IN RE AMTRAK TRAIN CRASH IN BAYOU CANOT, ALA.

• Decision Date: 03 May 1996
• Docket Number: MDL Docket No. 1003. Master Docket No. 94-5000-RV-C.
• Citation: 923 F. Supp. 1524
• Parties: In re AMTRAK "SUNSET LIMITED" TRAIN CRASH IN BAYOU CANOT, ALABAMA, ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1993.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

923 F. Supp. 1524

In re AMTRAK "SUNSET LIMITED" TRAIN CRASH IN BAYOU CANOT, ALABAMA, ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1993.

MDL Docket No. 1003. Master Docket No. 94-5000-RV-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

May 3, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gregory B. Breedlove, Mobile, AL, Stephen D. Heninger, Birmingham, AL, Turner W. Branch, Branch Law Firm, Albuquerque, NM, J. Michael Papantonio, Levin, Middlebrooks, Pensacola, FL, Larry U. Sims, Helmsing, Lyons, Sims & Leach, Mobile, AL, Dennis C. Sweet, III, Langston, Frazer & Sweet, Jackson, MS, Lanny S. Vines, Edmond and Vines, Birmingham, AL, L. Andrew Hollis, Jr., Birmingham, AL, Martin H. Levin, Levin, Middlebrooks, Pensacola, FL, James J. Thompson, Jr., Birmingham, AL, Frank Granito, III, New York City, Steven A. Martino, Jackson, Taylor & Martino, Mobile, AL, for plaintiffs.

Broox G. Holmes, Sr., Mobile, AL, Jerry A. McDowell, Mobile, AL, John W. Vardaman, Jr., Washington, DC, John P. Coale, Coale & Van Susteren, Washington, DC, Richard R. Rosenthal, Birmingham, AL, for defendants.

VOLLMER, District Judge.

ORDER NO. 78

This matter is before the court on defendant CSX's "motion ... to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction" (see tab 1, Civil Action No. 96-5116), plaintiff's response (tabs 1061 & 1062, Master Docket No. 94-5000; tab 3 Civil Action No. 94-5000), and CSX's reply brief (tab 1079, Master Docket No. 94-5000; tab 5, Civil Action No. 96-5116). Having duly considered the aforesaid materials, the court concludes for the reasons that follow that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted.

Background

This action arises out of the derailment of Amtrak's "Sunset Limited" passenger train near Mobile, Alabama. The ensuing crash resulted in forty-seven fatalities, including that of plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Crenshaw ("Crenshaw"), and numerous injuries.

According to the complaint, plaintiff, Barbara Petrie ("Petrie"), is the duly appointed, qualified, and acting Personal Representative of Crenshaw's estate. Crenshaw, in fact, was her mother. Petrie is a resident of Arizona. Crenshaw was a resident of Hillsborough County, Florida. Crenshaw boarded the Sunset Limited in Houston, Texas, and was en route to Florida at the time of her death. She did not travel through Arizona on the train.

Petrie filed the complaint in this case against CSX and Amtrak in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona on September 20, 1995.¹ In it, she alleges that CSX was negligent in various ways. Specifically, she complains that CSX failed to: (1) properly design, build, inspect, maintain, and protect the Bayou Canot bridge; (2) warn vessels of the presence of the bridge; and (3) warn the "Sunset Limited" of the structural damage that had been caused to the bridge by the MAUVILLA or its tow. None of the allegations relates in any way to CSX's alleged contacts with Arizona. In fact, the complaint does not allege that CSX had any contacts with Arizona. The only connection of this case to that state is that the plaintiff is an Arizona resident.

CSX filed its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in February 1996. The case was transferred to this court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in late February. At the time of transfer, the motion to dismiss was still pending. Briefing concluded on April 15, when CSX's reply brief was submitted.

Shortly after this case was transferred to this court, Petrie filed a new case in this court against CSX and Amtrak. See Civil Action No. 96-5113-RV-C. The new complaint is identical in all respects to the complaint in this case.

Discussion

CSX seeks dismissal of this case on the basis that the Arizona court lacked personal jurisdiction — specific or general — over it. In ruling on the motion, this court must apply the law that would be applied by the court in which the complaint was originally filed — in this instance, Arizona federal court. See, e.g., In re Duarte, California Air Crash Disaster on June 6, 1971, 354 F.Supp. 278, 279 (J.P.M.L.1973).²

Arizona law, the law of the forum state, governs the issue of personal jurisdiction in this case. Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir.1989). Under Arizona's long-arm provision, Arizona courts may exercise personal jurisdiction "over parties, whether found within or outside the state, to the maximum extent permitted by the ... Constitution of the United States." ARIZ.R.CIV.P. 4.2(a).³ Consequently, the only issue for the court to determine is "whether personal jurisdiction in this case would meet the requirements of the due process" clause of the United States Constitution. Brainerd, 873 F.2d at 1258. "Federal law is controlling on the issue of due process." Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir.1984) (citation omitted).

The Due Process Clause prevents a court from exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant unless that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that an exercise of jurisdiction does not offend "`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). "In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on `the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.'" Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1486, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)). The test is a flexible one, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).

The burden of establishing personal jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir.1990)). Where, as in this case, the district court receives only written evidentiary submissions, the court must determine if the plaintiff has presented a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 268 (9th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). Once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state, "a rebuttable presumption arises that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.... `The defendant bears the burden of ultimately proving that the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable.'" Tomar Electronics v. Whelen Technologies, 819 F.Supp. 871, 875 (D.Ariz.1992) (quoting Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1986)).

Personal jurisdiction may be established in either of two ways: the plaintiff may establish that the forum court has specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. at 2182 n. 15. "`Specific jurisdiction is asserted when the defendant's forum contacts are sporadic, but the cause of action arises out of those contacts. This distinction is a significant one because in order to assert general jurisdiction there must be substantial forum related activity on the part of the defendant.'" Tomar, 819 F.Supp. at 875 (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1067, at 296 (West 1987)).

General personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a non-resident defendant if that defendant's contacts with the forum are "continuous and systematic." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416-17, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1983). Under such circumstances, the assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend the Due Process Clause, even if the lawsuit does not arise out of, or relate to, the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Id. at 414, 104 S.Ct. at 1872. The rationale for exercising general jurisdiction is that a non-resident defendant that has such "continuous and systematic" contacts "`may in fact be said already to be "present" there.'" Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1977)).

A plaintiff has an especially heavy burden in seeking to establish general jurisdiction. See, e.g., Cubbage, 744 F.2d at 667-68 (no general jurisdiction over non-resident physicians despite considerable number of patients in forum, use of forum state's medical insurance system, and telephone listing that reached forum); Gates, 743 F.2d at 1330-31 (no general jurisdiction despite several visits and purchase in forum, significant communication with forum, and forum-selection clause favoring forum); see also Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993) (noting Supreme Court has upheld general jurisdiction only once).

Absent general jurisdiction, the court may assert specific jurisdiction over CSX, but only if this action sufficiently relates to, or arises out of, CSX's contacts with Arizona. Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 270. To establish specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff must to satisfy each of the following elements: (1) that CSX performed some act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arizona, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) that plaintiff's claims arise out of or result from CSX's activities in Arizona; and (3) that the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. Id.

Under the first of these elements, the defendant "`must have performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction or business within the forum state.'" Tomar, 819 F.Supp. at 875 (quoting Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990)).⁴ This requirement is "based on the presumption that it is reasonable to require a...