Hunter v. Conner

• Decision Date: 28 October 1925
• Parties: HUNTER v. CONNER ET AL. HUNTER v. HAMILTON COUNTY ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

277 S.W. 71

152 Tenn. 258

HUNTER v. CONNER ET AL.

HUNTER v. HAMILTON COUNTY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

October 28, 1925

Appeal from Chancery Court, Hamilton County; W. B. Garvin Chancellor.

Suits by Thomas S. Hunter against Sam A. Conner and others, and against Hamilton County and others. From an adverse decree of the chancellor, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

COOK J.

This appeal involves the validity of chapter 101 of the Acts of 1921, to fix the salaries of certain county officials, and provide for the disposition of the fees of their office. Four previous acts, intended to transfer fees to the public treasury and compensate officials by a fixed salary, were declared void.

Chapter 8 of Acts of 1879 was held void because violative of article 2, § 17, of the Constitution, in State v. McCann, 4 Lea 14.

Chapter 124, Acts of 1897, was declared void in Weaver v Davidson County, 104 Tenn. 316, 59 S.W. 1105, because it circumscribed the authority of county courts to determine the number of deputies and their salary in two classes of counties, and imposed no restriction upon counties of another class. It was held void as violative of article 11, § 8, of the Constitution.

Chapter 47, Acts of 1917, classified 13 counties wherein compensation was provided, and excluded 83 counties without providing compensation by salary or otherwise. This classification was declared violative of article 1, § 8, and article 11, § 8, of the Constitution, in Hickman v. Wright, 141 Tenn 417, 210 S.W. 447.

Chapter 77, Private Acts of 1917, to deprive officers of their fees in Shelby county, and to provide salaries, was void because it imposed burdens upon officers of Shelby county to the exclusion of others, and suspended a general law for the benefit of a single county. State v. Stewart, 147 Tenn. 375, 247 S.W. 984.

The legislative history of the state shows a purpose to abolish the system of compensating officers by fees, to transfer the fees to the public treasury, and allow county officials a salary not to exceed the maximum of fees coming to the particular office, and proportioned to fit the obligations and duties of the particular officer. The act under review expresses a similar purpose. This act deprives all county officials of their fees, and regulates their compensation in all the counties of the state, classified by reference to population.

Upon hearing before the chancellor, he sustained the act, after eliding the second paragraph of section 4, which was held an unauthorized delegation of legislative power.

Upon appeal, it is urged that the act is void because:

First, the caption embraces more than one subject, while the body of the act embodies many unrelated subjects of legislation contrary to article 2, § 17, of the Constitution.

Second, the act is arbitrary and capricious in its classification, contrary to article 1, § 8, and article 11, § 8, of the Constitution; that it imposes burdens on officers of one class of which others are relieved, and deprives county officials of their authority and lawful compensation without due process of law, in that it takes away their inherent right to employ deputies, conduct their office according to their judgment, and denies them adequate compensation for their services.

Third, that the act delegates legislative power to the courts in violation of the Constitution.

The caption of the act reads:

"An act to be entitled 'An act fixing the salaries of certain county officials in the state, to wit: The several clerks and masters of the chancery courts, clerks and masters of the various special chancery courts, clerks of the various county and probate, circuit, criminal and special courts, county trustees, register of deed, and sheriffs; to provide for the disposition of the fees of their offices; to fix the salaries of said officers and to provide for the payment thereof; to provide for the appointment and removal of deputies and assistants to said officers and to prescribe the manner of fixing their compensation and the payment thereof; to provide for the payment of the expenses of the offices and for a system of auditing for said offices; to provide punishment for the violation of certain provisions of this act, and to otherwise regulate the rights, duties and liabilities of the said officers and to repeal all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this act.' "

The act expresses a legislative purpose to abolish the old system and institute a new one by fixing a maximum salary for all county officials after first transferring all the fees of the office to the county treasury. This single purpose is expressed in sections 1 to 4, inclusive. All subsequent sections of the act relate to details necessary to carry out the legislative intention, and are germane to the object expressed in the caption and followed up in the body of the act.

