In re Adoption of BTD, 20020083-CA.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 20020083-CA.,20020083-CA. |
| Citation | 2003 UT App 99,68 P.3d 1021 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ADOPTION OF B.T.D., C.A.D., and D.A.D, minors. Ann Marie Gunderman, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Larry Helms and Wendy Helms, Respondents and Appellants. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Donald E. McCandless and Lorie D. Fowlke, Scribner Stirland & McCandless PC, Provo, for Appellants.
Gary H. Weight, Aldrich Nelson Weight & Esplin, Provo, for Appellee.
Before Judges JACKSON, GREENWOOD, and THORNE.
¶ 1 Appellants Larry and Wendy Helms appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss Ann Gunderman's Complaint in Intervention in an adoption proceeding, and the trial court's award of child custody to Gunderman.
¶ 2 On February 26, 2001, the Helmses filed a Petition for Adoption and Temporary Custody of three minor children in the Fourth District Court in Utah County, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-30-1 to -19 (2001) (the Adoption Statute). On March 22, 2001, both natural parents, Vern Dillon and Ann Gunderman, signed documents entitled Consent to Adoption and Relinquishment of Parental Rights. On May 9, 2001, Gunderman filed a Complaint in Intervention, claiming that her consent had been procured through duress. On October 18 and 19, 2001, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Gunderman's consent was procured through duress, and expressly limited the evidence to that issue.
¶ 3 On December 13, 2001, the trial court issued a memorandum decision concluding that Gunderman's consent was given under duress. Without analysis, the memorandum decision also set aside the temporary custody order, dismissed the Helmses' adoption petition, and awarded Gunderman custody of the children. The trial court simply stated that it had "considered the interests and welfare of the children" in reaching this result. ¶ 4 On December 19, 2001, the trial court sua sponte issued an amended memorandum decision affirming the December 13 decision on a new basis. Specifically, the trial court concluded that Dillon and the Helmses had violated the notice requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205 (2001) (), and that the adoption thus could not proceed.
¶ 5 The amended memorandum decision also addressed the Helmses' earlier legal argument that the court must nevertheless hold a hearing to determine child custody based on the best interests of the children, pursuant to the Adoption Statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(2). The trial court concluded that section 78-30-4.16(2) did not apply to this case because "the statute did not contemplate parents being placed on equal footing with strangers in a custody determination where that parent's rights to her children have not been adjudicated and where the children were stolen from the mother and placed for adoption." Further, the trial court ruled that the statutory best interests of the children hearing was unnecessary. Finally, the trial court stated "a full blown best interest analysis was not undertaken as normally seen in a child custody case." Nevertheless, it determined that it had received enough evidence during the duress hearing to make findings and conclusions with respect to the children's best interests and custody.
¶ 6 Three separate opinions have been filed in this case. Judge Greenwood concurs with Judge Jackson's main opinion, which requires reversal and remand for a new duress hearing regarding Gunderman's consent to adoption of her three minor children. Judge Thorne filed a separate opinion, concluding that the statutory requirements for the children's best interest hearing were fully satisfied during the original duress hearing. Judge Greenwood concurs with Judge Thorne on that issue. Thus, a remand for a best interests of the children hearing is not required.
¶ 7 During the course of Nevada divorce proceedings, Appellee Gunderman and Dillon filed a stipulated parenting plan. They agreed to share jointly legal custody of their three minor children. Gunderman stipulated that Dillon would have sole physical custody of their children. In November 2000, two months before the divorce decree issued, Dillon removed the children from Nevada to live with his sister in Bountiful, Utah, without Gunderman's knowledge. Dillon and Dillon's family refused to tell Gunderman the children were in Utah because they believed Gunderman to be a drug addict and neglectful mother. Later, in January 2001, the Nevada court entered the divorce decree. The decree contained the custody provisions outlined in their stipulated parenting plan, including a procedure regarding change of residence to another state and removal of the children from Nevada.1
¶ 8 In February 2001, Dillon privately placed the children for adoption with the Helmses, who are Utah residents, without advising Gunderman. On February 26, 2001, the Helmses filed a Petition for Adoption and Temporary Custody pursuant to the Adoption Statute. The trial court awarded temporary custody to the Helmses pending final disposition of the adoption petition.
