In re Application of Shelley

• Decision Date: 18 July 1925
• Docket Number: 25959
• Citation: 274 S.W. 688,309 Mo. 612
• Parties: IN MATTER of Application of EDITH SHELLEY for Blind Pension v. MISSOURI COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

274 S.W. 688

309 Mo. 612

IN MATTER of Application of EDITH SHELLEY for Blind Pension v. MISSOURI COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND, Appellant

No. 25959

Supreme Court of Missouri

July 18, 1925

Rehearing Granted, Reported at 309 Mo. 612 at 623.

Appeal from Greene Circuit Court; Hon. Guy D. Kirby, Judge.

Reversed.

C H. Skinker, Jr., for appellant.

The testimony of the oculists as to the meaning of the technical terms "light perception" and "greater than light perception" shows that there is no ambiguity about the meaning of these terms in their profession. They were nearly unanimous on the crucial proposition that the ability to see the direction of motion at one foot constituted vision "greater than light perception." State ex rel v. Gammon, 73 Mo. 426. When the Legislature uses technical terms, they should be given the meaning they have in the trade or profession to which the terms apply. State v. Murlin, 137 Mo. 297.

Thomas H. Gideon for respondent.

(1) The language of a statute should be given its plain and ordinary meaning where it has no special or technical meaning. Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 68. (2) All statutes that have a charitable or beneficent purpose should be given a liberal construction, such as the Blind Pension Statute. Dahlin v. Mo. Comm. for Blind, 262 S.W. 424; O'Dea v. Cook, 176 Cal. 659; Ryan v. Foreman, 181 Ill.App. 262, 262 Ill. 175; Straughan v. Meyers, 268 Mo. 580; Lusk v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 277 Mo. 264. (3) Where the language used in a statute is of doubtful import; or ambiguous and uncertain; or its literal meaning would lead to palpable injustice, contradiction or absurdity, the intention of the Legislature and purpose of the law must be looked to as the cardinal rule of construction. Dahlin v. Mo. Comm. for Blind, 262 S.W. 424; Gleason v. Board of Commrs., 92 Kan. 632; Grimes v. Reynolds, 94 Mo.App. 584; In re Bomino's Estate, 83 Mo. 441; Humes v. Ry. Co., 82 Mo. 227; Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 65; State ex rel. v. Corkins, 123 Mo. 66; State ex rel. v. Fields, 112 Mo. 558. (4) Light perception as used in the act, we construe to mean all that field or scope of vision from the mere ability to distinguish between light and darkness up to the ability to discern form; that is, when one is able to recognize the form of an object, such person has a greater vision than light perception. We do not believe the Legislature intended such a restricted and limited scope. Such a restricted and limited construction would for all practical purposes, render ineligible all those except the totally blind. Dahlin v. Mo. Comm. for Blind, 262 S.W. 424; 1 Schmidtmann's Handbook of Medico-Legal Medicine (9 Ed.) 564. (5) There is no discrimination against any class of deserving blind when Section 2 is properly and liberally construed. If any discrimination is made it would have to be made by an erroneous construction by the courts. Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 65.

OPINION

White, J.

Edith Shelley, the respondent, made application under the Act of 1923, Laws 1923, p. 302, to the Commission for the Blind, for a pension as a deserving blind person. Her application was rejected by the Commission for the reason that she "did not come under the purview of the blind pension law, Section 2" of the Blind Pension Act of 1923. She appealed to the Circuit Court of Greene County. The court heard the evidence, sustained the order of the Commission, and dismissed the application. The petitioner filed a motion for new trial which, June 30, 1924, the court sustained. The Commission then appealed from the order sustaining the motion, to this court. It was admitted by the attorney for the Commission that the applicant was in every way qualified to receive a pension as a blind person, except that the Commission did not admit that she was blind within the meaning of the law, because she had more than "light perception," as provided in said Section 2.

The trial court took evidence. The petitioner introduced "Exhibit B," a circular issued by the Missouri Commission for the Blind for the information of applicants and examiners which provided tests for determining who were the deserving blind. Among other things this circular contained the following:

"It will be very easy for the general physician to determine if the appellant's vision is better than light perception. If the applicant is seated before a well-lighted window, having his back to the light, then the examiner can move his hand up and down from right to left against a dark colored background (such as the examiner's dark clothes or some dark-colored surface).

