Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Jane (2013-15) Doe (In re Termination of the Parental Rights of Jane (2013-15) Doe)

• Decision Date: 18 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 41213.,41213.
• Parties: In the Matter of the Termination of the Parental Rights of Jane (2013–15) DOE. Idaho Department of Health & Welfare, Petitioner–Respondent, and Guardian Ad Litem, Respondent, v. Jane (2013–15) Doe, Respondent–Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

156 Idaho 103

320 P.3d 1262

In the Matter of the Termination of the Parental Rights of Jane (2013–15) DOE.Idaho Department of Health & Welfare, Petitioner–Respondent,andGuardian Ad Litem, Respondent,

v.Jane (2013–15) Doe, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 41213.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, November 2013 Term.

March 18, 2014.

Marilyn Paul, Twin Falls County Public Defender, attorney for Appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent Idaho Department of Health & Welfare. James T. Baird argued. Jamie LaMure, Kimberly, attorney for Guardian ad litem.

HORTON, Justice.

This is an expedited appeal by Jane Doe from an order terminating her parental rights to five minor children on the grounds of neglect. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

There are five children involved in this case: C.C., M.R., G.C., M.C.C., and A.C.C. The children have four different fathers. This appeal is the culmination of several child protection actions involving Jane Doe. The first child protection action was filed by the State on August 17, 2006. C.C., who was then one year old, was taken from Jane Doe because of an unsafe and unhygienic home and Jane Doe's drug use. There was also evidence of domestic abuse by the man who would later become M.R.'s father. Jane Doe completed a case plan including drug treatment and other tasks, and C.C. was returned to Jane Doe on October 25, 2007.

The second child protection case was filed on November 4, 2009, involving the two children that Jane Doe had at the time, C.C. and M.R. The children tested positive for drugs. Jane Doe was pregnant with G.C., whom the magistrate found had been "almost certainly exposed to methamphetamine in utero. " Again, domestic violence was present, this time perpetrated by G.C.'s father. Jane Doe participated in another case plan, including child protection drug court. During drug court, she relapsed twice. Despite the relapses, Jane Doe graduated from the program in May of 2011. One month later, she gave birth to twins, M.C.C. and A.C.C.

On April 1, 2012, shortly after 3:00 a.m., police officers attempted to serve a warrant at an apartment in Twin Falls. During a struggle in which the subject attempted to flee, the officers noticed twins, younger than one year old, crawling on the floor. Methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were present in the apartment. Jane Doe told an Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("IDHW") caseworker that she had left her three younger children at the apartment to be cared for by a friend because she had been evicted. She admitted to recent use of methamphetamine. The caseworker believed that Jane Doe and her children were living out of her car. The other children were located and all five were placed in foster care.

The final child protection case was filed on April 2, 2012. Following a hearing on May 22, 2012, the magistrate court granted default judgment against two of the fathers of Jane Doe's five children and made a finding of aggravated circumstances as to all of the children and parents. Pursuant to I.C. § 16–1619(6)(d), this meant IDHW was not required to use reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the parents. Jane Doe filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Aggravated Circumstances Finding on June 5, 2012, which was denied after a hearing. Although the magistrate court's finding of aggravated circumstances was an appealable order, I.C. § 16–1625(1)(c), Jane Doe did not appeal the order. The magistrate court approved IDHW's permanency plan with respect to the parental rights of all the parents except for the father of M.C.C. and A.C.C. The State filed a Motion for Termination of Parent–Child Relationship on June 26, 2012. The magistrate court received evidence on May 13 and 14, 2013, and found that C.C., age eight, had been in foster care for 44 months; M.C., age six, had been in foster care for 32 months; G.C., age three, had been in foster care for 14 months; and M.C.C. and A.C.C., ages two, had been in foster care for 14 months. On July 2, 2013, the magistrate court ordered the termination of the parental rights of Jane Doe with respect to all five children and the parental rights of three of the fathers. Jane Doe timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. in thE matter OF aragon, 120 idaho 606, 608, 818 P.2d 310, 312 (1991) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ).

