Hutchison v. State
| Decision Date | 07 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 85548.,SC 85548. |
| Citation | 150 S.W.3d 292 |
| Parties | Brandon HUTCHISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Melinda K. Pendergraph, Office of the Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Stephanie M. Morrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Brandon Hutchison was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. This Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal.1 The court overruled Hutchison's Rule 29.15 postconviction motion. On appeal, this Court, without addressing the other issues raised, remanded the postconviction motion for hearing on whether the state failed to reveal a plea agreement with the primary witness against Hutchison.2 After the hearing on remand, the court again denied relief. All issues raised by Hutchison relating to his postconviction motion are now before this Court.
The denial of relief as to the guilt phase of the trial, including the denial of relief on the state's alleged failure to disclose a plea agreement with the primary witness against Hutchison is affirmed.
As to the penalty phase of Hutchison's trial, however, this Court concludes that Hutchison's trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of his impaired intellectual functioning. Counsel have a duty under the United States Constitution to conduct a reasonable investigation and to present evidence of impaired intellectual functioning — evidence that is inherently mitigating — in the penalty phase of a murder trial.
The judgment is affirmed as to the guilt phase of the trial. The judgment is reversed as to the penalty phase of the trial. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, a new penalty phase trial is ordered. The case is remanded.
Hutchison, Michael Salazar and Freddy Lopez were charged with first-degree murder for their participation in the murders of Brian and Ronald Yates after a New Year's Eve party at Lopez's home on December 31, 1995. Salazar shot and severely wounded the Yates brothers at Lopez's home. Salazar, Lopez and Hutchison then transported the victims in the trunk of Lopez's car to another location, where Salazar and Hutchison removed the victims from the trunk and Hutchison fatally shot the victims using Lopez's gun.3 The bodies were left by the side of the road. Hutchison and Salazar fled to California where they were apprehended several days later.
Hutchison and Salazar were tried and convicted of first-degree murder in separate trials, and Lopez pled guilty to second-degree murder. Hutchison was tried first and was sentenced to death for his role in the murders. Freddie Lopez was the State's main witness against Hutchison. Salazar was tried after Hutchison and was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Lopez did not testify at Salazar's trial. Lopez was sentenced to ten years in prison.
Hutchison was represented at his trial by two attorneys who had no experience in defending murder cases and who had never tried a capital case. They spent nearly the entire time before trial preparing for the guilt phase and virtually no time preparing for the penalty phase. Hutchison's trial counsel retained only one expert, who had no independent knowledge of Hutchison. Hutchison's parents paid for his trial defense and could not provide extra money for experts and other discovery expenses. Hutchison's attorneys did not investigate Hutchison's life history or obtain any records documenting his troubled background and his mental and emotional deficits.
Before, during and after Hutchison's trial, Lopez's attorney and the prosecutor had discussions about a plea agreement in exchange for Lopez's testimony. After Hutchison's trial, the prosecutor extended a formal offer to Lopez, agreeing to reduce the charges from first-degree to second-degree on each count and ten years for armed criminal action, for a total of 30 years. Lopez rejected the offer, and the state prepared to go ahead with a trial and to seek the death penalty against Lopez.
Lopez fired his attorney and hired a well-known criminal defense firm4 after his sister won a large cash prize in the California lottery. One of Lopez's new criminal case co-counsel contacted an attorney to negotiate a wrongful death settlement with the victims' family. The settlement called for the family to recommend to the state that Lopez receive no more than a ten-year sentence in exchange for a cash payment to the family of $200,000.00 plus $30,000.00 in attorneys' fees. Lopez pled guilty to two counts of second-degree murder. At the plea hearing, sentencing was continued until after the money was deposited into the victims' family's trust account. With the state's consent, and at the recommendation of the Yates family, Lopez was sentenced to two ten-year terms to be served concurrently.
The court overruled Hutchison's Rule 29.15 motion after a lengthy evidentiary hearing on all but two claims. The court did not allow Hutchison to present evidence to support his claims that the State failed to reveal a plea bargain with Lopez during the trial and that Lopez's payment to the victims' family inappropriately resulted in a lenient sentence. After hearing other evidence, the court also denied relief on Hutchison's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of his impaired intellectual functioning.
On remand, the court again denied relief. The court found that the plea agreements did not violate any of Hutchison's constitutional rights. The court held that the state did not make a formal offer of a plea until after the trial and that the prosecutor and the court were not involved in the civil settlement in which Lopez paid the victims' family in exchange for the family's recommendation of a lenient sentence.
"This Court will uphold the findings and conclusions of the motion court unless they are clearly erroneous." Morrow v. State, 21 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Mo. banc 2000); Rule 29.15(k). Findings and conclusions are "clearly erroneous" if, after reviewing the entire record, the court has the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209, 224 (Mo. banc 1996).
Hutchison presents 11 points of error in this appeal. Except for one point regarding penalty phase jury instructions, all of the points can be grouped generally into two main categories: error with regard to Lopez's plea agreements and ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to conduct a reasonable investigation into Hutchison's life history and to present evidence of his impaired intellectual functioning.
Hutchison claims that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to offer evidence challenging the penalty phase instructions even though they believed the instructions were incomprehensible and, thus, objectionable. Hutchison contends that jurors do not understand penalty phase instructions and that when jurors do not understand the instructions, they are more likely to impose death.
Claims of instructional error are beyond the scope of a Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief and are matters for direct appeal. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 468 (Mo. banc 1993). Moreover, the motion court found that the study relating to jurors' comprehension of Missouri approved death penalty instructions that Hutchison claimed his trial counsel should have offered was discounted by this Court in State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 542-543 (Mo. banc 1999). The motion court held that counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present evidence concerning a study that this Court has found to be unpersuasive. The court's conclusion is not clearly erroneous.
Hutchison claims that the remand court erred in concluding that:
1) the plea agreement between Lopez and the victims' family did not violate the Missouri Constitution and Hutchison's state and federal constitutional rights;
2) the prosecutor did not mislead the jury by not acknowledging the ongoing plea discussions with Lopez;
3) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's statements in closing argument that there were no plea deals; and
4) considering Lopez's and Salazar's sentences, Hutchison's sentence is not disproportionate.
"Justice for Sale?"
"[J]ustice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Mo. Const. article I, section 14. Hutchison claims that the state's agreement to a sentencing recommendation in exchange for Lopez making a substantial payment to the victims' family was tantamount to "justice for sale" in violation of the Missouri Constitution and the United States Constitution.5
Hutchison asserts that he received the death penalty not because he is the most culpable, but because he was the least able to afford justice and that evidence presented at the remand hearing proved this claim. As previously noted, after Hutchison was convicted, and before Lopez was tried, Lopez pled guilty to second degree murder after reaching an agreement with the victims' family and with a recommendation by the prosecutor for a ten-year sentence. Under the settlement agreement entered into evidence at the hearing, Lopez would pay the victims' family $230,000.00 if: the family recommended to the prosecutor that Lopez receive no more than ten years in prison and the judge actually sentenced Lopez to a prison term not to exceed ten years.
On its face, the agreement was contingent on actions of both the prosecutor and the judge in Lopez's case. The prosecutor testified that he did not believe ten years was a just sentence, but he made the recommendation at the family's request, so that they could get the money. The sentencing judge testified that he did not know the specifics of the agreement, but he was aware that there was an agreement...
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