In re A.Y.C.
| Decision Date | 09 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 14-22-00361-CV |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF A.Y.C., A CHILD |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020-02304J
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.
MAJORITY OPINION
D.C ("Mother") and H.G.G. ("Father") appeal the trial court's Final Decree for Termination of their parental rights to their son A.Y.C ("Adam").[1] Mother contends in four issues that (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination of her parental rights pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) (D) and (E); (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the child's best interest; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it appointed the Department of Family and Protective Services (the "Department") as the sole managing conservator of the child. Father contends in five issues that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction "to sign a decree terminating the parental rights of" Father; (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination of his parental rights pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E) (N), and (O); and (3) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in the child's best interest. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Adam was born in Honduras in 2013. On December 5, 2020, when Adam was almost eight years old, the Department received a referral alleging sexual abuse of Adam by David Calderon. The referral also alleged as follows:
[T]he child was alleged to have been smuggled to the United States from Honduras also by Mr. Calderon. There are also allegations of physical abuse by Mr. Calderon and medical neglect. The child has been in three different homes since arriving to the United States. One being that of David Calderon, one being that of [Ms.] Portillo, and one being that of [Ms.] Manzanares. It is unknown how long [Adam] was in the care of Mr. Calderon. He was alleged to be with Ms. Portillo for approximately 22 days, and with Ms. Manzanares for approximately three days. Ms. Portillo allegedly received [Adam] from Mr. Calderon, who was supposed to be giving her money to keep [Adam]. Ms. Portillo met Ms. Manzanares at her church. Ms. Manzanares was called by Mr. Caldron and threatened to take [Adam] from Ms. Portillo, stating that another woman will be calling to meet her with the other kids and that she needs to appear with [Adam] at that time. Ms. Manzanares and her adult son reported this to the police and turned over [Adam] at that time to Child Protective Services.
On December 8, 2020, the Department filed its Original Petition for Protection of a Child for Conservatorship, and for Termination in a Suit Affecting the Parent- Child Relationship. That same day, the trial court signed an Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency, appointing the Department as emergency temporary sole managing conservator of the child. Adam was placed in a foster home.
On November 29, 2021, Mother and Father filed a Joint Counter-Petition in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship and Request for Temporary Orders, pleading for a return of the child to his parents.
The trial judge conducted a bench trial over three days, December 7, 2021, January 26, 2022 and February 25, 2022. Mother and Father appeared via WhatsApp with a certified Spanish interpreter; they were represented by their respective attorneys. The court heard testimony from the caseworker, Cali Crawford; the foster mother, C. Tanner; the supervisor, Yolanda Jenkins; another foster mother, D. Winger; the investigator, Karla Rodas; a cousin of Adam, Belki Hernandez; and Mother and Father.
On May 4, 2022, the trial court signed a "Final Decree for Termination." The court found that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was in the child's best interest and was justified under several subsections of section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. Mother's parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1) (D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). Father's parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) of the Texas Family Code. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O). The trial court appointed the Department to be the child's sole managing conservator. Mother and Father timely appealed.
Mother presents four issues on appeal, arguing that the (1) evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination of her parental rights pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) (D) and (E); (2) evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child's best interest; and (3) trial court abused its discretion when it appointed the Department to be the sole managing conservator of the child because the evidence is insufficient to support the appointment. Father presents five issues on appeal, contending that the (1) trial court lacked jurisdiction "to sign a decree terminating the parental rights of" Father; (2) evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support termination of his parental rights pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (N), and (O); and (3) evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in the child's best interest.
Considering that Mother and Father are foreign nationals living in their home country of Honduras and Adam is an undocumented foreign national from Honduras, we first address subject matter jurisdiction before turning to the parties' arguments on the merits.
"'A court may exercise only the jurisdiction accorded it by the constitution or by statute.'" Estate of Nicholas, No. 14-19-00716-CV, 2020 WL 1469519, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2020, pet. denied) (quoting Goodman v. Summit at W. Rim, Ltd., 952 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.)); Vantage Sys. Design, Inc. v. Raymondville Indep. Sch. Dist., 290 S.W.3d 312, 317- 18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied) (); Webb v. Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, No. 03-03-00764-CV, 2005 WL 3234580, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 2, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (subject matter jurisdiction refers to the kind of controversies a court has authority to hear-authority conferred by constitution or statutes).
Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed, cannot be conferred by consent or estoppel, and cannot be waived. See Wilmer-Hutchins Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan, 51 S.W.3d 293, 294 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. 2000); Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex. 1993). Even if not raised, issues affecting jurisdiction must be reviewed sua sponte. M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Gantt v. Gantt, 208 S.W.3d 27, 30 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
In his first issue, "Father challenges whether the trial court maintained subject matter jurisdiction, which granted authority to sign a decree terminating the parental rights of the appellant, a foreign national living in his home country of Honduras, and the child is an undocumented foreign national from Honduras." In that regard, Father "asserts the trial court should have allowed the federal authorities to hear this dispute as (1) the issues involved require the special competence of the agency, and (2) great benefit is derived from the agency's uniform interpretation of its laws and regulations." He also states: "Appellant argues DINAF was the appropriate governmental agency, which the appellant believed which could provide a remedy." Mother had filed an action with DINAF (Direccion de Niñez Adolescencia y Familia) in Honduras.
However, Father does not cite any applicable authorities nor does he present a clear and concise argument for his assertions as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) (requiring that an appellant's "brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record"). See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Nonetheless, as we explain below, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction in this case.
A district court's statutory authority for subject matter jurisdiction over suits involving child custody is found in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), as incorporated in the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 102.011, 152.201; Arteaga v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regul. Servs., 924 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied). The UCCJEA applies to a suit by the State to terminate parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(4) (); Arteaga, 924 S.W.2d at 760.
As relevant here, section 102.011(a) ("Acquiring Jurisdiction over Nonresident") provides: "The court may exercise status or subject matter jurisdiction over the suit as provided by Chapter 152." See Tex Fam. Code Ann. § 102.011(a). Further, section 152.201(a)(1) ("Initial Child Custody Jurisdiction") provides, as applicable here, that a Texas court has...
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