Marchioro v. Chaney

• Decision Date: 20 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 45014,45014
• Citation: 582 P.2d 487,90 Wn.2d 298
• Parties: Karen MARCHIORO, William Baarsma, Richard Schroeder, Robert Fithian, Ruth Fisher, Doris Evans, William Pierce and Kathy Reid, Respondents, v. Neale V. CHANEY and the Washington State Democratic Committee, Appellants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 298

90 Wn.2d 298

582 P.2d 487

Karen MARCHIORO, William Baarsma, Richard Schroeder, Robert Fithian, Ruth Fisher, Doris Evans, William Pierce and Kathy Reid, Respondents, v. Neale V. CHANEY and the Washington State Democratic Committee, Appellants.

No. 45014.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

July 20, 1978.

Trethewey & Brink, Winship A. Todd, Jr., Daniel Brink, Seattle, for appellants.

Wickwire, Lewis, Goldmark, Dystel & Schorr, Charles A. Goldmark, Seattle, for respondents.

DOLLIVER, Justice.

This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by plaintiffs who are active in the affairs of the Democratic Party in the State of Washington. Included are the chairwoman of the King County Democratic Central Committee, the chairmen of the Pierce County and Spokane County Democratic Central Committees, and several members of the Democratic Party of the State of Washington. Defendants are the incumbent chairman and the members of the Washington State Democratic Committee, established in conformity with RCW 29.42.020.

The bases of plaintiffs' action are that (1) RCW 29.42.020 and .030, which provide the two members of the State Democratic Committee elected by the county central committees be of the opposite sex and the chairman and vice chairman of the State Democratic Committee be of the opposite sex, violate Const. art. 31, the equal rights amendment (ERA); (2) RCW 29.42.020, by regulating the size and composition of the State Democratic Committee, violates the right of freedom of association found in the first amendment of the United States Constitution and Const. art. 1, § 4, the right to assemble; and (3) the "Charter of the Democratic Party of Washington" adopted by the Washington State Democratic Convention in Olympia on June 12, 1976, which, Inter alia, in article 4(G)4 provided for the composition of the state committee, is binding on the State Democratic Committee. Article 4(G)4 specifically provides The State Democratic Committee membership shall be organized according to state law: however, in addition to having two (2) delegates per county as voting members, each legislative district shall elect one voting member. Each district representative shall be allowed to vote on all matters or issues, policies and goals which would reasonably fall within the function of the state convention and as allowed by state law. Legislative district representatives shall be elected by the Legislative district organization at their organization meeting, or by the county chairpersons and the state committee persons of the counties within the district with their votes being weighted on the same basis as the last previous state convention in those districts with more than one county.

The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on each of these claims. We reverse on issues (1) and (2) and partly affirm and partly reverse on issue (3).

The state committee referred to in RCW 29.42.020 and .030 was created by laws enacted in 1909. Laws of 1909, ch. 82, § 6, p. 175. At that time, the state committee was composed of one member elected by the county committee from each county. In 1927, the composition from each county to the state committee was changed to one committee-man and one committee-woman. Laws of 1927, ch. 200, § 1, p. 287. In 1939, the requirement was enacted which provided for officers of the state and county committees and the further mandate that they must include a chairman and vice chairman who shall be of the opposite sex. Laws of 1939, ch. 48, § 1, p. 153. Regulation by statute of political parties in this state has been in effect since 1907. Laws of 1907, ch. 209, p. 457. State committees, whose size and composition were mandated by statute, have been in effect since 1909; equal representation by sex of the governing body of the state committee has been required since 1927; and a state committee chairman and vice chairman of the opposite sex have been required since 1939.

Before proceeding to the substantive issues, there is a procedural matter to be considered. Defendants argue the trial court did not have jurisdiction because of plaintiffs' failure to join the State Republican Committee in this action. Defendants point to RCW 7.24.110 which requires joinder of "all persons . . . who have or claim any interest which would be affected" in an action for declaratory relief and to CR 19 which requires the joinder of indispensable parties. It is alleged the State Republican Committee, also constituted by RCW 29.42.020, has an interest which will be affected should that statute or portions of it be held unconstitutional: I. e., defendants allege if the statute is held unconstitutional, all state committees established under it, since they have no other statutory authority, will cease to exist.