The purpose of article 2, § 17, of the Constitution, was to give notice of the nature of the proposed legislation and prevent surprise and fraud in the enactment of laws. Memphis Street Railway Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460.

Before the Constitution of 1870, the practice prevailed of preparing omnibus bills containing incongruous subjects, with a view of enlisting the aid of as many legislators as were interested in the several subjects, and by such combination of effort to pass the bill as a whole when no one of the subjects so embraced could have secured the favorable consideration of the Legislature or a majority of its members. This was not the only evil met by article 2, § 17. Experience had shown that objectionable provisions were craftily introduced into pending measures, without intimation given in the title. Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk, 515; State v. Hayes, 116 Tenn. 540, 93 S.W. 98.

To prevent objectionable legislation through such methods, it was provided in article 2, § 17, that:

"No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title. All acts which repeal, revive or amend former laws, shall recite in their caption, or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, revived or amended."

To meet this constitutional requirement it is not necessary for the title to index the details of the act or give a synopsis of it. Memphis Street Railway Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460. It is sufficient to direct the mind to the object of the proposed legislation (Truss v. State, 13 Lea, 312); the general purpose being accomplished, if the caption states the object of the legislation so that the legislative intent may be gathered from the words used ( Van Dyke v. Thompson, 136 Tenn. 136, 189 S.W. 62; Ryan v. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 126, 50 S.W. 744, 45 L. R. A. 303). The Legislature must determine how broad and comprehensive the object of the act shall be, and the particularity to be employed in the title defining it ( State v. Cumberland Club, 136 Tenn. 84, 188 S.W. 583), but the question of whether the provisions of the act are congruous and germane must be determined by the court upon an inspection of its terms. Frazier v. Railroad, 88 Tenn. 138, 12 S.W. 537.

The provisions of the act relating to the diversion of fees from the several offices to the county treasury, the requirement that officers keep an account of the fees collected, the provision for an audit and accounting of the fees so collected by the office, and the requirement that counties shall furnish office supplies and other related provisions, are not incongruous, but refer to the one general subject expressed in the caption, and form a natural connection with it. These provisions were necessary to accomplish the object of the Legislature as expressed in the caption. It was not necessary to provide for these details in a separate act. Such a requirement would be unreasonable and impractical. State ex rel. Morrell v. Fickle, 3 Lea, 79.

When the subject of a statute is sufficiently expressed in the title, the measure, modes, means, or instrumentalities of its enforcement, administration, or accomplishment may be embraced in its body, though not recited in the caption. Petty v. Ph nix Cotton Oil Co., 150 Tenn. 295, 264 S.W. 353.

We have no difficulty in concluding that the caption of the act expresses one general subject, and expresses it sufficiently to meet the requirement of the Constitution, and that the provisions of the act are germane to the title, and not inconsistent with each other.

It is next urged that the act violates article 2, § 17, of the Constitution, by failing to state the substance of the title of acts repealed. While the conclusion of the caption and the provisions of section 23 read, "to repeal all laws and parts of laws in conflict," the act is not a repealing statute. It does not in fact expressly repeal any law. Such words, of themselves, used in an act, do not give to it the character of a repealing statute. They add nothing to the meaning of the act, and take nothing from it, and must be regarded as surplusage. State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 558, 32 S.W. 481, 34 L. R. A. 656; Turner v. State, 111 Tenn. 606, 69 S.W. 774; Knoxville v. Lewis, 12 Lea 183.

In Turner v. State, the last clause of the caption reads, "to repeal all laws in conflict with this act." The last section of the act contained a general repealing clause. The court said the repealing clause had no legal effect, that the act is of the same legal import in point of validity as if the clause were omitted, because the words without more did not give character to the act.

Through the second and fourth assignments of error it is urged that the act violates article 1, § 8, and article 11, § 8, of the Constitution.

Article 11, § 8, forbids legislation which grants favors and benefits inconsistent...