In Matter of M.C., No. COA06-158 (N.C. App. 10/3/2006)
| Decision Date | 03 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. COA06-158,COA06-158 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF: M.C. & R.C. |
Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee, for Cumberland County Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellees.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., by Wallace C. Hollowell, III, for North Carolina Guardian ad Litem, petitioner-appellees.
Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-mother-appellants.
Peter Wood, for respondent-father-appellants.
Lynda C. ("respondent mother") and Ray C. ("respondent father") appeal the termination of their parental rights to their minor children, M.C. and R.C. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the order of the trial court terminating their parental rights.
R.C. was the fourth child born to respondent mother, the first to respondent father, while respondent mother was married to her first husband. M.C. was respondent mother's seventh child, born of her third marriage, to respondent father.
The Cumberland County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a juvenile petition on 29 April 2002, alleging M.C., R.C., and five other half-siblings were abused, neglected, and dependent, as those terms are defined by statute. At the time the petition was filed, R.C. was six years old, and M.C. was four months old.
After a hearing on the matter held 1 May 2002, non-secure custody was ordered, placing R.C. and M.C. in the custody of DSS. The trial court held regular review hearings on the custody matter. An adjudication hearing was held 28 January 2003 followed by a disposition hearing on 30 January 2003, finding that both M.C. and R.C. were abused and neglected as defined by statute, and ordering legal and physical custody be placed with DSS. Respondents appealed to this Court the order of abuse and neglect, and the trial court's placing of custody of M.C. and R.C. with DSS. By this time, respondent mother was expecting her eighth child.
Respondents worked with DSS to create a case plan, which was approved 7 March 2003. The plan required that respondents each complete psychological and psychiatric assessments and follow through with recommended treatments, participate in parenting assessments and complete parenting skills classes, and enroll in and complete domestic violence counseling, anger management counseling, and marital counseling. In addition, the plan required respondent father to secure and maintain employment and provide verification of same, and to submit to random drug screenings and enroll in a substance abuse program. Respondent mother was to enroll in individual counseling to deal with depression and relationship problems.
Respondents attempted to enroll in a domestic violence program but were not accepted into the program because they had already completed the program twice before. They were instructed to utilize the techniques they previously had learned. Despite already having received domestic violence services, the acts of domestic violence between respondents continued. On 29 March 2003, respondent father choked respondent mother and threatened to cut the child from her stomach so that no one could take it. Respondent mother took out a restraining order against respondent father, and on 4 April 2003, respondent father was arrested and subsequently pled guilty to assault on a female on 17 April 2003. When respondents attempted to obtain marital counseling, they were informed they could not be counseled together if the restraining order was still in effect. The counselor also believed respondent father was under the influence of a substance at that time.
On 3 May 2003, respondents experienced a house fire which was later determined to be the result of arson. Respondent father was the prime suspect. In mid-October 2003, respondents were engaged in a domestic dispute in front of their residence, prompting a passing police officer to stop and intervene. On 29 October 2003, the trial court relieved DSS of reunification and visitation efforts, and allowed DSS to change the placement plan to adoption. Also, between May and November 2003, respondent father had two positive drug screenings.
A petition to terminate respondents' parental rights to M.C. and R.C. was filed on 8 April 2004. However, due to the pending appeal in this Court of the underlying order of abuse and neglect, the matter was stayed, with regular permanency placement hearings continuing.1 During the time in which respondents' appeal was pending, there continued to be numerous incidents which were concerning to DSS. On 30 March 2004, respondent father again had a positive drug screen, testing positive for marijuana. There was a report from a neighbor that respondent father slapped respondent mother in the head. On 1 April 2004, police were called to respondents' residence to investigate "inappropriate affection" between respondent mother and a fourteen year old boy. Respondents' new baby was removed from their custody prior to the 26 April 2004 permanency planning hearing in the instant case. Respondent father was arrested on 4 June 2004 for assaulting respondent mother, and was also charged with two counts of communicating threats, and interfering with emergency communications. Respondent mother was arrested on 17 June 2004 for trespassing and communicating a threat. On 21 September 2004, this Court filed its unpublished opinion in the underlying appeal, upholding the determination of abuse and neglect by the trial court. The judgment was entered 11 October 2004. A hearing on the termination of parental rights petition was scheduled for 23 November 2004; however, multiple continuances were granted over the next several months due to scheduling conflicts, illness, appointment of a new guardian ad litem for respondent mother, and respondent father's incarceration. The petition for terminating respondents' parental rights ultimately was heard 16, 17 and 20 June 2005.
On 1 July 2005, the trial court entered an order terminating respondents' parental rights as to M.C. and R.C. The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate their parental rights pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, sections 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and (3). The court further concluded that it was in the children's best interest that respondents' parental rights be terminated. From the order terminating their parental rights, respondents appeal.
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111 sets forth the statutory grounds for terminating an individual's parental rights. We consistently have held that "[a] finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 that is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is sufficient to terminate."In re Howell, 161 N.C. App. 650, 656, 589 S.E.2d 157, 160-61 (2003) (citing In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990)); see also In re Humphrey,156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003). "[T]he party petitioning for the termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist." In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997). "On appeal, the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard[.]" In re J.L.K., 165 N.C. App. 311, 317, 598 S.E.2d 387, 391 (citing In re Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001)), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 68, 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). This Court must affirm a trial court's termination of an individual's parental rights "'where the court's findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.'" Id. (quoting In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561, 565, 471 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1996)).
Both respondents contend the trial court erred in terminating their parental rights based upon the ground that they "have abused or neglected the juveniles within the meaning of [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-101." Specifically respondents argue the trial court's conclusion was not sufficiently supported by the evidence or the trial court's findings of fact. We disagree.
"The standard of review of a termination of parental rights is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support its conclusions of law." In re J.G.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 628 S.E.2d 450, 454 (2006) (). Findings of fact not assigned as error or argued on appeal are deemed to be supported by sufficient evidence, and are binding on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2006); see also In re Clark, 159 N.C. App. 75, 83 n.5, 582 S.E.2d 657, 662 n.5 (2003) (citing In re Caldwell, 75 N.C. App. 299, 301, 330 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1985)). However, we review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo. In re D.H., __ N.C. App. __, __, 629 S.E.2d 920, 922 (2006) (quoting Starco, Inc. v. AMG Bonding and Ins. Services, 124 N.C. App. 332, 336, 477 S.E.2d 211, 215 (1996)).
In his assignments of error, respondent father assigns error to several of the trial court's findings of fact. However, in his brief to this court, respondent father fails to present specific arguments as to any of the findings of fact, and fails to present argument as to the specific assignment of error concerning the trial court's findings of fact. Thus, all of the trial court's findings of fact are binding on appeal as to respondent father. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6). Respondent mother assigns error only to the trial court's findings of fact numbers 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, and 22. As respondent mother has neither assigned as error nor...
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