Hygiene Fire Prot. Dis. v. Bd. of Cty. Com.

• Decision Date: 11 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07CA2354.,07CA2354.
• Citation: 205 P.3d 487
• Parties: HYGIENE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF BOULDER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

205 P.3d 487

HYGIENE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF BOULDER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07CA2354.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

December 11, 2008.

Frascona, Joiner, Goodman & Greenstein, P.C., Joseph Adams Cope, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

H. Lawrence Hoyt, County Attorney, Pat A. Mayne, Deputy County Attorney, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge GABRIEL.

The Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County (County) appeals the Ruling and Order Regarding Motion for Summary Judgment and C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) Review (Judgment) issued by the district court in favor of Hygiene Fire Protection District (District). We affirm.

I. Background

The District wanted to build a second fire station within its service area, which is located within Boulder County. To that end, the District approached the Boulder County Land Use Department (Land Use Department), which was in the process of reviewing the Blue Mountain Vista TDR/PUD (PUD), to request that the Land Use Department designate the land at issue here as the site for the station. The Land Use Department declined to do so, indicating that it preferred that the City of Longmont provide fire protection services to the proposed PUD and surrounding area.

After the PUD was approved, the District met again with the Land Use Department, this time to discuss the District's plan to purchase the land, through agreement with the owners or condemnation, and to construct a fire station there. The District informed the Land Use Department that it believed the only approval process that it was required to complete was a Location and Extent Review, pursuant to section 30-28-110, C.R.S.2008. The Land Use Department, however, disagreed, maintaining that in addition to such Review, the District would need to submit the plan to a Special Use Review and to seek to amend the PUD, each pursuant to sections 3-202(A)(8) and 3-202(A)(9) of the Boulder Land Use Code.

Subsequently, the District submitted to the Land Use Department a completed application for Location and Extent Review. The Land Use Department, however, refused to accept the application for filing, reiterating that an amendment to the PUD was required. The District then filed a complaint with the district court, asking the court to find, among other things, that the Land Use Department had exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion in refusing to accept the application and in taking the position that the proposed project could not be completed absent an amendment to the PUD. The District further asked the court to declare that the fire station project could proceed and the land could be purchased without amendment to the PUD.

The County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to join indispensable parties, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), 12(b)(6), and 19. As to the indispensable party motion, the County argued that if the only review required was the Location and Extent Review, then the interests of the owners of the land at issue would not be adequately protected, thus making them indispensable parties under C.R.C.P. 19.

The court rejected both of the County's arguments and proceeded to the merits of the case. Thereafter, the District moved for summary judgment, and the court granted that motion. The court first found, as a matter of law, that the District, as a public entity, was not subject to zoning regulations. The court then determined that, because a PUD is considered a form of zoning, the District was not subject to the PUD regulations. The court thus issued a declaratory judgment that the District was not required to seek an amendment to the PUD in order to submit an application for Location and Extent Review. The County now appeals.

II. Joinder of Indispensable Parties

The County first argues that the trial court erred in finding that the owners of the land were not indispensable parties. We disagree.

We review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties for abuse of discretion. Board of County Comm'rs v. Roberts, 159 P.3d 800, 808 (Colo.App.2006) (citing Dunne v. Shenandoah Homeowners Ass'n, 12 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo.App.2000)). C.R.C.P. 19(a) states, in relevant part:

A person who is properly subject to service of process in the action shall be joined as a party in the action if: ... (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may: (A) [a]s a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest....

"Mere interest in the subject matter of litigation, even if the interest is substantial, is insufficient to make a party indispensable." Roberts, 159 P.3d at 807. "If the interests of the parties before the court may be finally adjudicated without adversely affecting the rights of an absent person, the absent party need not be joined." Id. at 808.

Here, the relief that the District sought in its complaint was narrow. The District asked the court to find, among other things, that the Land Use Department had exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion in refusing to accept the District's application and in taking the position that the proposed project could not be completed absent an amendment to the PUD. A finding that the Land Use Department abused its discretion by refusing to perform the ministerial task of accepting the District's application in no way implicated the landowners' interests so as to make them indispensable parties. Nor did the District's request for a declaration that the project could proceed absent amendment to the PUD. At root, the question presented involved which process the District was required to employ in order to build its fire station. This determination did not impair the landowners' ability to protect their interests because, whether the court required a Location and Extent Review, as the District sought, or an amendment to the PUD, which the County believed to be required, the landowners would have had the opportunity to be heard and protect their interests through the applicable statutory processes. See, e.g., § 24-67-106(3), C.R.S.2008 (requiring public hearing); §§ 38-1-101 to -122, C.R.S.2008 (procedures for eminent domain); Blue River Defense Comm. v. Town of Silverthorne, 33 Colo.App. 10, 14, 516 P.2d 452, 454 (1973) (even though certain entities had right to overrule county's decision under Planning Act, county residents were entitled to an opportunity to present their objections and views as part of the planning commission's approval process).

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the County's motion to dismiss for failure to join the landowners as indispensable parties.

III. Amendment of PUD

The County next contends, based on its interpretation of the Planned Unit Development Act of 1972, §§ 24-67-101 to -108, C.R.S.2008 (PUD Act), that the trial court erred in finding that the District did not have to amend the PUD to allow it to build a new fire station. Again, we are not persuaded.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Colo.1995). In interpreting statutory language, we must strive to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182, 188 (Colo.2006). "In doing so, our starting point is the plain meaning of the language used." Id. We should read the statute in such a way as to give effect to every word. Id. "We also must consider the language in the context of the statute as a whole." Id. We must "give effect to the ordinary meaning of the language and read the provisions as a whole, construing each consistently and in harmony with the overall statutory design, if possible." People v. Cross, 127 P.3d 71, 74 (Colo.2006). Interpretations that will render words or phrases superfluous should be rejected. Id. at 73. Only if a statute is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning may we look to other sources to aid in our interpretation. Romanoff, 126 P.3d at 188.

This case requires us to examine the interplay between the PUD Act and the so-called Planning Act, §§ 30-28-101 to -139, C.R.S. 2008. The District claims that approval of its new fire station required only that it comply with the Planning Act. Under that Act, the District would submit "the proposed location and extent" of the planned fire station to the Land Use Department for approval. § 30-28-110(1)(a), C.R.S.2008. If the Land Use Department were to disapprove the proposal, however, the District could overrule that Department by a majority vote of its governing board. § 30-28-110(1)(c), C.R.S.2008.

The County, on the other hand, claims that the District was required to comply with the requirements of the PUD Act. Under the PUD Act, a change in use of a parcel of land like that proposed by the District would be considered a modification of the PUD. § 24-67-106, C.R.S.2008. No such modification could be made, however, without first holding a public hearing in the manner designated by the County. §§ 24-67-104, 24-67-106(3)(b), C.R.S.2008. Moreover, pursuant to the PUD Act, the County has enacted certain provisions of the Boulder Land Use Code regarding the amendment of a previously approved PUD. Boulder County Land Use Code §§ 3-202(A)(9), 6-1100. The County contends that the District would also be required to amend the PUD pursuant to these provisions.

The trial court found that the District was required to comply solely with the Planning Act. We agree with the trial court.

Courts have long held that public entities "have the power to overrule or disregard the restrictions of county or municipal zoning regulations." Reber v. S. Lakewood Sanitation Dist., 147 Colo. 70, 75, 362 P.2d 877, 880 (19...