Our review of factual findings is limited, and where the trial court has granted a petition terminating parental rights, that conclusion will not be disturbed on appeal so long as there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the findings. Furthermore, in reviewing such findings, this Court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court's judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In our review, we are mindful that

[t]he finder of fact has the opportunity to observe witnesses' demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the parties. In a parental-termination case, this is immensely important. A cold record of the trial does not tell the whole story. An independent review by our court could not take into account the trial court's superior view of the entire situation.

Id. (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 110 Idaho 93, 96, 714 P.2d 62, 65 (Ct.App.1986) ).

III. ANALYSIS

The issues presented in this appeal are (1) whether the magistrate court erred in finding aggravated circumstances; (2) whether the magistrate court erred when it found the children to have been neglected pursuant to I.C. § 16–2002(3)(b) and I.C. § 16–1602(25) ; and (3) whether the magistrate court erred when it found termination of Jane Doe's parental rights to be in the best interests of the children. We address these issues in turn.

A. Jane Doe has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in finding aggravated circumstances.

Jane Doe contends that the magistrate court's finding of aggravated circumstances deprived her of due process and equal protection because she was unable to complete a case plan. In addition to responding to the merits of her claims, IDHW contends that Jane Doe has waived this issue by failing to timely appeal the finding. We address the preliminary issue of waiver before turning to the substance of Jane Doe's claims of error.

1. Jane Doe's failure to appeal the magistrate court's finding of aggravated circumstances does not bar review of her claim of error.

The finding of aggravated circumstances was clearly an appealable order. Idaho Code § 16–1625(1) provides:

An aggrieved party may appeal the following orders or decrees of the court to the district court, or may seek a direct permissive appeal to the supreme court as provided by rules adopted by the supreme court:

(a) An adjudicatory decree entered pursuant to section 16–1619, Idaho Code ;

* * *

(c) Any order subsequent to the adjudicatory decree that authorizes or mandates the department to cease reasonable efforts to make it possible to return the child to his home, including an order finding aggravated circumstances ....

(emphasis added). Consistent with this statutory provision,¹ both the Idaho Juvenile Rules and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure authorize appeals to the district court from an order finding aggravating circumstances. See I.J.R. 49(a) ("An aggrieved party may appeal to the district court those orders of the court in a C.P.A. action specified in I.C. § 16–1625"); I.R.C.P. 83(a)(1)(6) ("an appeal must first be taken to the district judges division of the district court from any of the following judgments or orders rendered by a magistrate: ... Any order, judgment or decree by a magistrate in a special proceeding for which an appeal is provided by statute.").

However, the conclusion that an order may be appealed does not compel the conclusion that the order must be appealed or forever be foreclosed from appellate review. Rule 83 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals from the magistrate division to the district courts of this state. Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 877, 292 P.3d 264, 268 (2012). However, Rule 83 is silent as to the narrow question presented: whether the failure to appeal an interlocutory order that is appealable as a matter of right forever forecloses appellate review. Rule 83(e) requires that an appeal of such an order be brought within 42 days of the entry of the order. Rule 83(s) provides that the 42 day requirement is jurisdictional and specifies the remedy; the failure to timely file a notice of appeal "shall cause automatic dismissal of such appeal upon motion of any party, or upon initiative of the district court."

Rule 83(s) has no application in this instance, because this case does not involve an attempt to present an untimely appeal to the district court. Rather, this appeal is before this Court as a direct appeal from an order terminating parental rights that is expressly authorized by I.A.R. 11.1. Thus, as an appeal to this Court, this appeal is governed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. See I.A.R. 1 ("These rules shall govern all proceedings pending in the Supreme Court on the effective date or thereafter commenced....")

Jane Doe timely appealed from the order terminating her parental rights. Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "The notice of appeal shall designate the judgment or order appealed from which shall be deemed to include, and present on appeal: (A) All interlocutory judgments and orders entered prior to the judgment or order appealed from...." This Court has interpreted I.A.R. 17(e)(1) as permitting a party to "properly challenge" interlocutory orders. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 641, 249 P.3d 829, 834 (2011).

Although this Court has not previously defined...