Hynes v. Tomei

• Decision Date: 22 December 1998
• Citation: 706 N.E.2d 1201,684 N.Y.S.2d 177,92 N.Y.2d 613
• Parties: , 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,377 In the Matter of Charles J. HYNES, as District Attorney of Kings County, Respondent, v. Albert TOMEI, as Justice of the Supreme Court, et al., Appellants. In the Matter of Howard R. Relin, as Monroe County District Attorney, Respondent, v. John J. Connell, as Monroe County Court Judge, et al., Appellants, and Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor-Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 177

684 N.Y.S.2d 177

92 N.Y.2d 613, 706 N.E.2d 1201, 1998

N.Y. Slip Op. 11,377

In the Matter of Charles J. HYNES, as District Attorney of

Kings County, Respondent, v. Albert TOMEI, as Justice of the Supreme Court, et al., Appellants.

In the Matter of Howard R. Relin, as Monroe County District

Attorney, Respondent, v. John J. Connell, as Monroe County Court Judge, et al., Appellants, and Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General of the State of New York,

Intervenor-Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 22, 1998.

Flamhaft, Levy, Kamins & Hirsch, Brooklyn (Barry Kamins of counsel), for Albert Tomei, appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Kevin M. Doyle, Capital Defender, New York City (Susan H. Salomon of counsel), for Michael Shane Hale, appellant in the first above-entitled action.

Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney of Kings County, Brooklyn (Jonathan Frank and Keith Dolan of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General, New York City (Jill Gross Marks, Edward D. Saslaw and Michael Buskus of counsel), for intervenor-respondent in the first above-entitled action.

Christopher Dunn, New York City, Norman Siegel and Arthur N. Eisenberg for New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, amicus curiae in the first above-entitled action.

Donald M. Thompson, Rochester, for John J. Connell, appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Office of Capital Defender, Rochester (Joseph T. Flood and William T. Easton of counsel), for Angel Mateo, appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Howard R. Relin, District Attorney of Monroe County, Rochester (Wendy Evans Lehmann of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General, New York City (Jill Gross Marks, Edward D. Saslaw and Michael Buskus of counsel), for intervenor-respondent in the second above-entitled action.

William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney of Onondaga County, Syracuse, Richard A. Brown, District Attorney of Queens County, Kew Gardens (Gary Fidel and Linda Cantoni of counsel), and Bruce Seeliger for New York State District Attorneys Association, amicus curiae in the first and second above-entitled actions.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Chief Judge.

Thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act (18 U.S.C. § 1201[a] ), which allowed a defendant to be sentenced to death only after a jury trial. The Supreme Court invalidated the provision because, by needlessly encouraging guilty pleas and jury waivers to avoid death sentences, it impermissibly burdened defendants' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial (United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138). Despite the passage of three decades, a plethora of decisions involving the death penalty and a sea change in plea bargaining, the Supreme Court has never overruled Jackson, which binds this Court. Indeed, every other death penalty State has fit its capital murder plea-bargaining procedures within the rationale of Jackson.

Three years ago, the New York State Legislature enacted a capital punishment statute that--like the Federal Kidnaping Act--allows a defendant to be sentenced to death only after a jury trial (L.1995, ch. 1). Bench trials are not permitted in capital cases (see, N.Y. Const., art. I, § 2), and the statute bars imposition of a death sentence upon a guilty plea (see, CPL 220.10[5][e]; 220.30[3][b][vii]; 220.60[2][a] ). The New York law thus explicitly provides two levels of penalty for the same offense, imposing death only on those who assert innocence and proceed to trial. ¹ Defendants before us now challenge the plea provisions of the New York statute as violative of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, relying on Jackson.

[1-3] Both trial courts held the plea provisions facially unconstitutional under Jackson (People v. Hale, 173 Misc.2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457; People v. Mateo, 175 Misc.2d 192, 664 N.Y.S.2d 981). In separate declaratory judgment actions, the Appellate Division of the Second and Fourth Departments subsequently declared the provisions constitutional (Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 237 A.D.2d 52, 666 N.Y.S.2d 687; Matter of Relin v. Connell, 251 A.D.2d 1041, 674 N.Y.S.2d 192). We are convinced that Jackson compels the contrary result, and therefore reverse the Appellate Division orders and declare CPL 220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii) unconstitutional. CPL 220.60(2)(a), in the absence of the other two challenged provisions, is constitutional. Because the unconstitutional provisions are severable, the remainder of the statute is also unaffected by our ruling.