¶ 9 Pursuant to the Adoption Statute, the trial court appointed a Nevada attorney as a commissioner to advise Gunderman and take her consent to the adoption. At that time Dillon revealed to Gunderman the children's location in Utah and his plans to have the children adopted. Gunderman initially refused to give her consent to the adoption, but ultimately signed the consent before the court-appointed commissioner. However, on May 3, 2001, Gunderman filed a document in the adoption proceeding entitled "Revocation of Consent to Adoption and Relinquishment of Parental Rights by Natural Mother." A week later, her newly-retained counsel filed a Verified Complaint in Intervention, alleging that her consent had been obtained by duress. The Helmses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing, inter alia, that Gunderman had no standing to intervene because she consented to the adoption.
¶ 10 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing limited to evidence of whether Gunderman consented under duress. The court ultimately decided duress existed, denied the Helmses' motion to dismiss the complaint in intervention, dismissed the Helmses' Petition for Adoption, automatically awarded custody of the children to Gunderman, and issued a pick-up order. The court based its ruling of duress on several factors, including: the Helmses' alleged failure to comply with notice requirements; the placement of the children without Gunderman's knowledge; Dillon and Dillon's family's hostility toward Gunderman; Dillon, Dillon's family, and the Helmses' attempts at moral persuasion toward Gunderman; Gunderman's emotional vulnerability to Dillon's control; Gunderman's status as a divorced woman with limited financial resources and lack of access to independent counsel; Gunderman's fear that if she did not consent the state would take custody of the children; Gunderman's alleged belief that the consent was not final since it was not notarized and that all consents are revocable for six months; and Gunderman's initial unwillingness to sign the consent. The Helmses appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss Gunderman's complaint due to its duress ruling, and its refusal to hold the statutory best interests of the children hearing after dismissing the petition for adoption.
I. The Helmses' Motion to Dismiss Gunderman's Complaint
¶ 11 The Helmses appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss Gunderman's complaint in intervention. "`We review the ... denial of [the Helmses'] motion to dismiss for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's ruling.'" First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., 2002 UT 56, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1137 (quoting Pendleton v. Utah State Bar, 2000 UT 96, ¶ 5, 16 P.3d 1230).
¶ 12 The Helmses present three legal challenges to the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss Gunderman's complaint. First, the Helmses challenge the trial court's ruling that, under the Adoption Statute, Gunderman was entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings. "The interpretation of a statute... presents a question of law, which this court reviews for correctness." Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 473.
¶ 13 Second, the Helmses challenge the trial court's ruling that Gunderman consented to the adoption under duress. Whether duress existed and was sufficient to void consent is a mixed question of law and fact, and In re Estate of Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1994).
¶ 14 Third, the Helmses challenge the trial court's amended duress analysis, which applied the notice requirements of the Jurisdiction Act to determine whether Gunderman consented under duress. This is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Parks, 2002 UT 55 at ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 473.
II. The Trial Court's Failure to Hold a Hearing on the Children's Best Interests
¶ 15 The Helmses challenge the failure of the trial court to conduct a best interest hearing for the children, pursuant to the Adoption Statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(2) (2000), after dismissing their adoption petition. The trial court interpreted the Adoption Statute not to require a best interest hearing under the circumstances of this case. The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Parks, 2002 UT 55 at ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 473.
¶ 16 The Helmses filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Gunderman did not have standing to intervene because of her...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re I.K.
...25, 100 P.3d 1177. We review the denial of a motion to dismiss for correctness, granting no deference to the district court. In re Adoption of B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, ¶ 11, 68 P.3d 1021. We also review standing and intervention issues under a correctness standard. See In re Adoption of K.C.......
-
Int'l Fid. Ins. Co. v. La Porte Constr., Inc.
...§ 175(1) (1979)).13 The burden is on Mrs. Logue to establish duress by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of B.T.D., 68 P.3d 1021, 1026-27 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citing Reliable Furniture Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 466 P.2d 368, 370 (Utah 1970)) ("Utah case law requires c......
-
STATE EX REL. EH
...a neglected child." `The interpretation of a statute ... presents a question of law, which this court reviews for correctness.'" In re B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, ¶ 12, 68 P.3d 1021 (alteration in original) (quoting Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d ANALYSIS ¶ 5 S.S. argues ......
-
Colosmio v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City
...Plaintiffs' claim. The articulation of a proper legal standard is a question of law, which we review for correctness. See In re Adoption of B.T.D., 2003 UT App 99, ¶ 13, 68 P.3d ¶ 8 Further, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court wrongly ruled that the statutes of limitation had run against ......