" If the applicant can tell definitely the direction of the motion of the examiner's hand at two feet, he can see better than light perception and therefore is not eligible for a pension. If the contrary is so, or if there is doubt in the physician's mind as to the ability of the applicant to distinguish the movement of the hand at two feet, he should be classed as not seeing better than light perception and should be referred to the examining oculist. It is to be noted that vision in both eyes must be zero or light perception only in order that the applicant may be eligible to a pension."

The petitioner testified as follows:

"By Mr. Skinner: Q. Your sight is better in your left eye than your right eye? A. Yes sir.

"Q. You can count figures at a distance of one foot with your left eye, can you not? A. I can about that far (Witness indicating).

"Q. Can you see the direction of motion of the hand at one foot with your left eye? A. Yes, sir."

And after experts testified, she was recalled and testified as follows:

"By Mr. Gideon: Q. Can you see anything in front of your eyes (Attorney placing hand before witness's eyes? A. No, sir.

"Q. Can you distinguish this motion (Attorney passes hand before witness's eyes)? A. Just something going in front of me.

"Q. Can you count the fingers there? A. No, sir.

"Q. Can you see that (Attorney passing hand in front of witness's eye)? A. No, sir.

"Q. Can you count your fingers? A. I can that close (Witness indicating)."

Eight or nine oculists were summoned as witnesses and testified. The Commission in a letter to Dr. Coffelt, one of the witnesses, defined the degrees of blindness, as follows:

"It is perfectly apparent to every oculist that no absolute differentiation between the degrees of vision can be fixed, but in a general way all of us recognize the following classes:

"(a) Total and absolute blindness.

"(b) Perception of light.

"(c) Recognition of motion.

"(d) Recognition of form."

Dr. Coffelt testified that that was the proper classification of the degrees of blindness used in his profession. The oculist witnesses were practically unanimous in testifying that the perception of motion showed a greater degree of vision than light perception, and that a recognition of form showed a still greater degree of vision. A sample of such testimony is as follows:

"Q. Now, we want to find out what is meant by the words 'Light Perception' in your profession: I will ask you this question: would you say that a person who is able to see the direction of the motion of the human hand one foot from the eye, one foot in front of the eye, has greater vision than what is known in your profession as light perception? A. Yes sir.

"Q. The ability to count the fingers on the hand held at one foot in front of the eye would indicate still greater vision? A. Yes, sir."

Light perception was defined as ability to tell day from night; distinguish between a dark room and a light room; to cover the eye with the hand and take it away and tell whether it is light or dark; or to take a patient into a dark room, turn on the light, and if the patient can tell when the light is turned on he has light perception. Some of the oculists were asked if they were obliged to take the statement of the patient as to whether he could see in any certain degree. The answer was that the statement of the patient in determining motion and form would have to be relied upon to some extent, but there were tests by which they could tell whether the patient really did perceive. It was said that the pupil would react to light if the eye was not absolutely blind; that there were a number of well known tests by which the vision could be more or less determined.

The trial court held that, under Section 2 of the Blind Pension Act, which provides that no person shall be entitled to a pension who has vision greater than light perception, the petitioner was not entitled to a pension, and later sustained a motion for new trial after a ruling by the Springfield Court of Appeals in case of Dahlin v. Missouri Commission for the Blind, 262 S.W. 420, in which that court defined light perception in a way that would include vision such as that possessed by the petitioner here.

I. The appellant expresses some concern about the jurisdiction of this court. This court has jurisdiction of appeals whenever "any State officer is a party." The Missouri Commission for the Blind is provided for in Section 12360, Revised Statutes 1919, which authorizes the appointment of five persons constituting such commission. Undoubtedly the commissioners are State officers. The names of the individual commissioners do not appear as parties to this proceeding, but no question has been raised as to a defect of parties defendant. The Commission is a collective name for the individual commissioners who constitute the commission. The Commissioners are, therefore, in court. A correct petition for appeal to the circuit court from a ruling of the Commission would name the individual commissioners.

This situation is not to be confused with that in the case of State to use of Nee v. Gorsuch, 303 Mo. 295, where it was held that the jurisdiction of this court...