I.

The Federal Kidnaping Act considered in Jackson provided:

"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate *** commerce, any person who has been unlawfully *** kidnaped *** and held for ransom *** or otherwise *** shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnaped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed."

Because the Act authorized the death penalty only on the recommendation of a jury, while a defendant convicted of the same offense on a guilty plea or by a Judge escaped the threat of capital punishment, the Supreme Court concluded that the Act "needlessly" encouraged guilty pleas and jury waivers (United States v. Jackson, supra, at 583, 88 S.Ct. 1209; see also, Pope v. United States, 392 U.S. 651, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1317 [death sentence imposed under the Federal Bank Robbery Act (18 U.S.C. § 2113[e] ) vacated for the same reason] ). The Court acknowledged that restricting the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it is a legitimate goal, and that such a restriction would likely decrease the frequency of capital punishment. However, the Court concluded these considerations did not save the Act from constitutional infirmity. While the Act's chilling effect on a defendant's exercise of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial may have been incidental, the effect was also "unnecessary and therefore excessive," since Congress could have achieved its goals by allowing juries to sentence defendants to the full range of punishments regardless of how guilt was determined (id., at 582-583, 88 S.Ct. 1209).

Shortly after Jackson, this Court invalidated two provisions of the former Code of Criminal Procedure that required waiver of a jury trial in order to receive the benefit of youthful offender treatment (see, People v. Michael A.C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 261 N.E.2d 620). Although respondents who refused to waive a jury trial were not subject to the death penalty, they were exposed to longer prison sentences than those prosecuted as youthful offenders. Drawing a parallel to Jackson, this Court held that "a procedure which offers an individual a reward for waiving a fundamental constitutional right, or imposes a harsher penalty for asserting it, may not be sustained" (id., at 86, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 261 N.E.2d 620). ²

II.

New York's death penalty statute authorizes a District Attorney to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty against a defendant charged with murder in the first degree (see, Penal Law § 125.27; CPL 250.40). Upon conviction by a jury, a capital defendant faces a separate sentencing proceeding before a jury to determine whether the penalty imposed will be death or life imprisonment without parole (see, CPL 400.27). The statute affords a defendant the opportunity to ensure a maximum sentence of life without parole by pleading guilty pursuant to the following provisions:

"A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the penal law; provided, however, that a defendant may enter such a plea with both the permission of the court and the consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence is either life imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment for the class A-I felony of murder in the first degree other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole" (CPL 220.10[5][e]; 220.30[3][b][vii] ).

"A defendant who has entered a plea of not guilty to an indictment may, with both the permission of the court and the consent of the people, withdraw such plea at any time before the rendition of a verdict and enter: (a) a plea of guilty to part of the indictment pursuant to subdivision three or four but subject to the limitation in subdivision five ofsection 220.10" (CPL 220.60[2][a] ).

For all other crimes in New York only one top sentence is prescribed by statute.

Thus, like the invalidated Federal Kidnaping Act provision, New York's death penalty statute explicitly provides for the imposition of the death penalty only upon a jury verdict. As a result, under the New York statute, only those defendants who exercise the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial put themselves at risk of death. Nevertheless, respondents argue that the New York statute is distinguishable from the Federal Kidnaping Act in several ways. We conclude that the distinctions are without a constitutionally cognizable difference.

First, under the challenged New York provisions, a defendant can plead guilty to first degree murder, with agreement on the sentence to be imposed, only with the permission of the court and consent of the People (see, CPL 220.10[5][e]; 220.30[3][b][vii] ). Because a defendant does not have unilateral control of the plea process, respondents argue, the statute never gives a defendant the choice between facing a jury and risking death on the one hand, and pleading guilty and avoiding death on the other. Therefore, respondents urge, the statute cannot "needlessly" encourage guilty pleas.

The Supreme Court,...