We have held joinder is required only when the interest of the other persons might be adversely affected by the proceedings. Williams v. Poulsbo Rural Tel. Ass'n, 87 Wash.2d 636, 643, 555 P.2d 1173 (1976). Also, CR 19(a)(2)(A) requires joinder when a person claims an interest and the proceedings may "as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest". Thus, the question is whether an interest of the State Republican Committee may be prejudiced by the proceedings.

RCW 29.42.020 establishes state committees as integral parts of the party organization. King County Republican Comm. v. Republican State Comm., 79 Wash.2d 202, 211, 484 P.2d 387 (1971). It also enumerates certain powers of the state committee and provides for a meeting in January of each odd-numbered year. Even if a portion of a statute is void, the entire statute need not be struck down unless the invalid portion is unseverable. See Distilled Spirits Inst. v. Kinnear, 80 Wash.2d 175, 176, 492 P.2d 1012 (1972).

Here, as pointed out by plaintiffs, the relief sought would serve only to lift restrictions on the party's power to constitute its state committee; it would not eliminate the committee. Thus, although the requirement that committee members be of a certain sex or be chosen pursuant to a certain formula may be void, the statutory establishment and enumeration of powers would remain, and the committee would not cease to exist or be hindered in any way. The real interest of the State Republican Committee is to exercise the powers enumerated in RCW 29.42.020. The continued exercise of these powers is not threatened by this action. We hold no interest is prejudiced, and we hold the trial court had jurisdiction.

I THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT

Prior to reaching the ERA issue, we must address defendants' argument that plaintiffs have made no showing of actual or imminent injury to themselves and thus have no standing. Defendants further contend this is not an exceptional case of broad public import allowing the court to decide an otherwise nonjusticiable issue within the rule of Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wash.2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952). Distilled Spirits Inst. v. Kinnear, supra, citing Huntamer, held a question of public interest which has been adequately briefed and argued may be decided by the court in an advisory opinion if to do so would be beneficial to the public and to government officers. Because we hold plaintiffs have standing, we need not reach the question of whether this is such an exceptional case of broad public import as to overcome lack of standing.

A person has standing to raise constitutional questions when his interest is a " 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.' " DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash.2d 11, 24, 507 P.2d 1169, 1177 (1973). In Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F.Supp. 673, 677 (W.D.Wash.1970), the court held state party officers and members who participate regularly in the selection of their representatives (in that case to state and national conventions) "have a deep personal stake in the outcome" of a challenge to the constitutionality of selection procedures.

Plaintiffs here identify two interests which give them a "stake in the outcome" of this issue: First they assert that if the party is allowed to supplement the number of members on the state committee with legislative district representatives, the 50-50 sex division may be applicable to newly created committee seats, thus threatening at least two of the plaintiffs with exclusion on the basis of their sex. The second interest asserted is that of electing party officials by voting one's conscience free from statutory sex criteria.

We hold plaintiffs have a sufficient interest to give them standing and that all the elements of a justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (RCW 7.24) are present, pursuant to the interpretation of that statute in State ex rel. O'Connell v. Dubuque, 68 Wash.2d 553, 558, 413 P.2d 972 (1966).

While we agree with plaintiffs on the question of standing, we disagree with their views that RCW 29.42.020 and .030 violate the equal rights amendment. Const. art. 31, § 1, approved in 1972, reads as follows:

Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.

In memoranda to the trial court and briefs to this court, plaintiffs assert the equal rights amendment forbids any classification based on sex. They cite Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash.2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975), in support of this view. This is not, however, what Darrin said. The determination that classification by sex is suspect, which is the key to the analysis used under equal protection (Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash.2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973)), has been replaced by the new demands of the equal rights amendment. As we said in Darrin v. Gould, supra, 85 Wash.2d at 871, 540 P.2d at 889:

Const. art. 31, provided the latest expression of the constitutional law of the state, dealing with sex discrimination, as adopted by the people themselves. Presumably the people in adopting Const. art. 31 intended to do more than repeat what was already...