In re

• Decision Date: 14 December 2012
• Docket Number: 2110859 and 2110863.
• Citation: 113 So.3d 663
• Parties: JIM SKINNER FORD, INC. v. John H. DAVIS. Department of Industrial Relations v. John H. Davis.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

113 So.3d 663

JIM SKINNER FORD, INC.
v.
John H. DAVIS.
Department of Industrial Relations
v.
John H. Davis.

2110859 and 2110863.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 14, 2012.

[113 So.3d 664]

John Martin Galese and Cassandra Harris Kalupa of Galese & Ingram, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant Jim Skinner Ford, Inc.

Joseph S. Ammons, gen. counsel, and Arthur F. Ray II, deputy gen. counsel, for appellants Alabama Department of Industrial Relations.

John P. Graves, Birmingham, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Jim Skinner Ford, Inc., and the Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) separately appeal from the circuit court's judgment determining that John H. Davis did not voluntarily quit his employment and that he is entitled to unemployment-compensation benefits. We affirm.

Following the separation of his employment from Jim Skinner Ford, Davis applied with DIR for unemployment-compensation benefits. Davis was granted benefits, and Jim Skinner Ford appealed that decision to DIR's Hearings and Appeals Division. Jim Skinner Ford asserted that Davis was disqualified from benefits because, it said, he voluntarily quit his

[113 So.3d 665]

employment without good cause. Following a telephone hearing, a hearing officer concluded that Davis was not entitled to benefits. Davis appealed that decision to the DIR's Board of Appeals, which affirmed the decision to deny him benefits. Davis then appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo, pursuant to § 25–4–95, Ala.Code 1975.

At trial, the parties disputed whether Davis had voluntarily quit his employment or whether Jim Skinner Ford had dismissed him. Section 25–4–78(2), Ala.Code 1975, provides for the disqualification of unemployment-compensation benefits if a claimant leaves work “voluntarily without good cause connected with such work.” The circuit court concluded that Jim Skinner Ford, as the employer, bore the burden of proving that Davis had voluntarily quit his employment. After hearing ore tenus testimony, the circuit court determined that Davis had not voluntarily quit his employment. Accordingly, because the parties did not otherwise dispute Davis's eligibility for unemployment-compensation benefits, the circuit court concluded that Davis was entitled to benefits. Jim Skinner Ford and DIR appealed to this court, and we consolidated the appeals.

On appeal, Jim Skinner Ford and DIR first argue that the circuit court erred in concluding that Jim Skinner Ford, as the employer, bore the burden of proving that Davis was disqualified from unemployment-compensation benefits for voluntarily quitting work. In concluding that Jim Skinner Ford bore this burden, the circuit court relied on our supreme court's recent decision in Ex parte Rogers, 68 So.3d 773 (Ala.2010). In Ex parte Rogers, the employer alleged that the claimant was disqualified from benefits under § 25–4–78(3), Ala.Code 1975, which disqualifies a claimant for misconduct. In that case, the specific issue under review was whether the “claimant has the burden of proving the absence of a disqualification for misconduct.” 68 So.3d at 773–74. Our supreme court answered that question in the negative, concluding that “the employer has the burden of proving that the employee is disqualified [from receiving unemployment compensation] for reasons of misconduct.” 68 So.3d at 781.

Jim Skinner Ford and DIR argue that Ex parte Rogers applies only to the burden of proof applicable under § 25–4–78(3), which concerns disqualification for misconduct, and does not apply to the provision in this case, § 25–4–78(2), which concerns disqualification for voluntarily quitting work. In Ex parte Rogers, the supreme court emphasized the distinction between the eligibility provisions of § 25–4–77 and the disqualification provisions of § 25–4–78. Neither of those sections address the allocation of the burden of proof. Our caselaw is clear that a claimant has the burden of proving eligibility; however, the burden regarding disqualification has not been as clear. In addressing the disqualification provisions, the supreme court, in addition to quoting from the provision in § 25–4–78(3) concerning misconduct, also quoted part of the subsection at issue here, § 25–4–78(2), as well as § 25–4–78(1), which concerns a “labor dispute in place of employment.” The court then addressed certain Alabama cases that suggested that the employee bears the burden of establishing the absence of a disqualification for misconduct. The court observed that “those cases do not address, or even acknowledge, any distinctions as to the burden of proving eligibility, disqualifying circumstances, and justifications or excuses for what would otherwise be disqualifying circumstances.” 68 So.3d at 778. The court then cited a contrary line of Alabama cases that places on the employer the burden of proof as to whether a claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits under § 25–4–78 (1) because the claimant's unemployment

