Hutchison v. State

• Decision Date: 18 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. A99A1265.,A99A1265.
• Citation: 239 Ga. App. 664,522 S.E.2d 56
• Parties: HUTCHISON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

522 S.E.2d 56

239 Ga. App. 664

HUTCHISON v. The STATE.

No. A99A1265.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 18, 1999.

Elaine T. McGruder, Atlanta, for appellant.

Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Todd E. Naugle, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. MILLER, Judge.

Convicted of rape, Neil Hutchison appeals on three grounds: insufficiency of the evidence, the sustaining of Batson challenges to four females struck by Hutchison, and the admission of a prior similar transaction. We affirm.

1. Based on the evidence presented, could any rational trier of fact have found Hutchison guilty of rape beyond a reasonable doubt? See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Here the victim testified that while she was sunbathing in her bathing suit, Hutchison asked permission to place his beer in her refrigerator. She consented, and once Hutchison was inside the residence, he grabbed her wrists and over her objections forced sexual intercourse upon her. As Hutchison escaped, she cried for help from a neighbor, who called police. Police found the victim traumatized and hysterical, with red marks on her throat, upper arm and chest and with a torn strap on her bathing suit.

After running from police for a day, Hutchison was apprehended and admitted to sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed she consented in exchange for $50. He further contended that she falsely accused him of rape because he took the $50 back before leaving.

Hutchison argues that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is insufficient to sustain a rape conviction. This argument is without merit. Maloy v. State, 237 Ga.App. 873, 874(1), 516 S.E.2d 370 (1999); Littleton v. State, 225 Ga.App. 900, 901(1), 485 S.E.2d 230 (1997). "The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact." OCGA § 24-4-8. And corroboration is no longer necessary to establish rape. Baker v. State, 245 Ga. 657, 665-666(5), 266 S.E.2d 477 (1980).

Moreover, corroboration was shown. The physical marks on the victim's body and her emotional state reflected a recent non-consensual struggle, and Hutchison's evasion of police constituted circumstantial evidence of a consciousness of guilt. Anderson v. State, 225 Ga.App. 727, 728, 484 S.E.2d 783 (1997); Gearin v. State, 208 Ga.App. 878, 879(1), 432 S.E.2d 818 (1993); see Renner v. State, 260 Ga. 515, 517(3)(b), 397 S.E.2d 683 (1990).

2. Hutchison used eleven of his fourteen peremptory strikes to remove females from the jury, resulting in all eight white female venire persons being removed and in only two females remaining on the thirteen-person jury. The State challenged these selections under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), as unconstitutional. The court sustained the challenge as to four of the removed females and reinstated them onto the jury.

Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 150-151(2), 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996), summarized: "The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of race or gender, or the assumption that a venireperson will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the person's race or gender. [Cit.]" The party challenging the selections must first make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by pointing to relevant facts giving rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 151, 476 S.E.2d 252. Here the State pointed to the elimination of all white females from the jury through Hutchison's use of 11 of his 14 strikes to strike females.

Once a prima facie case is made, the proponent of the strikes is asked to set forth a race/gender-neutral, case-related reason for each challenged strike. The opponent of the strikes may then show why the purported reasons are pretextual, and the court then determines whether the opponent has carried his burden to show that discriminatory intent motivated the strikes. "The trial court's findings concerning whether the opponent of the strike has carried the burden of persuasion are entitled to great deference and will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. [Cit.]" Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 152(2), 476 S.E.2d 252.

Here Hutchison failed to announce a race/gender-neutral reason for striking Flynn, one of the four females reinstated. His counsel admitted the rationale was that she was a young, white female who would closely identify with the victim (also a young, white female). He even admitted (i) picking certain jurors because they were white males and would therefore identify with the defendant, and (ii) excluding older females because they would be "sympathetic" to the victim and excluding younger females because they would be "antithetical" to the defendant. This is precisely the type of stereotyping that Batson and J.E.B. prohibit. See Tedder v. State, 265 Ga. 900, 901(2), 463 S.E.2d 697 (1995); Herrin v. State, 221 Ga.App. 356, 359, 471 S.E.2d 297 (1996) (counsel's admission of gender consideration is automatically an unconstitutional strike).

Although Hutchison did set forth a race/gender-neutral reason for striking the other three reinstated females, these reasons were suspect in light of his admissions. Moreover, the State in each case showed that similarly situated males were seated on the jury, a well-recognized method of demonstrating that discriminatory intent motivated a strike. See Turner, supra, 267 Ga. at 151(2), 476 S.E.2d 252; Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 559(3), 423 S.E.2d 245 (1992). ...