at the primary election to be held on the ___ day of September, 19__, and hereby request that my name be printed upon the official primary ballots, as provided by law, as a candidate of the _____ Party and I accompany herewith the sum of _____ Dollars, the fee required by law of me for becoming such a candidate.

'Affidavit

'Further, I do solemnly swear that I have read the provisions of Section 1, Chapter 254, Laws of 1951, of the State of Washington, defining a subversive person as quoted below; that I understand and I am familiar with the contents thereof; and that I am not a subversive person as therein defined.

'________

(Please print name to assure correct spelling)

'Sign Here ________

(Signature of candidate as name will appear upon ballot)

'Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day of _____, 19__.

________

(Signature of official)

________

(Official title)

'Excerpts of Chapter 254, Laws 1951

'Sworn Statement by Candidate.

'Sec. 16. No person shall become a candidate for election under the laws of the State of Washington to any public office whatsoever in this state, unless he or she shall file an affidavit that he or she is not a subversive person as defined in this act. No declaration of candidacy shall be received for filing by any election official of any county or subdivision in the State of Washington or by the Secretary of State of the State of Washington unless accompanied by the affidavit aforesaid, and there shall not be entered upon any ballot voting machine at any election the name of any person who has failed or refused to make the affidavit as set forth herein.

'Definition of a Subversive Person

'Sec. 1, Paragraph (e) 'Subversive person' means any person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the constitutional form of the government of the United States, or of the State of Washington, or any political subdivision of either of them, by revolution, force, or violence; or who is a member of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization.'

The applicable provisions of chapter 254, § 16, and subsection (e) of § 1, are set forth above in our full quotation of the declaration and affidavit of candidacy proposed by the secretary of state.

Two questions are involved in this appeal:

(1) Whether, under our declaratory judgment act, (RCW 7.24), Rem.Rev.Stat., (Sup.) § 784 (-1, et seq.) Laws of 1935, chapter 113, plaintiffs have spelled out a case that justifies an adjudication of their alleged rights; and

(2) Whether chapter 254, Laws of 1951, is unconstitutional, (a) in that it allegedly imposes qualifications for office upon candidates for Congress and candidates for certain state constitutional offices in addition to those qualifications required by the United States and the Washington state constitutions relative to the particular offices; and (b) in that chapter 254 requires an oath or affidavit of candidates for the particular offices, allegedly, with the result that chapter 254 is ex post facto in effect, and is in the nature of a bill of attainder, imposing a disqualification or punishment upon the particular candidates for past conduct or activity not previously proscribed or illegal.

Plaintiffs state they will be prevented from becoming candidates for the respective offices because they cannot or will not execute the oath or affidavit as proposed by the secretary of state as they interpret and understand it and its effect.

Because of the particular circumstances in this case, involving as they do some questions of considerable public interest and importance, we think the trial court acted properly in assuming jurisdiction to adjudicate certain questions in the case under our declaratory judgment statute. In saying this, we are fully aware of the decisions regarding our declaratory judgment act in the following cases: Washington Beauty College, Inc., v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 80 P.2d 403; Johnson v. State, 187 Wash. 605, 60 P.2d 681, 106 A.L.R. 237; Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341, 114 A.L.R. 1345; and State ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima County, 192 Wash. 179, 73 P.2d 759.

In Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments 1413 (1951), the following statement is found:

'A petition for a declaratory judgment is particularly appropriate to determine the constitutionality of a statute, when the parties desire, and the public need requires, a speedy determination of the public interest involved therein.'

In Allison v. Sharp, 209 N.C. 477, 481, 184 S.E. 27, 30, where the facts admittedly were somewhat different from those in the case at bar, the supreme court of North Carolina said:

'* * * the plaintiffs and all the people of the state are vitally affected by the statute in controversy. While there was another remedy at law available to them, they have challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which they contend that the registrar refused them registration. Under such circumstances and conditions, the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act affords a ready means of testing its validity * * *.'

We will now discuss the questions relating to the constitutionality of the indicated provisions of chapter 254. Oaths of office and oaths of allegiance have been of tremendous importance in the organization and functioning of society since very ancient times. In Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 581, 71 A.2d 352, 353, 18 A.L.R.2d 241, we find a pertinent reference as follows:

"* * * No country can subsist a twelve-month where an oath is not thought binding; for the want of it must necessarily dissolve society,' Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 34 (Ch. 1744). The oath has played a significant part in government from the earliest times; thus we find Lycurgus saying to the Athenians: 'An oath is the bond that keeps the state together,' Oratio in Leocraten 80, and Montesquieu attributing the strength of the Romans to their respect for an oath: 'Such was the influence of an oath among these people that nothing bound them stronger to the laws. They often did more for the observance of an oath then they would have done for the thirst of glory or the love of their country,' The Spirit of the Laws, Book VIII, chap. 13. Wigmore has traced the long history of the oath from its 'summoning of Divine vengeance upon false swearing,' to 'a method of reminding the witness of the Divine punishment somewhere in store for false swearing,' 6 Wigmore on Evidence 285. The importance of the oath in judicial proceedings cannot be overestimated; the judge on the bench, the jury in the box, the attorneys at the counsel table, the witness on the stand, the court stenographer taking a record of the proceedings, and even the bailiffs when they retire to guard the jury in its deliberations, are all sworn to do their respective duties before they are permitted to act. The responsibilities of members of the Legislature and other state officers are certainly of no less importance to the public welfare.'

Some considerable distinction may be noted between (a) an oath of office and (b) an oath of allegiance. The first, in its simplest terms, merely requires an office holder to perform the duties of his office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of his ability. An oath of allegiance, on the other hand, has somewhat different ramifications; in simple form, the person taking the latter kind of oath usually pledges to support and defend the principles or purposes of the organization of which he is a member or an officer....