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is directly due to a labor dispute. The court stated that it had not located any cases attempting to reconcile the two lines of cases “or to make a principled distinction among disqualifications under the various subsections of § 25–4–78.” 68 So.3d at 779.

The supreme court in Ex parte Rogers next observed that “Alabama's position on the burden of proof for disqualification is contrary to the approach adopted by most or all the other states” that have addressed the issue. 68 So.3d at 779. The court generally noted that many cases from other jurisdictions “recognize that placing the burden of proving a disqualification on the employer has the advantage of imposing the burden of proof on the party that generally has better access to the relevant evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). The court then broadly observed:

“Imposing on the employer the burden of proof as to a claimant's disqualification for unemployment-compensation purposes is consistent with the general principle that the proponent of an affirmative defense or similar position has the burden of proof as to that position as well as with the disinclination of the law to place upon a party the burden to prove a negative.”

68 So.3d at 780. The supreme court further stated, in broad terms:

“Finally, to the extent that, after considering all the foregoing, any uncertainty remains as to who should bear the burden of proving the existence of a disqualifying condition, we note that the ‘Unemployment Compensation Act is in the nature of insurance for the unemployed worker and is intended to be a remedial measure for his benefit [and] should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant and the disqualifications from benefits should be construed narrowly.’ [Department of Indus. Relations v.] Jaco, 337 So.2d [374,] 376 [ (Ala.Civ.App.1976) (overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Rogers ) ]. See also Ex parte Sargent, 634 So.2d 1008, 1009 (Ala.1993) ( ‘Disqualification provisions in the Unemployment Compensation Act should be narrowly construed.’).”

68 So.3d at 780–81. (emphasis added). The supreme court then concluded that the employer in Ex parte Rogers had the burden of proving that the employee is disqualified for misconduct, the particular basis for disqualification at issue in that case.

Based on the reasoning and sweeping language of Ex parte Rogers, we conclude that that case indicates that the employer has the burden of proving that a claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment-compensation benefits because the claimant voluntarily quit work, pursuant to § 25–4–78(2). DIR and Jim Skinner Ford argue that this cases is not controlled by Ex parte Rogers but by certain older Alabama cases. Several of those cases are factually distinguishable from this case in that they concern whether the claimant had “good cause” when it is clear that he or she had left work voluntarily. See Andala Co. v. Ganus, 269 Ala. 571, 115 So.2d 123 (1959); McNealey v. State Dep't of Indus. Relations, 664 So.2d 913 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); Nowell v. Mobile Cnty. Health Dep't, 501 So.2d 468 (Ala.Civ.App.1986); Davis v. Hoggle, 392 So.2d 1190 (Ala.Civ.App.1980); Department of Indus. Relations v. Meeks, 40 Ala.App. 231, 110 So.2d 643 (1959); and Morrison v. Department of Indus. Relations, 35 Ala.App. 475, 48 So.2d 72 (1950). The following is indicative of the allocation of the burden as stated in those cases: “When the evidence shows that a claimant left his or her employment voluntarily, claimant has the burden of showing good cause connected with such work for leaving.” Department of Indus. Relations v. Meeks, 40 Ala.App. at 233, 110 So.2d at 645. However, in this

[113 So.3d 667]

case, Davis did not argue that he voluntarily left work but had a good cause for doing so; rather, he argued that he did not quit but was fired. That is, the issue concerns the first consideration in § 25–4–78(2)—whether the employee voluntarily quit—and not the second consideration—whether there was good cause for quitting. Thus, we do not read the cases above as indicating that the...